Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, JULY 18, 1942. A PACIFIC OFFENSIVE?

Wairarapa Times-Age, 18 July 1942, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, JULY 18, 1942. A PACIFIC OFFENSIVE?

A CCORDING to a cablegram, it was made clear at a meeting of the Pacific War Council, on Thursday that all fronts areone front. It would be extremely interesting to know whether this pronouncement indicates or implies that early offensive action in the Pacific is appealing to the supreme directors of Allied strategy, not only as a means of improving the war position and outlook on this side of the world, but as a step towards the defeat of the enemy in all theatres. During the last month or two there have been many demands for a strong Allied offensive in the Pacific, but until lately the ruling view, in Washington as well as in London, apparently has been that other war areas have prior claims to consideration. Only a few days ago, the Australian Minister of External Affairs (Dr Evatt) was quoted as expressing an emphatic opinion that if the offensive were not taken against Japan, that country would take the opportunity of attacking at some new point in the hope of extending her area of conquest. TJiis aspect of the position was touched upon interestingly in an article ‘written last month by Mr Joseph G. Harsch, staff correspondent of the “Christian • Science Monitor” in Australia. Maintaining that Australia had been preoccupied with its own security rather than with the opportunity offered for a counter-offensive, Mr Harsch observed that it was “hardly surprising that the outside world has been insufficiently impressed as to the opportunities existing here.” This is particularly tragic (he added) considering that the circumstances of this Pacific Ocean war make an offensive cheaper than a defensive action. Recent events throw this into focus. During the past week (the article was written on June 8) Japan • has been tapping the great girdle of Allied power which surrounds its dream of victory at four different and widely separated points—Australia’s eastern coast, China, Dutch Harbour, and Midway. Japan is completely surrounded by actual Allied fronts plus a potential Siberian front. Considering the forces available on both sides this is a circumstance which shows that neither side could possibly garrison securely at all points. Anywhere the advantage must go to the side which takes the initiative. Taking this view, Mr Harsch at the same time set due emphasis . on the need for adequate preparation find the use of adequate force—not least air force. Given a force 'of 2,000 combat planes, he observed, General MacArthur could almost certainly retake everything between Australia and Manila, but if planes were doled out gradually the same number might be lost by attrition, leaving the Allies no better off at the end than they are now. A powerful Allied offensive in the Pacific might do much to bring total victory nearer, not least by giving help that is greatly needed to China and to Russia. Action that would give relief to China evidently is much to be desired, not only for the sake of that heroic nation, but in order to open the way to punishing attack, by air and otherwise, on Japan. Then again,' it has been pointed out by the Chinese Minister of Information'(Mr Wang Shih-chieh) that “an Allied offensivelaunched from Australia, or a British attack in Burma, would have the same effect as a second front in Europe.” It certainly affects the outlook in the Pacific and should affect the determination of Allied strategy, that Japan is credibly reported to be preparing for an early attack on Russia. It is plainly very desirable, from the Allied standpoint, that the war plans of the Japanese in China and against Russia should be wrecked and that Japan should be attacked with vigour and relentlessly in her own territory. The case for an early and powerful Allied offensive in the Pacific appears in fact to be overwhelming.