VIEWS OF CRITICS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 3 July 1942, Page 3

VIEWS OF CRITICS

ATTACKS ON CENTRAL WAR DIRECTION TANKS & DIVE-BOMBERS. SIR R. KEYS CONDEMNS CHIEFS OF STAFF.

(By Telegraph—Press Association— Copyright) LONDON, July 1. Asking for co-ordination of the three services under a single commander, when he moved his no-confi-dence motion in the House of Commons, Sir John Wardlaw-Milne added, i “I think it would be a most desirable move, if the King and his Royal Highness agree, that the Duke of Gloucester be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Army.” This raised- an enormous outburst of laughter, amid which an Opposition member called, “That put the lid on it!” Sir John tried to continue, but he could not be heard amid continued laughter and jeering. The Speaker | finally restored order. Sir John added that it was clear that the serious disasters of the last few months and the last few years were due to a fundamental difficulty in the central administration of the war. A man claiming credit for successes, if any, must bear tKe responsibility for defeats. The greatest possible mistake was made when the Ministry of' Defence was attached to the enormous duties of the Prime Minister’s office, and a strong, independent man must be given charge of the three services. No Defence Minister in full knowledge of the facts as they were known today could have made Mr Churchill’s statement that we were on equal terms with the enemy in Libya; that statement was untrue.

WEAPONS OUTDATED. “What is the Government’s excuse for asking the workpeople to strive to the utmost to produce weapons which are already outdated?” Sir John asked. “What is the Government’s excuse for sending men into battle with the scales constantly against them? The surprise weapon which knocked out the Allied taizks a few days ago was used against Bilbao in 1937. Whatever the Commons decide, the country won’t be satisfied with the present state of affairs. I have no confidence in the general direction of the war, but if the necessary changes are made Britain’s stability will be unimpaired. “Tanks which were designed before the outbreak of the war are still being manufactured, and they are quite unequal to the Germans. We have been at war for nearly three years, and have had five Ministers of Supply. Each Minister of Supply appointed a new tank designer, but none had any pre? vious experience in tank, construction. Not a single officer or general at present sitting on the Tank Board has had recent experience in desert tank warfare. The various chairmen are suitably rewarded with knighthoods, and the board has met monthly for two hours.” Sir John stated that the Government had said that dive-bombers were ordered in July, 1940, and the War Office yesterday said the question was still being considered. If the Commons was satisfied with this answer there was not much hope for this assembly. “This

House has been soothed with rosy statements about the wonderful things we are going to do,” he cohtinued, “but it must decide whether it will merely be a packed assembly to receive humbly often inaccurate Government statements, or assert its determination to put things right without fear or favour. Criticism so far has been an offence, and almost regarded as a personal affront. This debate is a test of whether Parliament should function. Loyalty to the country comes before loyally to party.”

ALLEGED FAILURES.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes (Conservative), seconding the motion, said: “Because of our faihve to use oux amphibious power in the first Libyan campaign, when were able to strike with commandos against the enemy’s communications and island bases, we failed to knock Italy out of Africa before Germany was able to come to . her rescue. We again failed to use our amphibious power in the second Libyan campaign. I made four of the strongest possible representations to the War Cabinet between October, 1941, and January, 1942, offering to fly out in any humble capacity to help organise amphibious warfare. “The story that Mr Churchill rides roughshod over his Service advisers and takes the whole direction of the war in his own hands is not true. Was it conceivable that the man who was responsible for the Dardanelles cam* paign was blind to the immediate immense advantage of shortening the route to the Middle Eaast by capturing strategic positions in the Mediterranean and delivering surprise amphibious attacks against the enemy’s communications? Mr Churchill powerfully and insistently urged all these considerations, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved them in principle, but the war machine succeeding in producing so much obstruction that action was delayed for some months till the Germans forestalled us and introduced hazards which the Prime Minister did not feel able to face without the full support of his Chiefs of Staff, which was then denied to him.

“It is a tragedy that the war machine neglected to develop Crete’s aerodromes and defences, and the Admiralty’s failure to insist on properly-equip-ped naval air. service at Crete was deplorable, and placed the Navy under a cruel handicap. “It has happened that thrice in the Prime Minister’s career he should be thwarted in carrying out—in Gallipoli, Norway, and the Mediterranean—strategic strokes which might have altered the Avhole course of the two wars because his constitutional naval advisers declined to share the responsibility if it entailed risks. “In. addition to the unhappy Norway episode, there had been a flood of naval disasters —a sorry tale for which the Navy will never forgive the Admiralty. I believe the country and Navy would approve if Mr Churchill made longoverdue changes in the Admiralty,. as there is no confidence in the direction of the present regime. The Admiralty’s failure to provide the Mediterranean Fleet with the necessary naval air force after three years of war is utterly inexcusable. It is simply intolerable to watch our war machine lumbering from, disaster to disaster in the course of which thousands of young fighting men die or are taken prisoner because they are using equipment that is inferior to the enemy’s, ,and lack the type of air support which the Army and Navy need, and because the Air Ministry is always obsessed with the

idea that they will win the war alone and neglected to develop naval and military aviation. LOOKING TO CHURCHILL. “I would like to see Mr Churchill head a real National Government, not formed, as the present one, by compromise, and to placate political interests. It contains Ministers who have neither the courage to rule nor the ability to lead. ... It would be a disaster if Churchill were forced to go. We are on the eve of another Battle for Britain. We look to Churchill to put our house in order, and rally the country once again to its immense task.” 1 ! Tl■■' '' ‘ ' '■& 4 IWfs£J7I3fiSIEI NEW LEADERSHIP URGED. Earl Winterton (Conservative), in an outspoken speech, said that the responsibility for the defeats was very largely, but not entirely, that of the Government and Mr Churchill. If the series of disasters continued, he would not want to see the Government as a whole fall, but he hoped the Prime Minister would, by one of the greatest acts of self-sacrifice and self-abnega-tion, suggest to his colleagues that one of them should form a Government and that he himself should take office in it. Asked whether satisfactory reports had been received of the tanks sent to Russia, Sir Stafford Cripps nodded assent. Mr W. Gallacher (Communist) said Sir John Wardlaw-Milne was really trying to undermine Mr Churchill’s position. The disaster in Libya was serious. The feeling of the country was not lack of confidence in the Prime Minister, but in the higher command of the Army.

DEBATE IN LORDS PRIME MINISTER'S AUTHORITY. SUPPORTED BY BEAVERBROOK. (By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright) LONDON, July 1. In the House of Lords, Lord Beaverbrook, former Minister of Production, speaking from an Opposition bench, said that when the Government came into office fighters and bombers were absolutely essential to the life of the country, and we were not prepared at that time to divert production to divebombers. Orders were placed in the United States, but there had been, disappointment. He would say without hesitation that the British had more tanks in Libya than the enemy. The policy of tanks for Russia had not interfered with tanks for Libya or Singapore. Referring to the suggestion that the office of Prime Minister should be separate from that of Minister of Defence, Lord Beaverbrook declared that if this were done, indecision would be substituted for decision, and if members wanted delays and disputes, that was the way to get them. On the Prime Minister must rest the final decisions for the conduct of the war, and final decisions for strategy must also be his.

MOTION LAPSES

IN LATE NIGHT SITTING. BUT IS MOVED AGAIN. LONDON, July 2. Back-benchers last night continued the debate in the Commons, chiefly concentrating on why we do not have dive-bombers, why the three Services did not co-operate as one, and why we are never one jump ahead of the Germans. Eventually, in the early hours of the morning, the House adjourned for want of a quorum, after its longest war time sitting. The Parliamentary correspondent of “The Times” points out that when the House was counted out, owing to fewer than 40 members being present, the censure motion automatically lapsed. The House resumed later this morning, when Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, in order to allow the continuance of the debate, moved his motion again, and it was seconded by Mr Aneurin Bevan. Mr Bevan said he thought the main strategy of the war had been wrong the wrong weapons had been produced and these weapons were being managed by men who were not trained. in the use of them and had not studied or used modern weapons. None, he said, had thought of this war in terms of the last more than had Mr Churchill. The Ministers responsible for the failure to rearm were still in the Government and supported by Mr Churchill. Mr Bevan urged that Mr Churchill should create machinery at the top of the war direction for following through his own ideas. There should be drastic reforms in the Army and the Secretary for War should be changed. Finally, Mr Bevan begged the. Government, when it made its decision to attack the enemy nearer home, to make it out of consideration of strategical propriety and not political propaganda. Nevertheless the decision must not be postponed till next year.