Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1942. ALLIED OFFENSIVE POLICY.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 24 June 1942, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age W EDNESDAY, JUNE 24 , 1942. ALLIED OFFENSIVE POLICY.

AS might have been expected in view of the gravity and magnitude ol’ the issues with which President .Roosevelt and Mr Churchill arc dealing, the joint statement they have issued on the progress of their discussions, though it. is definite enough as far*as it goes, is not very revealing. The object in view, the leaders state, x is the earliest maximum concentration of Allied war power on the enemy, or reviewing and where necessary further concentrating on, measures which for some time past have been on foot to develop and sustain the effort of the United Nations. This is unexceptionable, but can hardly be called infoimatite, nor, of course, is it to be desired that any indication should be given at this stage of the conditions in which it is proposed to bring the earliest maximum concentration of war power to bear on the enemy. The President and Mr Churchill have, however, not only discounted and discredited unofficial suimises as to the course of their discussions, but have disposed specifically of one of the boldest of these surmises the allegation cabled from London a couple of days ago that, with the secret talks in Washington in their third day, there were indications of “a divergence between the British and American viewpoints, not regarding fundamentals, but the timing 01. action. This divergence is denied flatly by President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill in their declaration that: “Complete understanding and harmony exist between all concerned in facing the vast and grave tasks that lie ahead.” It remains still to be seen how far the advocates' of early and powerful offensive action by the Allies are to have their way, though here it has to be remembered that Britain and the United States are pledged to the establishment of a second front this year. The most explicit official statement yet made on this subject was that of M. Molotov, when he told the Supreme Soviet a few days ago that “the question of a second front had been carefully considered in both London and Washington and complete agreement had been reached regarding its formation in 1942.” Vital details, amongst them those of time and place, no doubt will only be made known when action is taken, but in view of the agreement reached and declared, talk of a divergence of British and American views regarding offensive action was rather obviously wide of the mark even before the joint statement of President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill 'had scotched the latest unofficial surmise on the subject. Arguments that have been used freely in general discussion in the United States in recent months in favour of vigorous and powerful offensive action, by the Allies were summed up by Mr Roscoe Drummond in an article in the “Christian Science Monitor.” There is a considerable feeling, he wrote, that Germany is now in a weaker strategic and more attackable position than Japan and that America, Britain and Russia, uniting their efforts, can wrest the initiative from the Nazis and force Hitler into a dangerous dispersal of strength. . . . The growing opinion is that offence is the minimum defence that will be adequate, that both Germany and Japan must be struck at the centre and not merely at the circumference of their military action. There is no escape from the conclusion that the remaining hopes of Nazi Germany are contingent upon her ability to defeat and overwhelm Russia. It therefore follows that action which ■would compel Germany to divide her strength in a war on two fronts and to weaken her attack on Russia would be a positive and promising contribution to ultimate Allied victory. The only question that, is open in this matter concerns ■ the extent to which the Allies are prepared and able to take hold of the opportunity by which undoubtedly they are faced.