Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, MAY 26, 1942. CHINA AS OFFENSIVE BASE.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 26 May 1942, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, MAY 26, 1942. CHINA AS OFFENSIVE BASE.

yyiTII elements of watching and waiting still involved in the conduct of the war in a number of Pacific areas, it is natural that keen interest should be taken, not least in the South Pacific Dominions, in the fighting which is now developing on a considerable scale in the Chinese coastal provinces of Chekiang and Fukien, which extend south from Shanghai. The Japanese are now throwing considerable forces into these provinces in an effort, it is stated, to cut the Chinese off from all access to the sea and to tie up Chinese troops which might otherwise be sent to the western province of Yunnan, to oppose the Japanese drive up the Burma Road. At the same time, air bases from which the Chinese might attack Japanese cities have been bombed. ■

Ono of the principal objects the Japanese have in view in their offensive operations in Chekiang and Fukien no doubt is to prevent Allied air attacks on Japan from bases in Eastern China. They would be able also greatly to improve their land communications with Burma if they could gain effective control over the whole Chinese coastline south of Shanghai. This control. however, they have never yet obtained and they will not easily establish it now. Japan, as an American observer wrote recently, has blockaded the coast south of Shanghai, “but aside from intermittent raids and temporary occupations, has never taken military possession of many of the small unfrequented ports.” Even in what is classed as occupied China, the Japanese rely on more or less widely separated garrisons and fortified outposts. Chinese guerilla and other forces operate freely in areas between some of the Japanese strongholds and at times attack these strongholds. About the potential value and importance of China as a base for attack on Japan proper and on the enemy bases of Formosa and Hainan Island there can be no doubt whatever. The principal difficulty to be overcome by the Allies in developing offensive operations from China of course is that of supply. China' now has a. well-trained army, said to number five million men, backed by ample reserves, but for want of aircraft, heavy equipment and other supplies in adequate volume, the activities .of this army are restricted within rather narrow limits. Discussing the possibilities the situation holds, a correspondent in Chungking stated recently that in the opinion of high military authorities the use of the many potential bombing bases in,Eastern China which could be used to pave the way for the invasion of Japan is not now feasible because these bases are only lightly defended by Chinese guerillas and would be subject to immediate Japanese offensives and air attacks. This, no doubt, is very much the situation that is developing at the moment in Chekiang and Fukien. To make Chinese bases ’available for air attacks on Japan, the correspondent added, a concerted Allied offensive is necessary, with abundant aircraft in China to assist in wiping out thinly strung Japanese loops thrown along the main railway communication lines in North China. Regular Chinese troops could then sweep back into the large enclosed areas which the Japanese never really have occupied. Supply of these bases would be difficult, but, perhaps, not insurmountable. A great deal evidently depends on the ability of the Allies to carry out the policy of collaboration with China thus outlined. There are tremendous difficulties to be overcome, but the position of the Japanese also is difficult. The Chinese claim that at present they are holding down, throughout their invaded territories, Japanese forces totalling 800,000 men. The Japanese would have to employ very much greater strength in opposing a serious effort by the Allies to establish, supply, and use air bases in China. As in the past, the Japanese, no doubt are capable of occupying and garrisoning particular areas, but they would have to achieve vastly more than that in order effectively to dominate, not only the whole eastern coastline of China, but areas further inland in which bases for air attack on their homeland and on Formosa and Hainan Island might be established.