Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 18, 1942. WITHDRAWAL IN BURMA.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 18 April 1942, Page 2

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 18, 1942. WITHDRAWAL IN BURMA.

ALTHOUGH it is not unexpected, news that the British forces X in Burma have withdrawn beyond the first of three oilfields in that country is unwelcome and disturbing. Jtxcii to the nontechnical observer it is plain that there is much to suggest that any effort of which the Allies are capable towards reversing the present unfavourable trend of the campaign in Burma would be well worth while.

It has been recognised from the outset that Burma, held, in adequate and growing strength by the Allies, would be 01. tremendous value as a base for offensive action both by land and air. At present, however, British and Chinese forces, heavily outnumbered, are reduced to fighting delaying actions as they retreat northward through the great Burmese river valleys.

Having taken Rangoon and occupied Lower Burma, the Japanese are throwing heavy additional forces into the scale in an effort to gain further great strategic advantages. Not only are they within short striking distance of the rest of the Burmese oilfields —the last source of supply left to the Allies in South-Eastern Asia—-but they have made a dangerously close approach to lateral road and other communications which would enable them to bring men and supplies across Siam from the port of Bangkok, shortening their present sea and land communications with Burma by some 2,000 miles.

A successful continued development of the Japanese offensive on these lines would not only intensify the threat to India, but would be immensely damaging to the Allies in other ways. One great aim of the Japanese is to outflank China and isolate her from other Allied countries by cutting the Burma Road before the new route through Assam can be brought into use. It has been suggested, too, and the suggestion definitely is one to be considered, that if they achieve this measure of success in Burma, the Japanese may defer for the time being attacks on India and Australia, and direct their main energies into an attack on Russia from Manchuria. Bearing in mind that they have a powerful army posted on the Manchurian border, there is perhaps no way in which they could co-operate more effectively with Germany in her much-heralded spring offensive.

Whatever the enemy plans may be, great issues visibly are in the balance in Burma. If they are able to introduce adequate air and other reinforcements in time, the Allies will maintain contact with China and retain a valuable base for offensive action irrespective of what the enemy may next attempt or undertake. If, on the other hand, the Japanese are able to continue their northward drive through Burma, they will be advantageously placed either for further offensive action to the west or south, or both, or for making a defensive stand in SouthEastern Asia while they strike at Russia.