WAR STRATEGY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 20 February 1942, Page 3

WAR STRATEGY

f CAPT. MARGESSON SURVEYS POSITION DIFFICULTIES OF LIBYAN FIGHTING. TANK AND ANTI-TANK GUNS. (British OfTicial Wireless.) (Received This Day, 10.22 a.m.) RUGBY, February 19. The Secretary of State for War, Captain H. D. R. Margesson, presenting the army estimates in the House of Commons said that since no details of what exactly happened in the Malayan campaign or of British casualties had yet reached him he did not now propose to discuss that campaign. As soon as any information was received it would immediately be made public. Turning to the Libyan battle the Minister’ said the ebb and flow bewildered an onlooker. He could not say how far our latest reverses had been due to tactical considei’ations but said: “I do know the difficulties the staff have had to contend with in keeping troops in forward areas supplied with food, water, ammunition, petrol, etc., have been colossal. In the desert there is no continuous front line. Our forward troops are sometimes as much as thirty miles in front of their railhead. The House would readily understand from this that the number of troops that could be maintained in a forward area to attack General Rommel’s strongly defended positions at Agheila or resist any counter-attack that might be made against them was strictly limited by the amount of supplies that could be brought forward over hundreds of miles of desert. As General Rommel retreated onto his supply dumps, his maintenance difficulties became less, although his total forces had been considerably weakened. Thus, owing to supply difficulties, although we had a total force stronger than the enemy, this advantage was counteracted by our not being able to maintain in the forward line of battle a force sufficiently strong to drive the enemy from his defended position, covering his reinforcement of supplies or to withstand a counterstroke which the enemy, refreshed with new materials was able to launch against these light forces which were all we are able to maintain until once again we are able to use Benghazi as a base. Captain Margesson then dealt with certain criticisms of the efficiency of British tanks. Before 'the war, he said Britain’s tank and the two-pounder anti-tank gun were, without doubt, the best in the world. The gun’s . worth was shown in the battles preceding the Dunkirk evacuation. The Wai’ Office knew that the success of this gun would be countered by the enemy using heavier armour and a more powerful gun, so before the war a tank and anti-tank gun of greater hitting power was designed. However, if, after heavy material losses suffered at Dunkirk, some of the two-pounder capacity had been turned over to the production of a new design, the total output of tanks and guns would have been slowed down at a time when invasion was threatened and when the army practically was without equipment. *’ Thus it was necessary to rely entirely on new capacity for the production of a larger and more powerful weapon. This new capacity was secured and the manufacture of a new gun is proceeding apace. We are working on the production of a stR larger tank and an anti-tank gun with even greater penetrating power.