FALL OF SINGAPORE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 19 February 1942, Page 3

FALL OF SINGAPORE

CORRESPONDENT’S SURVEY CRITICISM OF DEFECTIVE ORGANISATION. ENEMY'S AIR SUPERIORITY. (By Telegraph—Press Association —Copyright) LONDON, February 17. The Singapore correspondent of “The Times,” in a dispatch from Batavia, asks, “Why did Singapore fall?” and states: “Following is an attempt to explain—but not explain away—what happened. “First, Singapore was never a fortress, but was a potential naval base. Its whole significance depended on certain unfulfilled, or partially-fulfilled conditions, the chief of which was the Allies’ ability to produce enough ships and aeroplanes to operate from the base and keep the Japanese several hundred miles away. The ‘fortress’ concept arose from loose thinking when our propagandists were trying to keep the Japanese from war by making them think we were stronger than we were. “Secondly, the majority of our troops had participated in a long, exhausting and thoroughly dispiriting withdrawal for over 500 miles. Many of our best units suffered heavily in the fighting on the mainland. The single Argyll battalion engaged lost 80 per cent of its men and the Ghurkka casualties were even heavier. Remnants of the last Surreys and Leicesters, who took the brunt of the attack at Kedah, were early amalgamated into the so-called British Battalion. Two

Australian battalions were badly cut up at Muar, and the Australians also lost heavily in other sectors. TROOPS ILL PREPARED. “Thirdly, many of the white troops —the Australians were conspicuous exceptions —never seemed physically up to the mark. Some had been too long in the tropical climate and had gone soft, and others were unaccustomed to the climate or the terrain. One brigade plunged straight into the jungle fighting in Johore three days after landing after an 11 weeks’ sea voyage. “Fourthly, the troops whose duty it was to repel the Japanese in the sector where they landed were subjected after three days to a crescendo of shelling, the bombardment reaching its climax on the evening of February 8, when, after four hours, Japanese light,

medium and heavy guns fired at machine-gun tempo. The Japanese also had the advantage of continuous aerial observation. “Fifthly, the enemy’s complete aerial ascendancy had a big effect in the fighting and a bigger effect on morale, especially that of the Indians.” Only one thing oould have transformed this state of affairs—dynamic, able leadership. The general showing the greatest qualities of leadership was Major-General Bennett. Though hard, bitter, sarcastic and difficult, he was a fighter through and through, imbued like his men with an aggressive, offensive and unconventional spirit. The other generals lacked this vital spark. The absence of forceful leadership at the top made itself felt from the top downward. The morale of the men was potentially good. Something was lacking to crystallise and co-ordinate it, infuse it with fire and confidence. The same lack of dynamism characterised the upper ranks of the civilian administration.

ASIATICS WHO LEFT. Except for certain sections of the Chinese community—some inspired by free China’s struggle, others by Soviet precept and example —the bulk of the Asiatic population remained spectators from start to finish. Their inclination was to get as far as possible from the hostilities in Singapore. This caused acute labour difficulties. Bomb craters in airfields were not filled because no Asiatics and not enough Europeans were available for the work of the labour force. Twelve thousand Asiatics were employed at the naval base early in the war but only 800 were now reporting for duty. There was no native laboui - at the docks and soldiers had to be taken from their military duties for loading and unloading ships. Many small ships which could have evacuated many thousands from Singapore were immobilised in the harbour because the native crews had deserted and there were not enough Europeans to man them.