CHOICE OF RISKS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 18 February 1942, Page 4

CHOICE OF RISKS

ESCAPE OF NAZI WARSHIPS FROM BREST BRITISH PRIME MINISTER'S , OBSERVATIONS. SOME POINTS OF CRITICISM ANSWERED. (British Official Wireless.) (Received This Day, 11-35 a.m.) RUGBY, February 17. Speaking in the House of Commons of the escape of the German warships from Brest, the British Prime Minister (Mr Churchill) said that in the Allan-’ tic the enemy vessels would have run a greater risk of being attacked by air, extensive reconnaissances from the shore and from aircraft-carriers, being slowed down by torpedo attacks, or brought to action against overwhelming forces, as was the Bismarck. The Channel route, on the other hand, was a run of under 24 hours, part of which could be made in darkness, possibly by surprise, and they had the opportunity of choosing the weather which would be most favourable. On the whole way through the Channel and along the Dutch coast they had the advantage of a powerful air umbrella. The danger of running past the Dover batteries, under suitable weather conditions, was not great. “Our slow convoys,” Mr Churchill continued, “repeatedly traverse the Straits of Dover and are repeatedly bombarded by guns on the French coast, but this has not stopped our convoys.*One great danger was mines. This they might hope to avoid by energetic sweeping. There remained, therefore, the action of surface craft and aircraft. Air reconnaissance would show the Germans that neither heavy cruisers nor even light cruisers were in the narrow Straits and that therefore the attacks of flotillas of destroyers and of small torpedo-boats were all that need be expected, apart from air attack. Some people seemed to think that heavy forces should have been stationed so as to have been able to intercept them in the Channel or North Sea. Had we done so, our ships would have been open to the same scale of attack as the German ships at Brest. Further, such dispositions would have dangerously weakened the preventive measures we have taken to safeguard convoys, guard the northern passage and deal with other German heavy ships. The Admiralty did not consider that an attempt to run the Channel would be an impossible operation under the conditions which prevailed, but this certainly was much less apprehended than that they should break 'out on to the trade routes or into the Mediterranean. No one can doubt the vigour and courage with which the enemy squadron was attacked as soon as its movement was perceived, and of course everyone is very sorry that these these ships were not sunk. The only questions which are open are: “(1) Why was their movement not detected shortly after daylight? “(2) Was contact and liaison between the Coastal Command and also between other R.A.F. Commands and the Admiralty as close as it should have been?” Mr Churchill then stated, as reported in an earlier message, that at the suggestion of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry he had ordered an inquiry.