AID FOR RUSSIA

Wairarapa Times-Age, 28 January 1942, Page 3

AID FOR RUSSIA

SUPPLIES OF MANY KINDS SENT EVERYTHING ASKED FOR. DECISION OF MAJOR STRATEGY AND POLICY. (British Official Wireless.) (Received This Day, 9.20 a.m.) . RUGBY, January 27. Mr Churchill then went on to survey the war situation, saying: “Three or four months ago we had to cope with the following situation: The German invaders were advancing and blasting their way through Russia. The Russians were resisting with the utmost heroism, but no one could tell what would happen. No one could tell whether Leningrad, Moscow or Rostov would fall or where the German winter line would be established. No one can tell where the German winter line will be established now but now the boot is on the other foot. We are all agreed that we must aid the valiant Russian armies to the utmost limit of our powers. His Majesty’s Government thought and Parliament, upon reflection, agreed that the best aid we could | give Russia was in supplies of many kinds of war materials and munitions', particularly tanks and aircraft. . Our forces at home and abroad had for a long time been waiting thirstily for these weapons. At last they are coming to hand in large number at home. We had always the danger of invasion to consider and to prepare against. We sent Premier Stalin, for that is how I understand he wishes to be addressed, that is the form in which he telegraphed me—we sent him exactly what he ( asked for. A whole quantity was promised and sent, but there is, I am sorry to say, a small lag due to bad weather, but it will be made up in the early days of February and thereafter deliveries will be strictly maintained. This is a decision of major strategy and policy. No one can say but that it is right to-put it first, when they watched the powerful achievement unhoped for and undreamed of by us. We little knew the Russian strength but that made it all the more glorious. Our munitions were of course only a contribution to the Russian victories, but they were an encouragement in Russia’s darkest hour. “Moreover if we had not shown a loyal effort to help our ally, albeit at heavy sacrifice to ourselves, I do not think our relations with Premier Stalin and his great country would be as good as they are now. There would have been a lack of comradeship which might have spread to reproaches on all sides. Far from regretting what we did I can only wish it had been in our power to have done more. Three or four months ago, at a time when the German advance was rolling onwards, we were particularly concerned with the possibility of the Germans forcing the Don River, the capture of Rostov, the invasion of the Caucasus and the reaching of the Baku oil wells before winter by the panzer spearhead of the German army. Everyone knows the deep anxiety that was in our breasts. Such an advance would have involved the destruction of the Russian fleet and the loss of the command of the Black Sea. It would have affected the safety of Turkey and it would, in due course, have exposed to the gravest danger Persia, Iraq, Syria and Palestine and, beyond those countries,” all of which is now under our control. It would have cut the Suez Canal and imperilled Egypt and the Nile Valley. At the same time, as this menace defined itself, General Rommel, with his army of ten German and Italian divisions, entrenched in forti- , tied positions at and behind Halfaya Pass, was preparing to make a decisive attack on Tobruk, as a preliminary to an advance on Egypt from the west. The Nile Valley was therefore menaced simultaneously by a direct attack from the west and by the more remote, but in some way more deadly attack, from the north. In such circumstances it is a classical rule of war, reinforced to some extent by endless examples, that you prepare to fight a delaying action against one of these two attacks and concentrate, if possible, overwhelming strength against the other and nearer.”