AID TO RUSSIA

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 October 1941, Page 2

AID TO RUSSIA

BRITONS DEBATE DIVERSION PLAN A CONFLICT OF OPINION SCOPE OF AMERICAN HELP. In view of the impatience generally expressed in Britain over the Government’s failure hitherto to take advantage of Russian resistance to the Nazis by creating a diversion in the West—an impatience voiced only recently inthe editorial columns of “The Times”— much speculation has been aroused by an exclusive article on the subject in a London evening paper by no less a person than War Minister David Margesson himself, states an article in the “Christian Science Monitor.” What caused the Minister to seek to guide public opinion by an exclusive contribution to a newspaper? The effect of the article seemed to be to discount the likelihood of Britain’s attempting an immediate attack on Germany from the west. At the same time, others read into Captain Margesson’s words a hint that Britain is gathering itself for such action. Speaking of the forces needed to guard against eventualities, he said: “We shall keep here no more —but no less than needed. I leave the enemy to find out, as he will find out by unpleasant experience, what we shall do with the surplus.” The nearest approach to elaboration on the last observation was “the quicker we get the hammers, the harder we shall hit.”

Meanwhile the public here feels that the Germans are advancing upon their objectives in Russia faster than winter is advancing upon them, and that what was hailed as a golden opportunity to make the Nazis fight on two fronts may pass if something ambitious is not undertaken . soon to strengthen the Soviet’s hand. NAZI FORCES SCATTERED. The Germans, it is generally believed, have substantially reduced their military forces in the occupied countries. It is said that they have only about 25 divisions available in these regions, and that only one or two of them are full armoured formations. Yet 25 Nazi divisions means somewhere around 500,000 men, while to land only one British armoured division on the continental coast guarded by mines, guns, aeroplanes, submarines, surface craft, and troops would involve the diversion of a very considerable number of ships from the vital work of maintaining the fullest possible flow of supplies from the United States, Canada, and various other parts of the Empire to Britain, Russia, and the Middle East. Moreover, although American help in the shape of warplanes and other armaments is beginning to flow to this country, it is a mere trickle compared with what it is expected to be later. In two years, for example, the United States has provided Britain with no more aeroplanes than the factories here can turn out in a few weeks. American manufacturers, too, have not yet been able to bridge the time lag between designers’ drawing board and flying field, which makes some of the aeroplanes almost out of date before they come into action. As far back as July last year Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Junr., announced that America was going to turn out 300 aeroplanes a week by the beginning of January, 1941. In actual fact by January Britain had only received a total of 424 craft. About the same time William S. Knudsen, Director of the United States Office of Production Management, declared that America could manufacture 33,000 aeroplanes by July, 1942, and that the British Empire’s share would be 1400 a month.

However, Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Supply, announced on August 15 that “altogether 2200 aircraft have been received from America, of which about 1.200 have been put to use.” This announcement was followed by President Roosevelt’s recent disclosure that America’s total monthly output of anti-aircraft guns—a far simpler manufacturing proposition than aeroplanes —was 69, and of anti-tank guns, 72. It is hot doubted here that ultimately American production will get into top gear, but at its present rate it may well cause the British authorities to hesitate a large-scale invasion of the Continent. The British people are more impressed by the Knudsen announcement that a record of 1854 military aircraft had actually been produced by American manufacturers in August, an increase of 354 over July’s figure, than by the news that a proportion of the new four-engined Flying Fortresses are to come to Britain. However, millions of men are under arms in this country, several armoured divisions are trained, and equipped sufficiently to do a fine job in action ■if only a foothold could be obtained in . Western Europe. Moreover, there is no reason to doubt that the Royal Air Force could establish local sky superiority to cover a landing. REDUCTION IN GARRISONS. If, as reported, the Germans have drastically reduced their garrisons in the occupied countries to second-line infantry, the Nazi High Command has obviously satisfied itself that the British cannot take any offensive action yet on a scale that would exercise a significant influence on the course of events in the east. The Germans themselves have admitted that the present air establishment in the west does not permit heavy operations against Britain., There may be relatively undefended i aerodromes in Norway, France, Belgium, and Holland which the British could attempt to seize with good prospects of success if they are ready for such undertaking with parachutists and air-borne infantry. Norway in particular seems open to attack. Perhaps this is why the Germans recently stressed Norway’s “invulnerability.” They boast that Norway is invasion proof now that the “Falkenhorst Line” is completed between Kristiansand and Trondheim. Observers in Stockholm say, however, that a landing on the Norwegian coast is quite feasible, and that the number of Nazi defenders immediately available is fewer than 100,000. LANDINGS POSSIBLE. It is pointed out that the Nazi announcements may have been made in an attempt to convince the restive j Norwegians that they cannot expect' help from Britain. British military authorities base their own defence plans on the assumption that the Germans with their limited

naval resources may be able to effect a landing here, though destined for subsequent destruction. It is therefore a fair inference that the same authorities believe that the British could land on the Continent, where the possibilities of surprise are multiplied by the length of the coast line. So it is deduced either that the British feel they cannot spare enough men to consolidate a position thus gained, or that they cannot command enough shipping for base transport problems. Shifting a whole armoured division overseas is a prodigious operation. The alternative mode of attack is obviously to make harassing raids, probing for weak spots, and exploiting them; to the utmost.