Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1941. MR CHURCHILL ON CRETE.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 12 June 1941, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1941. MR CHURCHILL ON CRETE.

£.\ replying In criticisms in the House ot Commons nJ' the eomlit ions in which Ihe Hal Ileol < Tele was I ought crif icisms directed particularly al the failure to equip and defend aerodromes in the island —Mr Churchill pointed out that lull explanations could not he given without revealing \aluable information to I lie enemv. A vreal many people probably will be of opinion that in spilt' of this handicap, the British Prime Minister effect ivelv answered and disposed ol Ihe principal contentions of the critics to whom he replied. Whore justification for the Battle of Crete being fought is concerned, two considerations advanced by Mr Churchill stand out as of commanding importance. One is that the British Empire and its allies have been and still are under the necessity of carrying on the war with a much smaller volume of many kinds of equipment Ilian could be desired. The other is that, Hie defence of Crete gained invaluable time and deranged the enemy’s plans. On the last-mentioned point. Mr Churchill sa id :— Suppose we had never intended to defend Crete. How would the Germans be now? Might not they, at this early stage of the campaign of 1941, already be masters of Syria and Iraq and preparing themselves for an advance into Persia? For the reason he himself presented in an opening passage of his speech—that valuable information must, be withheld from the enemy —tho British Prime Minister did not present all the facts upon which an assessment must be based. Assuming, however, that the enemy’s plans have in fact been thrown out of gear to the extent suggested (and there is a good deal to indicate I hat they have) tho final verdict of necessity will have to be that there is a great deal to set against the grievous losses suffered by our land forces and by the Navy in the defence of Crete. So far as shortages of vital equipment are concerned, there is little more to bo said than that whatever blame is to be apportioned in this matter belongs not to the present British Government,, but to its predecessors who allowed Nazi Germany to build up and elaborate unchecked her tremendously formidable military machine. Against, the inertia of these past, governments, Mr Churchill, as everyone knows, was an earnest, and untiring crusader. Disregarding what is now beyond recall, immense importance attaches to the extent to which Germany’s plans of aggression in the Middle East have been disorganised by the defensive and delaying battles fought in Greece and in Crete. As to the position now reached, the British Prime Minister lias been careful to encourage no undue optimism. While he spoke of the advance into Syria, as having been crowned, so far, with remarkable success and of the campaign in defence of the Middle East, as having prospered, so far, beyond all expectation, he also said that this campaign was now entering upon an even more intense and critical phase, and that “they must not give way to jubilations when engaged in operations of such difficulty and when the reactions of the Germans still remained obscure.’’ Paying due regard to these cautionary observations, it is to be noted that there is a distinct possibility that had the Germans been given a walk-over in Crete they would by this lime have been established strongly in Syria and Iraq. It is of interest, too, that an authority of high standing on air warfare has stated that unless the Germans are able to establish themselves in Syria, which might entail in the first place the conquest of Cyprus, they will no longer be able to pursue the tactics of air aggression, at short range on which they have relied hitherto and by means of which they have gained important successes.

Tn Crete, the authority in question points out, the Germans have captured a base .from which they will be able to make increasingly formidable attacks on British and Allied shipping in. the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, so long as they can be excluded from Cyprus and Asia Minor, and Turkey can maintain her neutrality, the Germans will be no longer in a position to make short-range air attacks on new and vital objectives in the Middle East. This 4n itself is encouraging, hut the hopes raised of course are contingent upon the Allies establishing and maintaining a completely effective hold on Syria and neighbouring territories and repelling whatever attacks the Germans may make on Cyprus.

The possibility is not to be overlooked that the enemy may be able to add to his air and other forces in Libya. Tn that theatre, however, he is handicapped by heavy difficulties of sea, land and air transport and it seems likely that these difficulties in great part would remain even if the Germans gained an increased control over the French North African colonies west of Libya. The all-important question meantime raised is that of an effective military masterv over Svria.