Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1941. WITHDRAWAL FROM CRETE.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 2 June 1941, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1941. WITHDRAWAL FROM CRETE.

ALTHOUGH wars are not won by withdrawals, it may be hoped that no small contribution to ultimate victory lias been made in the defence of Crete by British, Imperial and Greek troops in twelve days of battle against perhaps the most desperate odds that have ever been faced in any theatre of war The heroic defence of the island has now concluded with the withdrawal of 15.00(1 British ami Imperial troops, accompanied. it is reported, by their eommander-iu-ehief, MajorGeneral Freyberg. whom the Germans had erroneously reported to be dead. News of the withdrawal will be received in this country and in other parts of the Empire with profound relief. Much as that relief is mingled with grief for those who have 1 alien in twelve da"s of unprecedented battle, or have been lost in the process of withdarawal, the danger has been in plain sight of late that the whole of the forces defending Crete might tall into the hands of the enemy. So terribly have the valiant defenders of Crete been handicapped l.iv the lack of adequate air support that it may appear to be doubtful whether the decision to attempt to hold the island was justified. The justification offered is that in the defence of Crete, the enemy’s plans have been deranged and delayed, that he has suffered enormous losses of men and material and that, from the British and- Allied standpoint, there has been a gain of two weeks of precious time, enabling a preparation and strengthening of defences in other Mediterranean theatres. It stands our clearly that although the Germans have now gained Crete, the epic battle for the island has in a definite sense exposed the limitations of the Nazi offensive power. With all tin 1 advantages they enjoyed in enormous masses oi available materia! and the possession of a large number oi nearby aerodromes, the attackers plainly have made no brilliant showing. It was stated when the attack opened that the Nazi High Command counted confidently upon completing the capture ol Crete within a few hours. From that expectation there has been a rude awakening. Events in the immediate future will show just how far the enemy has been handicapped by his losses of men, material and time in Crete, but it is already apparent that the magnificent defence of the island had its important part in ensuring the defeat of his initial attempt to gain control over Iraq. Sorrow will 1)0 felt, not only for our own brave soldiers who have fallen in the forlorn-hope defence of Crete —a defence to which New Zealanders, pakeha and Maori, have made their full contribution—but for the heroic Greek people in the loss for Hie time being of Ihcir last national stronghold. Tragic as is their immediate position, the Greeks have the consolation of knowing that their noble stand against brutal and criminal aggression has not been made in vain and that they may look in full confidence, to a future in which Greek liberty will be re-established on a firm and lasting foundation. AN ATTACK 'ON GIBRALTAR? A GOOD deal has been heard of late about a prospective German attack on Gibraltar by way of Spain, and the recent political adjustments in the latter country, which have given increased powers to the Falangists—the Spanish Fascist Party—and their leader, Senor Kuner, may suggest that the way is being prenared for this undertaking. Active measures taken to strengthen the defences of the rock fortress, which is now under the command of Viscount Gort, show that there is no disposition on the part of the British Government to disregard or underrate the Nazi threat.

In a casual survey, it might appear that, with the subservience of France and Spain assured, Germany commands tin open route of military approach to Gibraltar. Actually, however, fairly considerable difficulties are involved. Never very good. Suanisli communications are tar iron) having reeoteted from Ihe damage they suffered during the civil war and. to quote an authority, “a great strain would be imposed on the impoverished Spanish railway system if it were placed at Germany’s disposal.’’

According to the military correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Ilei'tild,” in transporting the enormous quantities of war .material that would he needed in an attack on Gibraltar, Germany would have to use the main French railways down the Rhone to Marseilles and thence round the Spanish eoasts to Malaga and Gibraltar.

Even then (the correspondent adds) the task would not be easy, the less so because the coastal railway is liable to be bombarded by the British Navy at so many crucial points. Supplementary supplies brought by road also have to pass through mountain bottlenecks which would slow up any large movements. Because of this basic difficulty of transporting heavy materials over 600 miles of broken country, the inadequacy of communications in the Iberian Peninsula is likely to exert a powerful influence ion the development of any threat to Gibraltar. At the very least it would introduce an importan t delay, and there would be a race against time, because the Spanish passes become snowbound early in autumn. This factor is the more important because the possibility of landing seaborne supplies along the coast between Gibraltar and the Portuguese frontier is very remote, while the British would be bound to blockade the eastern coast of Spain in order to prevent the arrival of supplies from Italy.

11 seems improbable tlmt Germany could muster naval forces thal would enable her effectively to contest a British blockade of the Spanish coasts and naval attacks on the coastal railway. The naval position would be accentuated to some extent from Ihe British standpoint if Germany gained control of what is left of the French Heel, but her ability to do this is still doubtful —less admittedly on account of the disposition of the men of Vichy lhan because an attempt on their part to hand over the fieel io Hie Nazis might be expected to awaken new measures of I'ovoli. Germany’s own naval resoitre.es certainly will not enable her to challenge British seapower, if she massed her submarines in Spanish walers, they would probably be disposed of more easily lhan. at present and certainly would do less damage than in their current operations against seaborne commeri-e in the Atlantic and elsewhere. Italy’s remaining naval forces can no longer lie regarded as very important and Ilio Spanish Navy is of insignificant strength. 11 consists of half a dozen cruisers—the best of them of somewhat doubtful fighting value —If) destroyers, 11 torpedo-boats, 13 submarines and.a number of small eraft.

Whatever its effects in other respects might be, a German attack on Gibraltar certainly would bring terrible hardships and miseries on Spain. It is not to be supposed for a moment thal Ihe Nazis would make any serious effort to compensate Spain for (he loss of supplies under the blockade, and Hie massing of German military transport on a road and railway system already heavily overtaxed would intensify the privations am! miseries of Hie people of Spain. Similar hardships would be imposed in greater or less degree on France. All other considerations apart, acquiescence by the governments of France and Spain in Nazi military designs against Gibraltar would amount to a most abominable betrayal of the people of tjieir own eouutri.es.