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REPLY TO CRITICS

MR CHURCHILL ON WAR PROBLEMS Passage of German Ships Through Straits PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION Deep Sorrow Over Fate of Greece (British Official Wireless.) I (Received This Day, 12.40 p.m.) RUGBY, -May 7. Replying - in the House of Commons war debate, the British Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, said it had been marked by a high sense of responsibility in all who had taken part. Referring to Mr Lloyd George’s criticisms, he agreed that in Mr Eden’s speech much could have been said about Spain and about Russia, but he was not sure that there'would have been any advantage in saying; it, nor would the House have profited by debating at length about the sad and squalid tale of what was going cn at Vichy. With regard to Turkey, Mr Churchill reminded Mr Lloyd George (who had spoken of Turkey allowing German ships to pass through the Straits to attack Greek islands) that Turkey had no right, under the Straits Convention, to prevent ships passing through the Dardanelles while at peace. To do so would amount to a decision to quit neutrality. Mr Lloyd George had criticised the procedure of a motion of confidence, but after the reverses and disappointments in the field, the British Government had a right to know where it stood with the House of Commons and where the House stood with the country. Still more was this knowledge important for the fate of foreign nations, especially those which were balancing their foreign policy at the present time.

THE MIDDLE EAST It was very natural that the House should not be entirely satisfied with the recent turn of things in the Middle East, and that some members should be acutely disappointed that we had not been able to defend Greece successfully against the Italian and German armies, or should think that we should have been able to keep or extend our conquests in Libya. "For myself,” said Mr Churchill, “I watched the fate of Greece, after her valiant repulse of the Italian invader, with agony. The only relief I feel is that everything in human power was done by us, and that our honour as a nation is clear. If anything could add a pang to these emotions, it would bo the knowledge we had of the impending outrage, with so little power to avert from this heroic and famous people a fate so hideous and so undeserved. So far as the German invasion of Bulgaria is concerned, we had warning for a long while. It is three months since I stated in a broadcast that Bulgarian airfields were being occupied. Every week one watched the remorseless movement- of i vast German forces through Hungary, through Rumania, into Bulgaria and | towards Croatia, towards Yugoslavia, > until at last no fewer than forty German divisions, five of them armoured, were massed; Hitler told us it was a crime on our part', in such circumstances, to go to the aid of Greece.” ACTION NOT REGRETTED “I do not wish to enter into an argument with experts,” said Mr Churchill. _ That is not the kind of crime of which he is a good judge. Looking back, I can only feel, as the Premier of New Zealand has so nobly declared, that if we had to tread that stony field, even with the knowledge we possess today, I for one would do the same thing again, and that is the view of all my colleagues in the War | Cabinet and on the Defence Commit-1 tee, and I believe that view is gener-I ally agreed upon by this House. But | military operations must be judged by the success which attends them rather than the sentiment which inspires i them. It remains to be seen whether < the Italian invader, in invading Greece, or.the German invader coming to his rescue and engaging Yugoslavia in bloody strife, have gained an advan- 1 tage or suffered loss, when the full < story of the war is told. From a strict- 1 ly military viewpoint, the addition of 1 the Balkan peoples to the number of 1 ancient and independent States and 1 sovereignties under the Nazi yoke that 1 must be held down by force and intri- ( gue may by' no means prove a source i of strength to the German Army, ] while in the political aspect nothing * can more surely debar' the Germans 1 from shaping a new Europe—and one ( will certainly emerge—than the fact ‘ that the German name and the German 1 race are becoming more universally s and more intensely hated amongst all ; peoples, in all lands, than any race of * which history bears record. I derive ] confidence that the will-power of the ' British nation. expressing itself I through a steadfast House, will once ' again perform its liberating functions fc and humbly exercise, and execute its ' high purpose among men. I say this 1 with the more confidence because we J are no longer a small island lost in the ‘ northern mists, but around us arc ga- 11 thered in proud array all the nations ' of the British Empire, and now across c the Atlantic the United States proclaims herself by our side, or at any a rate near our side.” | ° THE WAR CABINET k

Replying to Mr Lloyd George’s criticisms on the composition of the War Cabinet. Mr Churchill said there was in fact a War Cabinet of eight, of whom five had no regular Departments, and three represented the main

general organisms of the State—Foreign Affairs, Finance and Labour. It gave its broad sanctions to the main policy and conduct of the war. Under their authority, the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services sat daily together, and he, as Premier and Minister of Defence, presided, summoning when necessary the three Service Ministers. All the larger issues of military policy were brought before the Defence Committee, which for several month's past had consisted of the three Chiefs of Staff, the three Service Ministers and four members of Cabinet—the Premier, Lord Privy Seal, . Foreign Secretary and Lord Beaverbrook.

“That is the body, and that is the machine, which works easily and flexibly at the present time, and I do not propose to make any changes in it until I am further advised,” said Mr Churchill. “In this whole business of Libya and Greece, I can assure the House that no violence has been done to expert military opinion. All decisions have been taken unitedly, freely and voluntarily and with goodwill, under the hard pressure of events.”

? He noted a tendency in some quartf i ers, especially abroad, to talk about , the Middle East as if we could afford 11 to lose our position there and yet carry , on the war to victory on the oceans ' and in the air, but no one must under- ■ rate the gravity of the issue being ; fought out in the Nile Valley. “The - loss of the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal, the loss of our position in the Mediterranean and of Malta,” he said, “would be the heaviest blows we could sustain. We are determined to fight ■ for them with all the resources of the ■ British Empire, and we have every ' reason to believe we shall be success- ; ful.” THE ARMY IN EGYPT “General Wavell,” Mr Churchill stated, “has under his orders at present nearly half a million men. A continu- | ous flow of equipment has been in proI gress from this country during the last ten months and now that Italian resisI tance in Abyssinia, East Africa and Somaliland is collapsing, a steady concentration northward of all these forces is possible. Indeed it has for many weeks been rapidly proceeding. General Smuts has ordered the splendid South African Army forward to the Mediterranean shore. But warfare in the Desert can only be conducted by comparatively small numbers of high-ly-equipped troops. Here the fortunes of war are subject to violent oscillations and mere numbers do not count. On the contrary, the employment in the Desert of large numbers would in the long run lead inevitably to disaster. That is what happened to the Italians. Their force of 180,000 men lay along the North African shore, from Benghazi to the Egyptian frontier, and once the head of this force was stopped and broken, it was not possible for the army to retreat all at once. The single coast road could not. carry it. The transport available could not feed it on the move. The victory of Sidi Barrani sealed the fate of ali the Italian troops in Cyrenaica. They did not possess command of the sea and they were destroyed in detail at Bardia. Tobruk and Benghazi. The same thing, with important modifications, might thus have happened to the British when the German armoured forces defeated and largely destroyed our single armoured brigade guarding the advance! frontier of the province of Cyrenaica.” Mr Churchill said he had no exact account of what happened at Agedibia or Mechili, the generals having been taken prisoner through running undue risks in their personal movements. The remains of that brigade were now fighting at Tobruk. The German armoured force was not much larger than our own, but tactical mistakes were committed and mischances occurred, with the result that our armoured ! force was disorganised. j

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WAITA19410508.2.45

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Wairarapa Times-Age, 8 May 1941, Page 6

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,543

REPLY TO CRITICS Wairarapa Times-Age, 8 May 1941, Page 6

REPLY TO CRITICS Wairarapa Times-Age, 8 May 1941, Page 6

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