Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 1941. A SETBACK IN LIBYA.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 5 April 1941, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 1941. A SETBACK IN LIBYA.

r £O those who are watching the progress of the war here and in other parts of the Empire, Hie announcement of the withdrawal from Benghazi no doubt has come its a disconcerting shock. At an immediate view, the event is a disappointing sequel to the brilliant campaign in which British Imperial forces so recently swept Io the confines of Cyrenaica., capturing in the process no inconsiderable part of the Italian Libyan armies, with their fighting equipment and other material. That a local setback has been suffered is obvious, but that any important reversal of the course of the war in Libya has occurred or is likely to occur has yet to appear. At the present, stage a reasonable amount of faith is called for in General Waved and the forces under his command. From the reports, already in hand it is clear that there is the greatest possible contrast between the British evacuation ol Bemrhazi and the series ol smashing defeats inflicted on the Italians in Libya. When Benghazi was captured in the final phase of the British offensive, a considerable Italian force, endeavouring Io retreat, was enveloped and captured. A British communique stales that Benghazi was evacuated alter all the captured military stores and equipment had been destroyed and that light covering forces were withdrawn in face of a determined effort by units of the Halo-German forces, supported by numerous tanks, considerable casualties being inflicted on the enemy. There is little dependable information available as to the strength of the enemy forces in Tripolilania, or the extent to which they have been stiffened with German reinforcements. If seems most improbable, however, that reinforcements have attained any very large scale. Alechanised forces can only have been transported to Tripolitania by sea,and must be dependent, on sea transport also for the flow of essential supplies. While it is likely enough that a few transports or supply ships may slip across at times from Sicily to Tripolitania, an attempt to conduct any considerable traffic on these lines most certainly would present a target on which British naval and air forces could be relied upon to concentrate with damaging effect. Doubt as to any large addition having been made to the enemy forces in Tripolitania raises the possibility that the British forces in Cyrenaica may have been reduced. The Libyan campaign obviously must be considered in relation to military operations in other parts ol Alrica—notably in Eritrea, and Abyssinia, where beaten Italian armies are staggering back in. defeats that have already assumed 1 he aspect, of disaster —and not without regard, also, to the developments that are taking shape in the Balkans. ( If has yet to appeal’ that the enemy forces which have now entered Cyrenaica and recovered Benghazi have prospects ol: gaining even temporary results and advantages ol: any great importance. Whatever the precise strength and composition of the enemy forces may be, the task confronting them is that of conducting an offensive al the end of a long and insecure Hue of communications, extending from the fertile part of Tripolitania through some hundreds of miles of desert to Cyrenaica. The only good transport route for mechanised forces and similar traffic through this extensive tract of desert is by the coastal road. This last is an excellent highway, but it is exposed almost throughout its length to bombardment from the sea. as well as from .the air. Seapower continues to be an all-important factor in the Libyan campaign and British command of the sea in the Mediterranean has just been demonstrated once again and most impressively in the Battle of Cape Matapan. Damaging air bombardments of the port of Tripoli and of other enemy bases in Tripolitania have been reported almost from day to day of late and it is hardly in doubt that in the matter of conveniently located aerodromes and in other respects. the Royal Air Force will continue to bo in a position to give an excellent account of itself in contlict with its German and Italian antagonists. The extent Io which it may be necessary meantime, from the British standpoint, to subordinate operations in Libya to those in other war theatres, has yet to appear, but it is certainly much too soon Io assume that there is cause for apprehension or foreboding over the latest turn of events in Cvrenaica.