AERIAL PHOTOS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 31 March 1941, Page 10

AERIAL PHOTOS

INFORMATION ABOUT KIEL WARSHIPS IDENTIFIED. SLOW CONSTRUCTION RATE EVIDENT. How does the British Intelligence speak with such assurance of the damage done to enemy targets by the Royal Air Force bombers? Reports of large fires are accepted as indications of damage in a certain area, but it is known, also, that hits on particular parts of the Nazi war machine are positively recorded. More, the authorities acquire unimpeachable information about the whereabouts and the conditions of certain important units of the enemy forces. How is this done? Part of the veil was lifted when Squadron-Leader P. J. A. Riddell, of the Royal Air Force, speaking to a Press conference late in December, displayed two mosaics of aerial photographs of Kiel Harbour taken by the R.A.F. A fortnight separated the two mosaics, and Squadron-Leader Riddell, directing attention to various points of interest, built a large dossier of important information. Every large ship in the harbour was identified. They included a Koln class cruiser of 8,000 tons. Two of this class (Karlsruhe and Koenigsburg) were sunk in April last. One Hipper class cruiser of 10,000 tons was there. A sister, the Bluecher, was sunk by the Norwegian shore batteries on April 9, taking down with her the Military Command Staff for the invasion of Norway. The Scharnhorst, a battle cruiser of 25.000 tons, which was damaged on June 13 by the Fleet Air Arm by two hits, was again hit a little later by bombs, despite the protection of some 50 Messerschmitt fighters. On June 29 the Scharnhorst was seen at Kiel in the floating dock and the photographs showed her to be still there. Her sister ship, the Gneisenau, was hit by a submarine and entered a floating dock on August 2. Another vessel of interest in the pictures is the Lutzow, formerly the Deutschland, one of the three pocket battleships. She was attacked in the Skagerrak by the submarine Spearfish and suffered considerable damage. Near her was the aircraft carrier of 19,250 tons, under construction.

As Squadron Leader Riddell pointed out, the fact that these vessels were in dock so long after they were struck, and the slow progress of the vessels under construction, were indications of (1) the extent of the damage sustained originally; and (2) the disruptive effects of the air raids on the dockyards at Kiel. At one shipbuilding yard he showed there was a cruiser of the type laid down in 1937 and 1938. None of the four vessels of this class had been seen in dock or at sea. When these photographs .were taken, they accounted for the major units of the German fleet. Those outside of Kiel were: one battlecruiser (Gniesenau) which shortly afterwards went into floating dock at Kiel, one pocket battleship (Admiral Scheer) and three cruisers. Enlargements showed the water badly discoloured, and this was identified as oil, coming, it appeared, from a broken pipeline in the Commercial Port. The oil had spread all over the harbour, and as the tracks made by 'vessels had not closed it was deduced that the oil had a high viscosity, probably of asphaltic basis. One of the attacking pilots had stated that there was an extensive area of fire. An oil fire on the water of a large naval dockyard can cause considerable damage, especially to smaller vessels which are very vulnerable to fire. All this information suggested that heavy punishment had been inflicted by the raids.

In the area occupied by the Deutsche Werke Yards, the main power station showed by broken lines that the roof had been penetrated. A power station equipped with turbines revolving at high speed in thin steel casings can suffer heavily from bomb splinters. Small pieces of steel can also play havoc with switch gear. The photograph also shows a gaping hole in the roof of the torpedo and gun store of the naval arsenal, in which are housed very costly and precise instruments. A bomb among these can do much damage. With the aid of special optical instruments the second of these photographic records showed a barrage of over thirty balloons hurriedly put into position, while the new aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, a destroyer and some E boats had been taken elsewhere, also evidence strongly presumptive of damaging raids. These are only a few of the details noted in the photographs. Explaining the work, of interpretation, Squadron-Leader Riddell said reports covering the major points and major changes are followed by amplified reports on details of naval, military, air force, industrial and economic interest to the appropriate authorities, who receive them within twelve hours of the landing of the aircraft which took the photographs.

To obtain this information in the best possible form and in the shortest time, special personnel has been collected from various parts of the Empire. Before they are permitted to undertake, on their own responsibility, the interpretation of aerial photographs, they must have detailed knowledge of all subjects connected with the three armed forces of the enemy, as well as similar details of those units of the fighting forces of the countries which the enemy has absoHjed. Added to this is information concerning t] ie communication, industi’ia’j and economic organisations under the control of the enemy. Moreover the learner must have a full knowledge of the history of the war, as far ns it has gone, so that he may fully appreciate activity and movement in M'f theatres of the war. /This knowledge is detailed and precise. Generalities are not good enough. Thus aerial photographs are scoured for evidence of change, and this evidence, properly appreciated, supplies accurate information of positive value as a check on enemy movements, as well as on the enemy's reports. Photographic raids are made frequently and often at great risk, but as the pictures indicate, the definite information they provide is of such great value that risks are justified. Squadron-Leader Riddell’s brief talk was in itself a warning of the manner in which the expert brain extracts revealing evidence from small things which to the lay mind are of virtually no consequence. It is the inability of the layman to appreciate the devilish skill of .the Intelligence organisation which makes him impatient of what to him appears as a cautious, blundering

censorship. This censorship is cautious because it seeks to keep from the enemy any facts oi' views which may be used by these keen Intelligence brains to build an accurate picture such as Squadron Leader Riddell revealed. The point that thousands in the country know the facts is of no consequence. The vital factor is: Does the enemy know? People in Kiel knew the facts about a lot of the Nazi warships; but it took the photographs to convey them to the British fighting men.