HITLER’S DILEMMA

Wairarapa Times-Age, 5 February 1941, Page 2

HITLER’S DILEMMA

: PROBLEM OF THE INVASION OF BRITAIN

TASK OF HUGE MAGNITUDE AND DANGER. CHANCE MISSED LAST AUTUMN. A British war correspondent. Mr. William Forres’, in a 8.8. C. broadcast yesterday examined the possibilities of an invasion of Britain and the forms such an attack might take. All experts, he said, were agreed that whatever chance of success an invasion might have within the next few months, by the end of the summer Hitler would face inevitable disaster. United States officials with reliable sources of information had said that the crisis would arise within 60 days, while neutral observers in Berlin said the attempt would be made within a month.

It was certain, the commentator said, that the longer the night hours the easier would be the immense task of passing large numbers of barges to the coast of Britain, and already the nights were beginning to shorten. Hiller had but two alternatives, he said. Either he must make his attack on the British Isles, or strike a swift blow at the British “lifeline" in the Mediterranean. An attack on the British Isles might come in any of three forms: 1. A frontal attack on the Dover area. 2. Landings at a number of places round the coast. 3. A landing in Eire. Dealing with the first of these alternatives, the commentator said that such an attack would have been far easier last autumn than now. Then the British forces were thinly strung out and ill-equipped. When lie visited a section of the South Coast at that time, he found the soldiers with only 10 rounds of ammunition a man for their rifles, no hand grenades and no machine-guns. Now there was a fresh-ly-equipped army, with positions carefully thought out and strong defences constructed. Then the Home Guard had been armed with slicks and shot guns. Now it also was a fully-equipped organisation. and each village instead of being easy prey for a few German motor-cyclists was an individual fortress which would hold up a far larger force.

FORCE AND COMMUNICATIONS. It was an accepted military’ fact that the attacking force must have superiority of fire-power of three, to one. As the defence could easily concentrate a force of a quarter of a million in the Dover area at a moment’s notice. Hitler would need to land at least 750.00'.) men. with 10 lo 15 divisions of tanks, thousands of motor-lorries, and at least 1.000.060 gallons of petrol a week. To do this the enemy would need lo maintain the constant passage to and fro ■J' about 15,000 barges. Even assuming that the Royal Navy's control of the Channel could temporarily be impeded by the sowing of intensive minefields to isolate a corridor between the invasion ports of Dunkirk ■ Calais and Boulogne, and the British coast, what a target 15.000 barges would be for the bombers and fighters id' the R.A.F. No minefields could ’ ward Ttiem o:l, ami the R.A.F., even if ' not the equal to the Luftwalle in num- ; l.'ers. was certainly its equal in efTieii ency ami atiaekmg power. . Passing to the second possibility', the ) speaker said that this method again did j mil present the chances of success it ) would have given last year. Defences i had bowi organised not only in the Dover area, and the island was ready ti> meet landings even on its most deserted shores. A LANDING IN EIRE, A landing m Eire presented an easier task. Eire’s defences were far weaker than those of Britain, and it was probable that a landing would meet with a certain measure of success. ' The maintenance of the troops landed .'.oil’d !?:• be easy. Where surprise might get th” mvaders a i. ■imi; the, lurlln : : .gv . : sh.ps is,ml 1 ... ,■ • would have to bo kept up .n fave <»: ’.he supri a: .< of the Na\y m-.c m- ;• ojjuisition of the !;;:d a I ■ ..w n Ireland, and a stroni; De ■ ere signs, th.- commentator •ud. t: !i:‘/cr might try m m- m. these tim::, iitc tliver.-mm of parti f the l.nf ■.. . if'- t ■ the Mediterranean ) ■ n"? '• •; si :w v a.■ c- nu.mi.m’..m,) .1 swift ii", a-. Britain's mounting) . ■ m imf theatre. Had he in- ' ■ • ■ ■ attack the Hi :m. nnd tn.. ' ' m i’" vt " aid be a mot <■ i f ties- j , i-:.on n. ami m:: Hit!. :■ would openly* d n t ’ i w A successful invasion of! t.ar v.’hile .’uecess m the; Ml ditmimieat) w. aid only be a pres- I ’re wi - ;>• d ' old t ■ tave <nf his I ! ■ • ' thi- •j • ,n..-: said, the pe< :1c i t •* i.iiin gju i.’*’ ti'iip ;h; luvusiun ; , >I7 ’' ‘Ui UU'UQ.Ij i Icatl’ ■; I • • • vrv ’,x i ; j,- .2 n |,.. ' ~1 ~ | j 1 C\> «’{•;« ’iCCtl j!1 ’/!< .