HITLER'S NEED

Wairarapa Times-Age, 3 February 1941, Page 6

HITLER'S NEED

MUST USE HIS ARMY

FORESTALLING HIS STROKE.

FACTORS IN STRATEGICAL

SITUATION

. While there is a partial lull in military operations we have an emporium- ; i ity to review the main factors of the! j strategical situation, writes Major- ■ , General Sir Charles Gwynn in the) j London "Daily Telegraph." It must be obvious that so far Hiller , ' has achieved nis successes chiefly with; j his army; immensely assisted, of i course, by his air force and by the : I underground activities of the “fifth i ! column" in the countries he has con- j 1 quered.

The way in which his air arm has been most useful to him has been in-co-operation tactics and not as an independent force except where the threat of its use alone lias served to bring about the surrender of countries incapable of reprisals. Austria and Czccho-Slovakia. it may be admitted surrendered to the air menace: the Dutch army laid down its arms when more of Holland’s cities were threatened with the destruction visited on Rotterdam. In all other cases —Poland. Norway Belgium and France—however ruthlessly air power was used, it was t< further the offensive power of the army.

Confronted by the Maginot Line. Germany, in spite of her great superiority in the air, did not attempt to obtain a rapid decision by ruthless air attack, but devised a plan which brought the full power of her army into play. That, apart from political considerations. was natural enough since the German General Staff has been nurtured in the belief that German’s army is her chief element of strength. Now (hat army has been halted by the sea and confronts a new and more formidable Maginot Line. FIRST IMPULSE. The first instinct of Hitler’s advisers was apparently again to use their air force in order to bring the army into play, even though it was clear that for invasion the army could not be employed at full strength. We cannot be certain that they are yet satisfied that here instinct must give way to logic, and that for an attack on Britain it must be accepted that their principal if not their solo instrument is their air force. Yet we may. 1 think, safely assume that their air force must adopt an independent role for the time being. Germany must accept that, even though she may hope ultimately to be able to use the army again. No one seems to be quite clear what has been the underlying purpose of the comparatively large-scale daylight at-’ tacks which Germany has made from the air. The targets selected—convoys, naval bases and aerodromes —have all been within the zone where fighter escorts can be provided. Night attacks by bombers have, of course, penetrated, further, but neither in numbers nor intensity did they equal the attacks delivered by the R.A.F. on Germany. None of the German raids would seem to indicate a definite attempt either: 1. T<> interrupt our sea communications. 2. To prepare the way for invasion. It is possible '.hat they may have been experimental, to enable a decision to be taken on which of the courses affords best prospects of success. They may have been chiefly intended to give personnel training m a new role. Perhaps it may have been hoped that by attacking targets within their lighters' reach heavy damage would be inflicted on R.A.F. lighters before aitwarfare was launched on a maximum scale. RESULTS DISAPPOINTING. Whatever the object, the results must have been extremely disappointing to Hitler. It i< 100 early yet to be supremely satisfied, but there are good grounds for believing that not only is invasion an impracticable project but that tn unrestricted air warfare Germany would suffer more than Britain Obviously our position can never bo .sufficiently secure to allow us to relax any of our offensive measures. More j and more fighter aircraft and pilots are required if only to provide reserves to replace damage and tired personnel. But. as Lord Trenchard has pointed out. our bomber aircraft, who can carry warfare into the enemy country are even more important. We are. of course, primarily conIcerncd with the defence of Britain, and ' we have reason ic believe that we can make it so strong that even Hitler may realise that he can neither invade us nor employ his airfare*.' against its in a ruthless attack. Confrunted/by a new I Maginot position would tie not. then, look for an alternative, especially one which would enable him to use hi army the instrument which he cannot use against Britain without incurring prohibitive risks? Obviously, we must not fall into the error of becoming obsessed with the problem of making our Maginot de* fences doubly secure We must consid er where else we are vulnerable In Egypt and in the Middle East nerally the margin of safety has bw none too large S-> long as we anthreatened there only by Italy the position is reasonably secure but the stronger the defence of Britain hrrmnw; the greater the probability ilia: G< rm.my will appear in that arena. GERMANY AND EGYPT. To transport tr>>*'P“ from Italy ’■ j Libya would **• course m\ .five gn-M. (ini;. but at le.-e' th-* m*'i: i-c pin embarked a' a fru-mily p-*rt ..nd mprovide .. . d t. •• ’v.-ry hn;<- ( fm-et-'- am! that there would be supply hliffieultii'S of all ■ I *t ’ti ul.if 1 v i I regard t-> pc'nil; yet there can be n ’ i'll- . !!< ‘' U;> ( *»’" i. Ji'UiU I Id make Italy ■f o , ■ min h f m idabh- ■ pecially .’ : (i!>;i> a;-!!'- ’UWU <!:■. a *■> < . brotighl )t:t > u *• Germa.-’ .>.r r* :nf< re;-".* t ' .;h: In i -■ni<■ i r v eie<* - i - to the 11.: lui n ■ iih Egypt German p.nrachuts t. and air'borne iro o rntght have m some ways ja favouriible field f<;r aetivity Tllo > British would noi care ha.%■■ to di - perse their fmve-. at:d the Egyptian’ arc not hkely be able t ) produce . H ime Guard for tlic ; c"- ' di . . -.. ■ ’ a. ■' ■ ; ened - H 1! < '• ■. . ■ i■■ r«*al « 1 ‘ ■ ’■ th,- :■ co ■'' ib. •: ' U • ' ■ - ’

a movement eastwards through the Balkans, threatening Turkey. or through Spain threatening Portugal and Gibraltar Any of such enterprise.--would give her that < ppurtunity she needs of employing her army to our detriment It is true that none of them would bring her quick, decisive victory however successful it mignt be but the fact remains that the I*-'-chance Germany Itos °t obtaining a rapid succ'ss iu Britain itself ’he mm* 1 likeh < he is to undertake (iper.itK>n.el-*--.’. hen- while ma.iit.mimg . n action threat against Britain A piit-ely di-feii-sive attitude on cur woult. in no way tie her hands The only means by which we can limit Germany’ powr ot taking the initiative in new theatres of war is »y devt'iiiping <*ur ov. it offensive power Our chief of!<-r; :ve weapon the Roval Navy 0 already fully m (.ix-ra-tiiH; It has tightosied its isloekade strangh'hold and we must see to t. that r.-* persuasion induces us to relax the grip. But our Air Force, magmacent as its p-rfijrmatices have been both tn defence and nt it : attacks on Gertm.itv. has not nearly reached the Im.it <■! it- }iote.>itiali!iv‘; P- I’- I L’G its offensive ].:oWtT which cspecialiy fe. >ti, !'e-- •' '.ITHgt hi’ll I! ig ’A'liethl’! it <’ < j ■ latiiig in m h<*mr bases or n-‘'m ba-.- .a the Middle East The deeper ami wider w<- c;m make the attack' agam ' G* 'a. .: G - BWns commonicamm and pt-. I-...-' u •' . th,- p. -he .. Hbe capable vt - ■ :w. ' fieldA -O.n-nc homhiiig (-”■-•■ t» Egypt ;,p? !lt p'. s. lake Hie iMcwWi' from I,,iby-ft- but we'ii the I'Sipwi-fw- •Jh-i ■ .. ~r mi aby our mm. laud forces ■■ f *w- S’ i i e 1 y ih '■ dt > h t' ~ - Wok’' a ' ■ a”■ s’ > 1 ’■ l ’-’■ e■"■ 1 . . ' France - ■- r the ■ ■■ 2 " < at! - ~f 'he Western Hr!-'iis;.>hen- ’■» Lok after the m t* h ' . m •* t >■ Fun me