Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1941. SWIFT CONQUEST IN LIBYA.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 3 February 1941, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1941. SWIFT CONQUEST IN LIBYA.

JX a series of remarkable victories gained in a period of less than two months, the Army ol the Nik', with the invaluable co-operation and support of the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, has made and is making history. Vastly heavier as the enemy's losses have been than those ol the Imperial forces, these victories have not been won easily, but in face ot tremendous dift'iculties which could only have been overcome by brilliant strategic planning and taetieal leadership and by line qualities of courage, endurance and enterprise in the individual members of th* 1 land, air and sea fighting iorvos engaged. I Impressive as is the measure of success already attained in Libya, there is every reason to believe that it will still be extended greatly, and with profoundly important effects on the whole strategic situation in the Mediterranean and on the position in other areas of war. With Derna in their hands, the Imperial forces are thrusting westward towards Benghazi, the principal remaining enemy base in Cyrcnaica. or Eastern Libya. Although Benghazi is about 15U miles west of Derna by the most direct route —one which runs through hilly and more or less defensible country —it is clear that a resolute and vigorous effort is being made to complete the conquest ol ('yrenaica. An Australian writer said the other day that, with 1 ohruk in British hands, inner (’yrenaica. with its prosperous agricultural zone (that is to say the area round Benghazi) “lies like a strategical plum ready for the picking." 'I his may have been a little optimistic. The Italians are reported to have withdrawn from Derna only after a stouter resistance than they had offered further east ami many opportunities at least for delaying action may arise in the area stiH covering Benghazi. Apart from the generally lowered morale of the Italians, however, and the effect of tin' limtvy losses of men ami material they have suffered, several important factors in the situation now reached promise well for the continued success of the British oiTeiisiv,>. Among lliese factors are the supply position, the extent to which tin' Italian defensive system in ('yrenaica lias already been penetrated, Ih<“ relatively poor showing of the enemy air force in Libya and—certainly not least important-— the British eommaml of the sea. From the western frontier of Egypt lo Tobruk, the only good land cojnmiinic.itmns are hy way of the coastal road, ami so long as they could lie held, the strongholds of B.irdia ami Tobruk were definite barriers to invasion. The capture ol Tobruk, however, laid open an elaborate system of both inland ami coastal communications extending westward. This sysjrin melmles a multiple grid of motor roads covering the Barce plateau and the settled agrienltnra! districts of western Gyre naica. The hill district between Derna am! Benghazi has h.-.-n described by a writer in the “Sydney Morning Herald” as a broken plateau. In the east. In l states, this plate,'in forms the Mnrmnric highlands, about 700 feci high, and any military textbook proves that tins region has been fought over since the time of the Carth.'igmians. In the west, the Jebcl Akhdar rises in parts to 1.800 feet, but it is not very difficult country. The mam problem is a shortage of water, because there are no rivers and the rock formation makes boring impossible In places the Italians have built iron acqueduets, but elsewhere, as betwi-en Derna and Bengha. - :, water is transjxsted by :r.i-o :■ Tim general supply question is. of emirs.•. .• \ Lll2l ( impertai:t. Besides having lost, ji >s csj nimie.j, In-twcen a ihird ami a half of his original force. Marshal Graziani's lighting p<<wer is further w.-akem-d !>y the loss of an imim-iise amount of '.;;lnali|e equipment, (hi acroiini ot tin ilriti-.ii naval grip mi the Eastern Medtlcrram'.iii ;> grip st n-ng: lipm-ii iiot.i'olv by th.* ui‘> asion of Libya and tin- rap!nre of Tobruk Graziani pn-iiaMy is unalile to obtain mltln mnal equipment bv sen r.n.j is lilmn to be reduce.| to siteh reserves ami stores as he .alr.-mlv has ,o Libya I’util the Imperial tm'ees had taken Tobruk. •).•-%■ h.ui t<> rely m,only on lines of coniniunicii; mn sirclchiny o’.cr nc.iriy tour humire.l miles of desert, Im! with the deep am! c..inm. d:• mharbour of Tobruk, ami tlm shallow draught but useful road steads of Bardia ami Derna in I'.rHisn hands, and tlm sc,a <-i r.te prole.'ted I)’, the \’a!im invading arm;, .-an i>e supplied largely by sea. The .-m-my i, mmm less happily plae.-d llhas excellent com 11111 ii urn t mils between Benghazi ami tie preseo; lighting froiit, but some liumireds of miles of desert, tr. : b > the coastal hig h v> ay. sr pa ra' ew,• > •,•< ■ ( j.• na ic.i iron: tmter - !<• area of western Libya, round Tripoli. T.>i::mj aer.mtd m.t only ol the prov. ess ~t til.. Army of the Xih- Im! ol B