Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1941. ANOTHER STRIDE IN LIBYA.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 23 January 1941, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1941. ANOTHER STRIDE IN LIBYA.

\yiTIT the capture of Tobruk, an important stage has been covered in the conquest of the whole of Cyrenaica. the eastern province of Libya. Possessed of an excellent harbour and strongly fortified as a land, naval and air base. Tobruk is in itself a valuable acquisition. Located some SO miles from the Egyptian frontier, it is at the same time the eastern bastion of the elaborately developed strategic communications and defences of Libya.

Forming the backbone of that defensive system, a great military highway runs along the entire length of the Libyan

coast, for a distance of 1.200 miles. The whole of the Italian forces in Libya were motorised in order to give them maximum mobility and enable them to operate at any point along this modern strategic road. “In vital .sectors, such as the higher country along the coast from Benghazi to Bomba.’’ an oversea writer slated recently, “the road has been duplicated inland, with elaborate cross-country connections." The sector mentioned is that of about 200 miles along the north coast of Cyrenaica, to within approximately 60 miles of Tobruk.

The weakening in morale and enterprise of the Italian armies in Libya is sufficiently indicated in the fact that instead of making effectual use of their magnificent system of communications and defences, they left Tobruk and its garrison to their fate. It was reported some days ago that the Imperial forces had not only enclosed and isolated Tobruk, but were operating far to the westward.

Although something must depend upon the resources at Sir Archibald Wavcdl’s disposal, and of course on develojmieni.s elsewhere around the Alediierranean, it seems highly probable lhat the British offensive will be continued with vigour and that the Italians meantime are in imminent danger of losing the whole of Cyrenaica. Benghazi, the Italian naval, military and air base on the extreme west of Cyrenaica, lies some 250 miles by road west of Tobruk, but a continuation of the air and naval co-opcration that has contributed so largely to the success ol the British advance already made in the Western Desert should simplify considerably tin? problems that are involved in an advance to the ext remit}’ of Cyrenaica. Il has been emphasised justly that the difficulties to be overcome in a more extended invasion of Libya are formidable. There tire only nvo cultivated areas of any great size in Libya. One of these lies round Benghazi and the oilier round Tripoli, in the western part of the Italian territory. Between these areas, the strategic coastal road runs through some hundreds of miles of desert. .Serious problems of transport and supply—not least of water supply—thus would be entailed in an advance on Tripoli, though over part of the distance these problems would be eased for the British, forces by the use of coastal' ports, It is a material tact, also, that although Tobruk and other places in Cyrenaica are strongly fortified, it is in Tripoli that the most formidable Italian defences have been constructed—this for the reason that the defensive scheme looked largely to the possibility of attack by the French from Tunisia. Whether an early invasion of western Libya is practicable remains to be seen. The Italians are possessed of a strong and highly developed delensive system and .Marshal Graziani s forces, as information stands, may still be numerically superior to those under General Waved s command. It is probable, however, that the SO.OOO Italians who had been killed, wounded or taken prisoner in the Western Divert before the attack on Tobruk opened were in the main the best troops at Marshal Graziani s disposal. <hi this account and others, notably the loss of irreplaceable equipment and material, the weakening of lhe Italian armies probably is much greater than the figures of casualties ami captures at a direct view would suggest. The possibility has been mentioned that German divebombers ma.y he sent to Libya lo support die Italians and help to stiffen their morale. The Royal Air Force no doubt might be trusted to deal with any enemy reinforcement of this kind, however. Moreover. British naval command of the Mediterranean would go far towards making it impossible for the Germans to maintain adequate fuel and other supplies for aircraft operating in desert conditions in Libva. Meantime, another signal victory has been won bv the British Imperial forces-—a victory it which, as in earlier stages <d the campaign, the operations of land, air and naval forces have been admirably directed and co-ordinated. With operations against (In* Italians now proceeding with good promise in other parts of Africa, another grettt step ha.s been taken towards their overthrow in Gvrenaica. if not in the whole of Libva.