BASE IN AZORES

Wairarapa Times-Age, 14 January 1941, Page 6

BASE IN AZORES

4 i__ FOR Till! I'M lED STATES POSSIBILITIES WEIGHED. ISLANDS IN STRATEGICAL POSITION. lhe recent acquisition ov the United j States - : bases in British possessit ns J extending from. Newfoundland to imr■l thorn South America, wit! entail a ■ comple'.o revision of its naval stratogv ! m the North Atlantic, write- Cuoiain •'Frederic!; L. Oliver. Cnited ' ■ Navy, retired. in the "Christian I Seience Monitor." ; There is no question but that public 1 se.'iiiment in the United States always j has been, and continues 10 be concern- ' ed wnh matters of defense rather than ;of aggression, and its nr.'/al strategy ■ must strike a nice balance between dvI fms.ve and oilensive operations. ' However, it is well known that the ■ j old adage "The best defence is a strong offense" is well taken. Should i there .-til! be doubters, they are referj red to the progress of events iti the present war. Tue essence <’•! naval strategy is to seek out the enemy in j time to permit a concentration of own (superior strength being made in the ■: vital area. To be free to attain this objective, a i fleet must be able to opertde from i strategically located bases that are not i dependent upon the tlevt for proteci lion. Bases of this character, scattered • throughout the world, are assets of in- ; estimable value to the British Fleet. j TIES WITH HOME COUNTRY, To a fiect. however, falls the rei sponsibiliiy of maintaining communi- ! cations between the home country and i its bases, and. when necessary, bc- ! tween bases. I A fleet based reasonably close to an ! enemy country has the advantage of ; having to cover a smaller area in con- | ducting scouting operations for an emerging cnerny .force, and the possible 1 opportunity of disposing of the enemy ! fleet before it can disappear into the iwide expanse of ocean. Furthermore, such a base over[shadows enemy lines of communion-! ' lions with its forces at sea. but on the l | ..ither hand, should lhe enemy succeed j ! in obtaining even a vestige of com-; 1 mand of the sea, the base's own linesj • of communication become eompromis- \ • ed. ; 'i’he new buses that have been obi tained by the United Stales will have; jthe effect of projecting its eastern' sea frontier some KOO miles into the, i Atlantic, mid afford a means of esiab- [ fishing scouting lines that will permit; ' early information of enemy move- ■ | ments being obtained. STRATEGICAL POSITION. ■ Prior to the windfall that provided j ! lhe United Stales with badly needed i ! Atlantic outposts. there existed a; I school of thought that gave coiisidcr1 able study to the possibilities presented : 1 bv the Azo res* for use as an advanced! ! base, if they could be obtained from! I Portugal. This way station in the Atlantic has! i oelonged to Portugal since long be- • • fore the discovery of America, and is I i the northernmost of several groups 01 'islands lying oh the northwest coast’ ' of Africa." During the World War the United; States with the permission of Portugal. then un ally, maintained a naval base' ' m :b.e A. i>iT • where repairs mid sup- • plies were available, and from which ‘ the surrounding sen area was patrol--1 led. The first trans-Atlantic airplane flight used the Azores as a stepping- . stone, mid they ;u'e a regular stop fm lhe dipper dill- which ply the a.i lanes between North America and Eurupe- , . ■

Situated in the latitude ot :udt»-; more and distant 2 100 mile- from New j York, the i.-l.md- ■ f tlx* Aron s group) , have several excellent harbours. The i ] climate is mild. and the weather cm.-; , dit'i>ii.s are generally line, although in j w inter the wind frequently .itiamm | near-gale strength Tin . e Islands occupy .. .trawgw po-p sition wills regard u» the lanvs t; leading west rm* south ftom Europi■ , I f.f the roundabout routes through j far northern Atlantic waiters. Many strategists have likened the advent .:;m that rwroswii of the! Azores would give in the Atlantic. tm those that Hawaii affords the t tilled st.c.m in the Pacific Thi- belief probably was well taken at the time tne . United States began .seriously to divelop the great naval b..-r . t Pearl Harbour, and : t ro.m?l. mt Army posts 1:; Oahu capable of canr.g lor a hupe' .. .. ... „ r d thro-rotlb - ■ .urpl.ir.f*. CHANGED BY AIR FACTOR. Had ‘he A. - irvs then been acquired, h id ’.!.<■ U: i St.il' . i X) ' I'.diV. wve’h'p.ro: a ii.se. anything like the j, : j: • . ! .-ilm-, and ittunvy that Im- !( bi'i’ii poured ;!;*>>’ Hawaii, tiiero . ■ j,o: ~ i ■ ' - ■ ' v • ; " 5 . kHd ..ml mr.ror;ro!D ,e valuable < utpm t Howt'Vvr. the tunes have Mi.mrod ■ aid the -tcadv prngrt-'s that has 1m.,--- ( . :;d cmiiiHm ■ to be 'cade in increasing hr ami !rii: : pro -of tb.em, . ■ till- i ■ ’V- . ! ill- '■ I 1 ill- Azo I*. -> • ; ■ — . d, • ■ P!. U.. th.- IT.wd Stall ■ The II '.rorom I MmL m- ■•me 2 ( 'r. _• ■ uh- i b;-'-’-. Ulsd. , . ;■ the I re-\least, are well . ; , ~p\ ;< j. l . i.H.mbit’.;' rattpr. rt I ' '. Hi .m :. -la A ’ ro- ' m j, . •}, ,(. pw-fl mill". from! id m... .. .... .nJ i. • t . - ~ ... ;>>;■) iv.K'h by i-vi i! y-iS - ; . - .. ■ ... >s n <■ c\<. . I ■ ;;■>■;■■■ ■ ■ m (■. .; -J P: J >L • ’< '' ■' - .i*n• u. » - 4 ' /,! ' ; ’ '• i-i.-sro i i'w» 1 ; 'r’.Ct' t