GRAZIANI’S STORY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 24 December 1940, Page 9

GRAZIANI’S STORY

BATTLE OF THE WESTERN DESERT SOME ASTONISHING CLAIMS. PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK FORESTALLED. (By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright) ROME, December 22. Marshal Graziani, the Italian com-mander-in-chief in North Africa, has made a report to Signor Mussolini on the fighting in the Western Desert. He concludes the report with the statement: “It is premature to make predictions on this titanic battle.” He said that a number of Italian detachments were wiped out completely in defending Sidi Barrani and elsewhere. He emphasised that the British attack was no surprise, but that the' British superiority in armoured units forced the Italians to make an orderly retreat.

He stressed also the importance of the British air and naval forces, and said that Italian air action was hindered by sandstorms. He claimed that at least 42 British planes were shot down. (The actual British losses from December 7 to December 19 were 13 planes, with five of the pilots saved). Marshal Graziani reveals that the British attack occurred a few days before the time planned for an Italian attack on Mersa Matruh.

Marshal Graziani’s report says that preparations for the attack on Mersa Matruh began immediately after the Italian capture of Sidi Barrani. The absence of water and the inadequacy of communications from the frontier prevented an immediate advance and a 70-mile road and pipeline were therefore built from Capuzzo while troops, with supplies and all services were concentrated for a resumption of the offensive. Some units, in order to economise transport, marched several hundred miles. .

Preparations were almost complete at the beginning of December, when all difficulties had been overcome. The water pipeline was an outstanding technical achievement. Built in record time, it supplied 67,000 gallons a day to Sidi Barrani. Military preparations were well forward and supplies of food, munitions and fuel had been moved to the advanced positions. “Our air force had meanwhile been systematically attacking the enemy rear, while British air forces attacked our rear bases, specially Benghazi. Advanced troops to test the British resistance swept territory in front of our positions, engaging in skirmishes against mechanised forces. Thus we noticed increased British aggression and boldness. While major units were taking up positions for the attack of ' Mersa Matruh, I sent adequate supplies of artillery to the bases from Hellfire Pass to Sidi Barrani to ward off possible attacks on our southern flank.” DENIAL OF SURPRISE.

Marshal Graziani (whose report comes from the Stefani agency) continues:

“From the beginning of October aerial reconnaissance revealed continual concentration of British forces and supplies east of Mersa Matruh, which might be attributed to an intention strongly io resist our offensive. A prisoner captured on December 7 declared that a British attack was being launched in 10 days. We warned our troops.

"I felt during the day of December 8 that a British attack was imminent and sent a fresh warning to the commands with orders to be prepared to withstand an attack. We took the necessary steps fully to utilise the air force. There was. therefore, no surprise. Everyone knew the probability of a British attack.

“At dawn on December 9, over the flat desert where advance was easy and tactical points of resistance non-exist-ent, the British poured masses of armoured cars, tanks and light and heavy arms, supported by mobile batteries and effective aerial forces. Artillery and planes undertook a short preparation. Then, immediately the terrific aerial bombardment ceased, armoured units advanced from all directions so that, despite the fiercest resistance, our positions went down one after another in a few hours. A SMASHING ASSAULT. “The first attack hit General Maletti, who began to withdraw, till, with the second Libyan Division, he was overcome. Our anti-tank guns and artillery were ineffectual because they were forced to disperse and fire on a number of very mobile objectives of an armoured mass operating concentrically over a wide front. The British 1 were crushingly superior in armoured units. “Our national and Libyan divisions were worthy even of this battle. Courage and heroism of our army commanders and troops write pages of glory and epic gradueur on this unequal struggle. Detachments which were isolated and encircled resisted to the last shot.

“After eliminating General Maletti’s force and the second Libyan division, the British hurled themselves against Sidi Barrani where on January 3 Black Shirt divisions, despite bombardment from sea and air, resisted bravely for two days. The first Libyan division tried to fall back on Sidi Barrani, but the road was cut by British armoured cars. It resisted for a long time, knowing its fate was sealed. The situation threatened to overthrow even the second line divisions, for which reason no counter-attack could be launched.”

It is commented in London, the 8.8. C. reports that Marshal Graziani did no attempt to explain how the weather conditions for air fighting can have been so much more favourable for the British than for the Italians at the same time and in the same sky. Another comment is that Graziani’s denial that his troops were surprised makes the Italian failure much more an indication of inefficiency than it otherwise would have been.