Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1940 ITALY’S AFRICAN PROBLEMS.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 7 December 1940, Page 6

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1940 ITALY’S AFRICAN PROBLEMS.

+ WITH New Zealanders included amongst the troops that have assembled to defend Egypt against invasion from Libya, the people of this country no doubt will be interested m the observations of an Egyptian journalist who has just letiw e from a visit to the Western Desert. His conclusions were gnen in a message received from London yesterday, 1 icj aie > brief that Britain has neglected nothing to ensure that Egypt s defences are impregnable and that: “If in Albania the enemy s strength is already yielding under the hammer blows ot the Greeks, it will smash asunder in the AVestern Desert. Although the stage has not yet been reached at which it is possible to anticipate easy victories in any theatre of war, there is, both at an immediate view and in a broader outlook, a good deal to justify British confidence with regard to the campaign that has developed, as yet very slowly anc on a lively, in the broad area of desert country covering the western confines ,of Egypt. It is not far from three, months since the Italian forces under Marshal Graziani reached Sidi Barrani, a coastal town about seventy miles inside the Egyptian frontier and at a rather greater distance from the Egyptian fortified outpost ot Mersa Matruh. No substantial advance has been made by the Italians since they occupied Sidi Barrani on September lb las -, though their outposts are reported to have reached Makti a, which is on the coast some fifteen miles east of Sidi Barrani, and there has been some movement of light forces in the difficult desert country inland. The Italians are still at a great distance ' from the actual defences of Egypt. The time at the disposal of the invaders is not unlimited and their failure to make progress presumably must be attributed to their realisation of the formidable character of the task by which they are confronted and perhaps in part also to the failure ot Italian and Axlis plans elsewhere. A. successful invasion ol Greece no doubt would have encouraged Marshal Graziani to put his fortunes to the test in a swift advance. During the long period of delay in which their coastal and other bases have been bombed frequently and with damaging effect by the Royal Air Force, and enemy ports and other targets liave been battered tremendously at times by the British Navy, the Italians are reported to have been engaged busily in roadmaking in the coastal zone and also in preparations tor an advance along the escarpment lying beyond the range of naval guns and through the desert still, further south. It seems impossible, however, that large invading forces, particularly, heavy mechanised forces, can, be moved speedily by any other route than that along the coast, which is exposed to heavy attack from the sea as well as by air. Short of some powerful diversion in another theatre or theatres of war —action capable of' weakening the British strength in Egypt—the position ol the Italian army which has advanced from Libya, only to halt for nearly three months in the vicinity of Sidi Barrani, must be regarded as rather precarious than promising. The outlook for the Italians is not improved when account is taken of their total situation in Africa and elsewhere. It has been said with truth that in the operations in Northi East Africa, the environmental advantages are, for the time at least, on the side of the defending forces. While the Italians have made no real progress in their invasion of Egypt from Libya, no serious attack on Abyssinia, save by air, has been attempted by the British forces in Kenya and in the Sudan. In both these areas, indeed, some ground of limited value has been conceded for the time being to the enemy. There are also very important points of contrakt, however, between the situation of the British forces in Egypt and that of the Italian armies in Abyssinia and elsewhere in North-East Africa. Thanks to British naval supremacy, the forces defending Egypt are being kept well supplied and have been reinforced. The Italian forces in Abyssinia, Eritrea and Somaliland, on the other hand, are isolated and are dependent on a limited body of supplies which is reported already to have been reduced very seriously. 1 . The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan interposes a wedge nearly nine hundred miles wide between the Libyan and Abyssinian frontiers. Moreover, Abyssinia is to the Italians a largely hostile country in which they have not. yet been able to effect any important agricultural or industrial development and in which they are greatly dependent on imports of food as well as of other materials ami commodities. To this it has to be added that Italian coinniidrications between her home territory ami Libya are at best exceedingly insecure. As Mr Walter Fitzgerald wrote recently, in the “Manchester Guardian”:— Italy finds that her air fleet cannot solve her geographical problem. Transport planes are o£ little use for the carriage of heavy military equipment in view of the enormous distances involved. From the main Italian bases on the coast of Libya to Addis Ababa, capital of Italian East Africa, nearly 2,000 ‘miles have to be traversed. Add to this the difficulty of transporting supplies from Italy to Libya in the teeth of a relentless naval blockade by Britain and the reinforcement of armies in Italian East Africa is seen to be a virtual impossibility. Ethiopia is besieged. and its Italian garrison will be starved out unless Mussolini is able to conquer Egypt. With Italy falling deeper into difficulties, in Greece ami elsewhere, and the British naval grip on the Mediterranean being made progressively more secure, Marshal Graziani’s prospects of pushing forward in a successful invasion of Egypt evidently are not, growing brighter. It seems rather likely the Italians before long may have every reason to regret their advance to Sidi Barrani.