Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1940. REALITIES IN THE PACIFIC.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 6 December 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1940. REALITIES IN THE PACIFIC.

'POUCHES botli of almost artless simplicity and of particularly cold-blooded cynicism are to be noted in a statement by the London manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank (Viscount Kano) which was reported in one of yesterday’s cablegrams. Declaring that- British propaganda was feeble, the Japanese banker said his people were only beginning to hear of the victory at Taranto, which had been smothered by German propaganda. It' is Britain herself (he added) who has driven Japan into the arms of the Axis. The Japanese people are still your friends, but they want to know you are not going down in defeat. While they are in their total effect rather far-fetched, these observations are of an almost matchless-naivete in their frank assertion that the Japanese desire the friendship of the strong. In the shaping of Japanese policy the power of an autocracy which doubtless is reasonably well informed in regard to war events and on all aspects of foreign, affairs counts for a great deal and that of the masses of the people for relatively little. So much is this so that the story of Japan having been driven into the arms of the Axis by the weakness of British propaganda, is decidedly unconvincing. It is cpiite probable, however, that the rulers of Japan are rather more than beginning to feel, and that on a number of grounds, that in linking up with the Axis they have backed the wrong horse. It may be true, too, that these rulers, or some of them, are now not unwilling that the people of Japan should be allowed to perceive in Britain’s expanding offensive power a reason for far-reaching changes in Japanese foreign policy. The issues involved are by no means simple, for the reason, amongst others, that the Japanese autocracy, as it stands today, is a combination of more or less diverse elements. The Government of which Prince Konoye is the titular head has been described as an alliance between the militarists of the Japanese Army and Navy, committed to a policy of aggression and plunder, and Japanese “big business’’—elements prepared to support a policy of aggression, provided it is safe and profitable. Many of Japan’s militarists no doubt are fanatical in their aggressive aims and are determined to pursue them at all costs and all risks. There may be and probably is, however, a point at which other powerful elements in Japan would set their faces against a continued policy of adventure and brigandage. Against that somewhat uncertain background, current events and developments bearing on Far Eastern policy are of great, and critical interest. Even to the most aggressive Japanese militarists, it must by this time be fairly plain that the partnership with the Axis is of small value to Japan, and that in. promoting that partnership, Germany’s only thought and intention was to make use for her own ends of her Far Eastern ally. Any hopes Japan may have entertained of getting even effective moral support from the Nazi dictatorship must have been rudely shattered by the announcement that Germany, following on Japan's establishment in China of the Nanking puppet regime, will continue to recognise the Government of General Chiang Kai-shek. There is no doubt that Hitler and his fellow-gangsters have been doing their utmost to impel Japan forward in a course which -would bring her into collision -with the British Empire and the United States. It is equally clear, however, that the Nazis have neither the desire nor the ability to offer Japan any support. Their whole aim is to secure the diversion to the Far East of military resources which otherwise might be used against Germany. To the fact that in her partnership, so-called, with the Axis, Japan obviously is being treated as a catspaw, it may be added that she has excellent reasons for hesitating to challenge the British Empire and the United States by attempting to extend her policy of aggression. The British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir R. Brooke-Popliam, dealt with the outlook in soldierly and direct terms when he said, in reference to Anglo-Japanese relations, as he was reported in a cablegram from Singapore yesterday:— There is no reason whatever for war, but I cannot guarantee peace . . . It would not be quite correct to say that Malaya can repel any attack, whatever the strength of the invading force, but Malaya is in a much better position to repel an attack than many people try to make out. One of the possibilities the Japanese Government has to consider is that in an extension of aggression to the south it might find itself faced at Singapore not only by British forces, but by American naval and other forces as well. Both Britain and the United States are giving Japan every opportunity to refrain from any extension of war in the Pacific, but there is little doubt that Japanese aggression to the south would be regarded by both the English-speaking nations as a menace they would be bound to unite in countering. American naval strategists are said to have informed the Administration, according to a recent message from Washington, that American use of Singapore would make the position of the United States in the Far East virtually impregnable to attack by Japan, but that Japanese use of Singapore would make it impossible for the American Navy to operate further west than the Hawaiian Islands with any reasonable assurance of success. It was expressly denied by President Roosevelt, on the eve of his re-election last month, that the United States had entered into any secret understanding -with Britain, but this does not alter the likelihood that the English-speaking countries would as a matter of course combine in resisting Japanese aggression. In the absence, as yet, of any formal agreement, the foundations of understanding appear to have been so well and clearly defined that it may be supposed that Japan in consequence will be much more inclined than she otherwise might have been to pursue a course of prudence and moderation.