Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1940. WEAKNESS IN THE AXIS.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 December 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1940. WEAKNESS IN THE AXIS.

INTERESTING possibilities were envisaged by the Secretary of State for India, Mr Amery, in the speech a day or two ago in which he observed that “Italy’s misadventures in Greece might give Britain and her allies a chance to get at Germany by'the back door if Britain could enable Greece to hold.her own while she (Britain) disposed of the Italians in Egypt.’’ We shall then have secured for our armies a foothold by which they might threaten the flank of any German attack on Turkey (Mr Amery added), and from that foothold we might eventually, with our own armies and the new allies whom our growing strength will gather, dare a mortal thrust at the German dragon. There is, of course, no question of an easy and smooth approach to the position of dominance and advantage pictured by Mr Amery, but it is not unreasonable to believe that Britain and her allies will eventually reach that, position in spite of any effort that Germany may make to prop up her weakening ally and to pursue her own schemes of south-eastern expansion. The position as it stands is exceedingly complicated and is capable of corresponding mutations, but as a whole it is much less favourable, to the Axis Powers than it appeared to be at a very recent, date—in fact up to the time, .just about a month ago, at which Mussolini struck his foul blow at Greece. Thanks to what has been accomplished since that time by the valiant Greek armies and by the British air and sea forces which have given them powerful assistance in direct and indirect co-opera-tion, it must now be plain to a large proportion of the Italian people, and not least to members of the Italian armed forces, that the policy of the Duce lias been as disastrously inept as it has been brutally unscrupulous. As affairs now stand, no Italian possessed of a normal standard of intelligence is likely to see much hope for his country, whether or not Germany elects to make an early effort to lift. Italy out of her present difficulties. The outlook for Italy if she is not helped by Germany obviously is dark. Iler sea, land and air forces have all of them suffered shattering defeats which certainly do not. promise well for what is to follow, the more so since it may be largely true, as Mr Amery observed, that: — Mussolini’s miscalculation was not to be found in the inferiority of the Italians as fighting men, but in their unwillingness to sacrifice their lives in a war which they knew to be unnecessary and unjust. The Italians have not distinguished themselves as fighting men, but they probably would have done better had they been sustained by the consciousness of a good cause. Not only are they denied that inspiration and support, but those of them who think must, know well that if they are assisted by Germany, it will be on terms which will reduce their country to a status analogous to that of Rumania—the status of a helpless and exploited dependency of the Reich. The diplomatic correspondent of a London newspaper was quoted in a recent, cablegram as stating that Hitler had demanded of Mussolini the following price for German assistance: — (1) The conversion of Trieste into a free port. (2) German occupation of portion of the Dalmatian coast, which Italy has long coveted. (3) German control of Italy's war effort. It may be that Ilitler will astutely prevent any early public, disclosure of terms like these, but that, terms as hard or harder will be imposed on Italy as the price of German assistance is not for a moment, in doubt. The Nazi dictatorship has only one. way of treating those who lie at its mercy. To all besides that his blundering and lust, for conquest have brought, about, it has to be added that Mussolini undoubtedly has betrayed his country into slavery to the Nazis. In one way or another, Italy in these circumstances cannot but be desperately weakened. Some other aspects of the position no doubt are at an immediate view less favourable to the Allies. Tn spite of the extent to which national outlook and sentiment in the Balkan countries still neutral have been swayed by late events, it. is still possible that Germany may launch a powerful southeastern offensive which would impose heavy immediate demands on the resources of Britain and her allies. The need of coping with such an onslaught might conflict, to some extent, so far as Britain is concerned, with the task of disposing of the Italians in Egypt to which Mr Amery referred. At a. local view, the British forces in Egypt, which include New Zealanders, are under no obvious necessity of hastening a decision, for the reason amongst others that the enemy is handicapped by bad and difficult, communications and that the important coastal route through the Western Desert is seriously exposed to both sea and air attack. ( Meantime, however, there is no doubt some disadvantage in the fact that strong British forces are needed in Egypt and may be needed presently also in the Balkans. On the other hand, against the threat of a formidable enemy drive through the Balkans, it has to be considered whether Germany, in view of Britain’s growing strength, can afford to divert powerful air and other forces to South-Eastern Europe. Tn any case Italy’s exposed weakness, both moral and material, and her generally poor prospects, certainly are significant features in the total situation, whatever detail changes that, situation may be destined to undergo in (he immediate future.