Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1940. STAGES IN THE BALKANS.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 2 December 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1940. STAGES IN THE BALKANS.

ALTHOUGH there is no doubt about the magnitude of the defeat suffered by the Italians in their attempted invasion of Greece, the extent to which it is open to the Greeks to follow up their victory in Albania, and advisable that they should do so, remains in light of available information, an open question. The long struggle for the Italian southern base of Argyrokastron shows that the defeated armies, in spite of the extent to which they have been broken and thrown into disorder, are by no means to be regarded as a negligible factor. The late ci Aigyrokastron no doubt depends to a considerable extent on the outcome of operations further north, where the Greeks have captured Pogradee and are breaking into river valleys which run to the Adriatic coast. With the Italians compelled io retreat down these valleys, Argyrokastron would be isolated and the forces holding and based on it would be in serious danger of being enveloped and cut off. There is no doubt that the Greeks will make every effort to take Argyrokastron. With Koritza already in their hands, possession of Argyrokastron would give them command of the whole of the enemy’s advanced communications in Southern Albania, and in particular of valuable roads. Good reasons still appear for doubting, however, whether the Greeks are likely at present to undertake a more extended invasion of Albania. It is true that they are now commandingly placed at the head of the river valleys which give access through comparatively easy country to the coastal plain of Albania. Moving down the valley of the River Devali, the Greeks would reach the coast well to the northward of Valona and on their way would be within easy striking distance of the Italian inland base of Elbasan. Tn view, however, of the enormous preponderance still possessed by the Italians in numbers and weight of military material, the Greeks may very reasonably elect instead to halt their advance in the high country extending west and south from Lake Ochrida, by way of Koritza to Argyrokastron and the coast. This would amount to the establishment of a deTensive line at no great distance beyond the Greek' frontier. This policy of caution is the more likely to commend itself since, in spite of the present attitude of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, there is no assurance that the Balkan campaign will not be extended greatly in the comparatively near future. With, the possibility that their north-eastern frontiers may yet be assailed by German and other forces, the Greeks may well think it unwise to attempt to extend their operations to the. Albanian coast north of Valona.

Sea power and air power brought to bear by Britain are, of course, highly important factors in the Albanian campaign: It is already being demonstrated from day to day, however, that sea and air forces may be used against Italy with increasingly damaging effect in the present state of the land campaign. Endeavouring to re-establish their hold on Southern Albania, the Italians are relying on communications dangerously exposed to sea and air attack. Their naval weakness is nowhere more remarkably apparent than in their failure to establish secure sea communications between their mainland territory and Albania. Taking account only of the ostensible strength of their fleet, at all events before that strength had been cut down by the British Navy and its Fleet Air Arm. it should have been a simple matter for the Italians to seize Corfu and close the Strait of Otranto to all hostile passage. Instead, it is to all appearance freely open to Britain to establish advance bases in the lonian Islands, as well as in Crete. British naval units have already operated in the Strait of Otranto and the Italian bases, in Italy and in Albania, are being persistently bombed. Another highly successful and effective attack, in which British aircraft dropped 26,0001bs of bombs on Brindisi, was reported during the weekend. The vital supply-line of the Italians across the southern Adriatic to Albania and its terminal bases are alike being attacked with damaging effect. Should this line be cut, thecate of the Italian armies in Albania would be only a matter of time, irrespective of the stage meantime reached in the land campaign. For the time being it is probably better that the Italians should remain committed to extended operations in Albania than that the Creeks should take any serious risks in endeavouring to drive them out of that territory. It has been suggested by the Secretary of Slate for India (Mr Amery) that the Italian attack on Greece may yet give Britain an opportunity “of getting at Germany throngh heiback door.’’ No doubt this hope is justified, but it is not necessarily contingent upon an early and considerable extension of the Greek advance into Albania.