Wairarapa Times-Age NOVEMBER 4, 1940. HITLER’S BAD SECOND BEST.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 November 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age NOVEMBER 4, 1940. HITLER’S BAD SECOND BEST.

ONE of the errors to be avoided in fighting a war is false U confidence. Another is that of exaggerating the power and prospects of the enemy. At present measures are being take to cope with what is expected to be a powerful combinec offensive by the Axis Powers in the Mediterranean-an offensne in which the invasion, of Greece by the Italians, and then- thrustinto the Egyptian Western Desert from Libya, may be mem > early moves. It would, of course, be foolish to under-estimate the magnitude of the task of defeating this new extension ol aggression, or to neglect any effort that will make tor the successful accomplishment of that task. It would be equa b foolish, however, to credit the enemy with an initiative and command of resources he does not in fact possess—to assume, in this instance, that the totalitarian States now seeking to destroy world democracy are advantageously placed and free to stnke when and where they will. The truth evidently is that a concerted Axis offensive is being undertaken, or at all events is being contemplated, m the Mediterranean regions because failure to invade and subiu°ate Britain has compelled Nazi Germany to seek a decision elsewhere. From Hitler’s standpoint, a Mediterranean offensive is a very bad second best indeed. If he had been, able to conquer Britain, all that he can now strive for in the Mediterranean would have fallen into his hands without additional cost. With Britain overthrown and British seapower broken, there would have been no question of preserving the countries of the Near and Middle East, and much besides in Africa and elsewhere around the Mediterranean, from falling under Nazi domination. Now, however, Germany and her jackal paituei must make great and costly efforts, and must incur seiious risks, in attempting Mediterranean conquests. Of these risks, the greatest is that of turning away from direct, attack on Britain while she is not merely unconquered, but is striking at her enemies in rising power and with increasingly deadly effect. Assuming that, Hitler means to iollow up the Italian invasion of Greece by attacking Turkey through, and perhaps with the aid of'Bulgaria and in other ways, nothing less will adequately reward his adventure than a measure of success that would completely cripple Britain, bailing that measure of achievement, lie will simply have engaged in an unwise diversion and dispersal of strength which might have been used more wisely in endeavouring to stem and repel the British attack on Germany in her own territory—an attack which Britain will develop methodically and relentlessly until its’ full purpose has been achieved. Very wide possibilities admittedly are opened meantime in the Mediterranean theatres. It is not yet; to be taken for granted that Greece, with all the aid that Britain can render, will be able to defend the whole of her mainland territory against the Italians. The possibilities of a German attack on Turkey, intended to open the way to a drive on Palestine and Egypt" from the north, have yet to be measured. The position will be further complicated and made more difficult if the Vichy Government hands over air and naval bases in North Africa, and perhaps also French warships, to the Nazis. Account has still to be taken, too, of the contingency, although it seems at present unlikely to arise, that Germany may be able to send land forces through Spain to attack'Gibraltar. Poorly as they have acquitted themselves thus far, the Italians, in' their considerable numerical and material strength, cannot be regarded as an entirely negligible factor. Even at the most immediate view, there is of course a good deal to be set down on the opposite side of the account. Britain has posted strong naval, land and air forces in the Mediterranean and these no doubt can be added to should the need arise. The Greeks are fighting gallantly and there is no doubt that the Turks wit] acquit themselves well if they are attacked in turn. The British Navy is playing an active, aggressive and tremendously important part throughout the Mediterranean, while the Italian fleet has yet to give proof of its fighting quality. One of many possibilties that has been suggested is that Germany may send powerful forces of dive-bombers into the Middle East, to be used not only in battle, but against centres and areas ' of crowded population in Egypt and elsewhere. Taking account/however, of Britain’s rising strength in the air it seems at least an open question whether the Nazis could now venture to divert powerful air forces to the Middle East, or whether tliev could hope to achieve mastery of the air if they did. It would have been one thing for the Nazis to lend some aid to an Italian invasion of Egypt intended to synchronise with an invasion of Britain. It would be another and a very different thing for Hitler and his gang, now that their hopes of invading Britain have dwindled, to take the risks that are entailed in sending large forces into the Mediterranean theatres and maintaining them at the end of difficult and more or less vulnerable communications. The point, to which all consideration returns is that nothing short of speedy and overwhelming success in the Mediterranean would serve the purpose of the Axis. The salient facts of the war are Britain’s unbroken command of the sea and her rapidly rising offensive power. Even if the enemy gained spectacular detail successes in some of the Mediterranean regions, these might do little to improve his-position and outlook. Whatever turn events may take in this or that theatre, the Axis undoubtedly will be attacked and opposed powerfully in the .Mediterranean. At the same time it remains true, and this is the overshadowing fact, that, unless she can both break the British blockade and repel decisively the developing British attack on her territory, Germany is headed for ultimate defeat, irrespective of what may happen meantime in the Mediterranean.