Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1940. THE AXIS AND RUSSIA.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 19 October 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1940. THE AXIS AND RUSSIA.

<> yyiTIIIN the last few days, news of events in the Balkans has been replaced to a large extent- by rumour and speculation, some of the last rather fanciful. To take only an example or two, a story that numbers of German troops are passing through Italy on their way to Libya has been followed by a messagje in which the Balkans correspondent of the London “Times” is quoted as stating that, according to authoritative sources in Berlin, the Germans intend to continue their air attacks on Britain and to maintain a fair proportion of their armed forces in Western Europe in order to keep Britain in check while the Axis Powers are preparing large-scale operations in the Near East, aiming to break the blockade and implying a drive across the Balkans and Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf. It is, of course, obvious that genuinely “authoritative sources” in Berlin are not likely to have much to say at this time or at any time about the actual hopes and intentions of, Ge[raiany and her Axis partner- with regard to the Near and Middle East. A good deal has been done and is being done by Britain and her Allies in the way of preparation to cope with war developments in and around the Mediterranean and it need not be assumed that the enemy will be permitted to exercise in these regions an unimpeded initiative. At the stage that has been reached, however, a number of important, issues remain to be determined and one of the most interesting of these relates to the probable attitude and action of Soviet Russia in the event of the Axis Powers launching a drive through and beyond the Balkans. Recent news, so-called, is nowhere more uncertain and speculative than in reference to Nazi-Soviet relations, but there are some underlying facts which presumably have not lost their weight and significance. All experience to date supports a belief that the leading aim of the Soviet is to profit to the greatest extent possible by the war, while doing as little as possible to help one side or the other. It has been said plausibly that the course of events desired and anticipated by Stalin is one in which the belligerents will wear each other into exhaustion, while Russia retains her strength unimpaired. It is not for a moment to be supposed that the Soviet will intervene in the Balkans or in areas further east, in order to assist Britain and her Allies. On the other hand it is quite conceivable that the Soviet may feel it advisable and even imperatively necessary, for its own sake, to impede in one way or another the Axis plans of south-eastern aggression. Any success gained by the Axis in this enterprise, notably against Turkey, would seriously weaken Russia’s position and lay her dangerously open to future attack. One of yesterday’s cablegrams quoted “diplomatic sources in Moscow’” as stating that M. Stalin recognises that the Soviet army is too weak to do anything against Germany at present, though he fully appreciates the German danger. On the other hand, it was added, Germany seemingly is bent on obtaining a declaration in her favour—in effect an unimpeded opportunity to thrust through and beyond the Balkans—“in view of the impossibility of launching a campaign against Russia as long as Britain is undefeated in the Mediterranean.” In conjunction, and for what they are worth, these statements evidently imply that it is open to Russia to do a good deal to impede the Axis plans of south-eastern aggression. The commanding fact of the position appears to be that with Britain not merely undefeated, but rapidly building up offensive power, Germany dare not risk forcing war with Russia. In these circumstances, the Soviet would pursue an extraordinarily fatuous course if it stood idly by and permitted the Axis to develop unopposed its schemes for the subordination or conquest of the remaining Balkan States and the seizure of the Turkish Straits. It goes without saying that Britain must rely primarily and essentially upon her own fighting power and that of the countries ranged with her in dealing with Axis aggression in the Near and Middle East, but it is rather early to assume that Russia is to be accounted an entirely negligible factor in the situation..that is developing in South-Eastern Europe. It is already remarkable, if true, that the Soviet is tolerating passively the establishment by the Axis Powers of submarine bases on the Black Sea coast of Rumania. It should perhaps be considered, however, that delayed action by Russia might be even more embarrassing and damaging to the Axis nations in such plans as they are now shaping than immediate, direct and open opposition to these plans. In the opening phase of the war, Germany found it necessary and expedient to submit to exacting Russian demands in Poland and in the Baltic region. It may be that the Soviet perceives a prospect of further aggrandisement on easy terms in the schemes of aggression in and beyond the Balkans now being prepared by the Axis.

POLITICS AND AID TO BRITAIN.

ALL the more because it is known or suspected that some of his supporters are still of an isolationist inclination, it is gratifying to find the Republican candidate for the American Presidency, Mr Wendell Willkie, urging further immediate aid to Britain in her prosecution of the war. Mr Willkie was not obviously convincing, however, in the attack he made in this connection on his Democratic opponents. It is conceivable (he said, as he was reported in one of yesterday’s cablegrams) that they may wish to delay the sending of aid in order to make a good impression for domestic political purposes, which would be reprehensible trifling with Britain’s safety for the sake of an unworthy political trick. If it is desirable to send further aid it should be sent immediately within the limit >of the laws. With Britain and democracy imperilled, this is not a time to play politics with deliveries of equipment which would strengthen Britain and raise the hopes of democracy throughout the world. It would be interesting to know what evidence, if any, Mr Willkie offered in support of his allegation of political trickery by his opponents. In the extent to which the attitude of the political parties in the United States has been made manifest, signs of what might be regarded as manoeuvring have appeared only in the rather dogmatic assumption by both Republicans and Democrats that there is no danger, or little danger, of the American people being drawn into the war in their own defence. So far as that aspect of the position is concerned, it will be remembered that Mr Willkie, not long ago, pledged himself never to send an American to fight across the sea. “I want to make America free and so strong,” he said on the same occasion, “that no dictator will ever strike here.”

11l an address recently to the American Bar Association at its annual convention in Philadelphia—an address which appears to have epitomised opinions now held by an overwhelming proportion of American citizens—Mr Frederic R. Coudert declared that the United States neutrality legislation stood in ridiculous contrast to American policy'as expressed in short of war aid to Great Britain and should be dropped into the limbo ol discarded laws. Stating that the United States was overwhelmingly unneutral in thought and had not hesitated to give to Hitler’s Germany far greater provocation than any other neutral would have dared to give, Mr Coudert added, in part:— Can any sane man believe that if the cash gave out and England needed credit in this hour when she alone is stopping an insanely aggressive Germany we should refuse to modify this (neutrality) legislation? When England can buy no more planes to repel the great air invasion and Canada has insufficient rifles for the soldiers she sends abroad, does any one really believe that all this will be stopped because the United States, which is spending billions of dollars to defend itself against Britain’s chief enemy, will not allow its nationals to extend any credit? America believes her vital interest lies in preserving the British Fleet and Empire. . . . These observations appear to define not only the sentiment of the American people, but, the policy of their present Government. What foundation, if any, exists for Mr Willkie’s allegation of delay in sending aid to Britain has yet to be made known. If, however, political controversy in the United States has the effect of speeding and expanding that aid, democracy in both the English-speaking countries and elsewhere will have reason to rejoice in that outcome.