Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1940. A UNION OF AGGRESSORS.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 30 September 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1940. A UNION OF AGGRESSORS.

THERE is room for speculation as to the probable immediate and early effects of the ten-year pact between Germany, Italv and Japan, but the general character and purpose of this alliance are defined quite clearly and in a manner that does not admit of doubt. The agreement is between three nations, all of them at present engaged in aggression, unscrupulously intent on extending their aggression, and prepared to eo-operate with one another in the extent to which they can individually find profit in doing so.

While von Ribbentrop’s vaunting declaration that: “This pact is a military alliance between the three most powerful Powers in the- world” is calculated to excite some ridicule, it does not follow that the alliance treaty, rogues’ coinpact as it is, is to be regarded with easy indifference. Something is left out of account in the observations of the American Secretary, of Sate (Mr Cordell Hull) that the new Axis alliance “makes clear for all a'relationship that has long existed in effect” and that: “The reported agreement does not substantially alter the situation which has existed for several years.”

The situation that has existed for several years is not static, and account has to be taken of developments which conceivably may arise. Fortunately, however, reasons appear for believing that a basis for active alliance between the Axis and Japan will not be found readily and that the intimation of the Japanese Foreign Minister (Mr Matsuoka) that the pact does not mean Japan’s early entry into the European war 5s a simple statement of fact.

That Hitler and his fellow-gangsters are keenly anxious to spread the existing scope of conflict and would gladly see Japan plunge into war either with the British Empire, or with both the British Empire and the United States, may be taken for granted. The policy of Japan is likely to be determined, however, by a strict regard for her own interests, as these. are envisaged by her present leaders. The Premier of Japan, 1 rince Konoye, is the ostensible head of a totalitarian and dictatorial regime which is pursuing well-defined aims. Writing in “Current History,” Mr Mark Gayn describes Prince 'Konoye as an ideal man for the job of leading the new single party in Japan which itself “essentially represents a compromise between the Army and Big Business.”

The Allied defeat in Europe (Mr Gayn adds) has created conditions under which the moderates in Japan can no longer resist the demand for new Pacific conquests. Hong Kong, Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya —all dangle within Japan’s reach. The moderates along with the Army recogpise Japan’s “golden opportunity.” They are willing to assist the military in new Pacific ventures. In return, they ask an assurance against further regimentation of Big Business, against efforts to set up an Army dictatorship, against dangerously irresponsible aggression. . . . Konoye ... is a discipline of Saoinji and an opponent of military dictatorship. He feels that Big Business must have relative freedom to earn and expand. It would, however, be erroneous to regard him as a foe of the Army or of aggression. He sanctioned the North China invasion in 1937. If Japan can seize Occidental colonies in the Pacific without war with the United States, he will readily approve new conquests.

Estimates like this of the present trend of policy in Japan and of the men who control it emphasise the dangers the pact between the Axis and Japan may hold. They suggest also, however, that as a partner of the Axis, Japan is likely to look before she leaps.

It is not in doubt that the Allied defeats in Europe in the spring and summer, and particularly the collapse of France, made Japan strongly inclined to seek in partnership with the Axis opportunities of extending her own aggression. Iler present action in Indo-China sufficiently indicates that she is reiidy and eager to turn such opportunities to account as they arise. On the other hand, the men who a:re shaping Japanese policy now have excellent reasons for looking doubtfully upon the Axis prospects in the war. Instead of following up her successes on the European mainland with a. victorious blitzkrieg against Britain, Germany has seen her air forces heavily defeated in every encounter with the Royal Air Force. Most, of the damage inflicted on Britain has been the work of furtive night raiders. On every occasion on which the Luftwaffe has ventured on daylight action, it has suffered heavy and disproportionate losses. Italy also has accomplished hardly anything.

Inlent as Japan undoubtedly is on aggression, the facts of the war in Europe may be expected to count heavily with her rulers for caution and delay. At the time of the collapse of France, it may have been thought in Japan that the United States was likely before long 1o be menaced from Europe in a way that would at least weaken her seriously in the Pacific. It may be supposed that anticipations of this kind are entertained much less confidently today, and also that nothing is less likely to appeal to Japan than the idea of self-sacrificing action, in order to create a diversion on behalf of Germany and Italv.

It may be some time before the actual conditions in which the ten-year pact was concluded are made known, but it is probable that the Axis negotiators have made the most of whatever plans Germany and Italy may be maturing for extended offensive action in the Mediterranean. They may have declared their countries to be assured of Spanish co-operation in developing these plans. What the future may hold, events must show, but Japan no doubt will, act at every stage with a sharp eye to her own advantage.

For the time being, at least, she would risk much more than she could hope to gain by entering into active alliance with the Axis. As matters stand, she has excellent reasons for pursuing a policy of caution. Iler undeclared war on China continues to impose an exhausting drain on her resources. She is still far from easy in her relations with Russia and she has every reason to fear at least the economic consequences of a break wifh the United Slates. Moreover, although the new pact is described as economic, as well as military and political, Japan evidently would be foolish to look Io the Axis Powers for economic or other assistance in the circumstances that exist at present or are likely to arise for a considerable time to come.