NAZI FAILURES

Wairarapa Times-Age, 25 September 1940, Page 8

NAZI FAILURES

IN AIR ATTACKS ON BRITAIN VIEWS OF SIR PHILIP JOUBERT j SOME ENFORCED CHANGES ( \ OF POLICY. 3 CONFIDENCE IN OUTCOME. ■ (British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, September 23. , Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, of the Royal Air Force, in a broadcast j today to the United States, discussed ( the changes of policy which have been I forced on the Luftwaffe and the attacks by the R.A.F. on enemy objeci tives. , “Early in August the Luftwaffe at- ■ tempted to invade this country in day- . light, and by sheer force of numbers to beat down our defences" he said. . "That effort cost them dear. The , enemy then sent over individual bombers, using also covers, to attack vital objectives. The loss of many of these lone raiders made him change again. "His third scheme was to send occasional strong forces to bomb our airfields and communications, and one of these attacks lost 20 per cent of its numbers. Then he tried escorting small numbers of bombers with powerful fighter forces to get through to our vital points. In this fighting our losses became heavier, but we still took a greater toll of the German Air Force, in particular of its fighters. TOLL OF NIGHT BIRDS. “So Hitler comes to night bombing —a form of attack that is hard to parry. There, however, is one distinctly hopeful sign. We are beginning to take a reasonable toll of these night birds; we are getting on well with night interception, and I hope to see during the next few weeks the figures steadily mounting till the proportion of German casualties by night approaches that by day. “In night fighting once the casualties become severe the moral effect is larger than by day. Setting off together in large formations in daylight, bombers and fighters give each other courage. At night a single pilot and crew have no outside source from which to draw additional stores of courage.” THE BRITISH OFFENSIVE. Turning to the R.A.F. offensive. Sir Philip Joubert emphasised the physical • disadvantages suffered due to the fact j that whereas the German bomber force ■ has only a short 20 minutes’ flight to reach England the R.A.F. bombers must fly four or five times that distance to reach Germany. “Naturally we are loath to bomb targets in France, but certain of these we have to attack, such as the Channel ports and the fields on which the German Air Force is disposed,” he said. “Against these we can develop the full effect of our bombers’ strength. But we are reluctant to carry the war any further into France, even the occupied portion of the country. We would much sooner be hitting the Germans in Germany, and it is this that we shall go on doing. “Berlin, Stettin, Leipzig. Bremen and Hamburg—all these towns regularly feel the weight of our bomber attacks, and even if we have to make a long, hard journey to get at them | the effort is worth while. This is not retaliation. No good soldier, seaman I or airman believes in retaliation by itself. The only way to bring the enemy down is to hit those things which contribute to the maintenance and development of his armed forces. 1 Our inflexible , aim is to pursue this I course.” i

Discussing the German preparations for an invasion, Sir Philip Joubert said: “For the Germans to use successfully the weapon they have forged they must have air superiority over the south-east of England. With this power in their hands it would be possible for the Germans to seize a harbour with airborne troops and, after establishing such a bridgehead, to use small steamships to bring over reinforcements and thus develop a powerful offensive on land.

“We are prepared for this. I do not believe the Germans will be able to obtain air superiority, and our land and sea defences are strong. I think most of us feel we would like the matter put to a test, and we are awaiting with impatience a German decision to make their gamblers’ throw.”