JAPAN AND INDO-CHINA.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 25 September 1940, Page 4

JAPAN AND INDO-CHINA.

TTVENTS have moved rapidly in Indo-China, in a way that was to some extent inevitable. There has never been any question, for instance, of the French forces in that territoiy offering by themselves very serious opposition to the Japanese naval, military and air forces. No doubt the status quo in Indo-China could have been maintained only with external support, which for the time being the United States alone was in a position to give. With the American Government electing to hold aloof, there was nothing to prevent Japan imposing her own terms on Indo-China, and this she has done or is doing.

News available at time of writing suggests that any resistance that has been or is still being offered to the Japanese is unauthorised. It is shown in any ease, that the French Government of Indo-China has entered into an agreement with Japan and is asking the people of the territory to accept this agreement. Some accompanying talk about the Japanese ■having undertaken to treat Indo-China as a friendly countiy evidently is not worth much. Indo-China has become for the time being a military province and outpost of Japan. Mention is made already of the use of airports being conceded to the invaders, but it seems clear in any ease that Japan is now in a position to make whatever military use she likes of the French Asiatic territory.

At best, this is a serious state of affairs. At a minimum, it means that Japan is now at liberty to open a new and probably damaging attack on China—an attack by way of the railway which runs from the coast, through northern Indo-China into the Chinese south-western province of Yunnan. This region' hitherto has been to the forces headed by General Chiang Kai-shek a reasonably secure stronghold and base, in which important war and other industries have been developed. The Chinese are now left to do what they can to defend themselves against attack through Indo-China. They are reported to have wrecked part of the railway and destroyed a frontier bridge, but the relief thus gained may not be more than temporary. It is true that the Chinese are reported to have built up and organised strong military forces, but they have not hitherto been able to resist for any great length of time concentrated attack by the Japanese iii a given area.

The full seriousness of the situation brought about by the Japanese occupation of Indo-China depends on factors which have yet to be accurately and dearly determined. One of these is American policy, and particularly the lengths to which the United States is prepared to go in tolerating an extension of Japanese aggression. Another factor concerns the ultimate intentions of Japan.

• As yet there has been no official confirmation of “authoritative reports” from Tokio, received at the end of last week by way of Shanghai, that Japan is prepared for a major crisis with America over Indo-China. These reports said that in view' of the statement of the American Secretary of State,'Mr Cordell Hull, regarding the maintenance of the status quo in IndoChina, American action “in the form of stiff embargoes” was anticipated. It was added, however, that:—

It is believed in Tokio that the Imperial conference (held recently in the Japanese capital) irrevocably decided on an immediate push to the south, including the Dutch East Indies. Then an attempt will be made to force the United States to lift the embargoes in return for tin and rubber from the Indies.

Japan has not yet officially proclaimed any intention of extending her aggression to "the Dutch East Indies, but it is a question whether the Japanese occupation of Indo-China can be reconciled with any more limited or less predatory intention. Recent reports have credited the Japanese with demanding naval as well as air bases in Indo-China. These bases could hardly be required for any other purpose than that of a “push to the south,” directed against the Dutch East Indies and possibly against other territories as well. Apart from its immediate effect, which is bad enough in itself, the latest Japanese aggression thus tends to raise serious questions relating to the security of Singapore and the British Pacific Dominions, and also, of course, to that of all holdings and interests of the European Powers and America in the Ear East.

Much as Britain’s preoccupation in Europe and other factors of the moment may seem to favour the predatory schemes of the Japanese militarists, there are other considerations which even in Japan may be expected to weigh heavily against the policy of unbridled and adventurous aggression involved in attempting to carry these schemes into effect. As matters stand, Japan is subjected to a heavy, if not exhausting military and economic strain in her war on China. The “push to the south” now suggested undoubtedly would bring her into collision, sooner or later, with the British Empire and probably with the United States as well. At the same time, on available information, Japan is far from being able to count confidently on continued peace with Russia. Taking account only of economic policy, talk of “stiff embargoes” is far from doing justice to the magnitude and effect of the economic weapon it is open to the United States to use against Japan. An American economic boycott would not only deprive Japan of essential war and industrial supplies, but would destroy well over a third of the external trade in which she is able to obtain foreign exchange and access to markets lor which she could find no alternative or substitute.