WAR TECHNIQUE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 3 September 1940, Page 7

WAR TECHNIQUE

GERMANY’S WHIRLWIND OFFENSIVE

EVOLUTION OF NEW METHODS. TANK FOR A TANK. The whirlwind offensive in the west was delivered by a combination of three arms, the bombing aeroplane, the tank, and the parachute, states "The Times." They swept through and over the Allied defences and by operating against communications and base units succeeded for a time in paralysing the organisation of the Allied Armies in those sectors which had been chosen for the attack. In view of these new methods, old ideas of defence in depth must be overhauled. It has been proved that a system of defences stretching back some five mile's behind no-man's-land fails to offer adequate protection against a determined onslaught pushed home without regard to loss.

The long-range and mobile artillery provided by the bombing aeroplane can strike at an objective far behind the old artillery area. Counter-bat-tery work, in the form of anti-aircraft gunnery, is necessarily cumbrous and loses much of its effectiveness in a time of swift movement, owing to the superior mobility of its target. It is difficult for fighters to counter the swift swoop of the single bomber. Their difficulties are increased by the destructive bombardment of airfields, which is the price that has to be paid for losing temporarily equality in the air. It seems unlikely that any system of defence against bombers operating in the field can be made wholly effective. The only effective counter-stroke consists in retaliation. If German bombers can partially paralyse the defence, it is evident that an equally strong Allied bomber force could do even more to dislocate the attack.

During the German advance from the Meuse to the Somme the tank, supported by the bomber, has played a brilliant role. The pitch to which its latent possibilities have been exploited must have surprised its most enthusiastic sponsors. Some time must elapse before it is possible to gain a clear picture of the methods used to overcome the formidable obstacles put in its path. But a few suggestions, based on the experience of previous trials, may come near the mark.

ANTI-TANK OBSTACLES. The most common type of anti-tank obstacle, which stretches all the way along the French frontier from Montmedy to the North Sea, is a deep ditch dug in zig-zag fashion. Its rear bank, facing the enemy, is revetted with stout wooden stakes that bar any farther advance. Each traverse of the ditch is commanded at either end by an anti-tank gun, the task of which is to disable any tank that may be held up on reaching the ditch. This type of obstacle has been tried and found wanting. Provided that the enemy is prepared to squander his resources, it is cleai' that a tank put out of action by either of the antitank guns effectively masks the passage of other tanks by interposing its bulk between the gun and its targets. Once the fire of the anti-tank guns loses its danger, the tank can set about the problem of crossing the ditch. Some carry plank bridges, which are set across the gap, and enable the tank to cross in safety. Others are accompanied by mobile infantry patrols armed with pencil-shaped dynamite charges that blow the stakes out of the ground and level the surface round them. In the case of the super-heavy tanks the usual obstacle is no obstacle at all. The monster passes over them without difficulty, doing tremendous damage to the ditch on the way.

All these methods are expensive. Germany must have lost hundreds of her armoured fighting vehicles at the first jump. But, once these initial losses are written off, the returns are rich. The tank moves out of the belt of territory adapted‘to repel it. and sets about its destructive task. It carries large supplies of spare parts, and gets its petrol from roadside pumps or military depots by holding up the guards and demanding service in gangster fashion. Tank columns have been known to cover more than 50 miles of hostile territory in a single day. It is clear that the defence in depth adopted by the Allied Armies was much too shallow to meet the new tank menace.

The third surprise of the German advance has been the parachute. Any tendency to regard this weapon as a freak expedient of no more than spectacular value must be discouraged. Although hundreds of parachutists have been rounded up in France, they have done great mischief in guiding bombing aeroplanes, supporting tank columns and in spreading unwarlike panic in back areas.

The experience of Rotterdam, where a number of large transport aeroplanes landed sufficient troops to hold the airfield for several days in the heart of enemy country, should also be taken to heart. For today defence in depth must reach back far behind the corps reserve line and cover the vital centres of the nation, the seat of its government, and the sources of its industrial power. WANT OF MATERIAL. The war in the west has shown that for many years the German people devoted its great powers of concentration to the study of warfare. It refused to be deterred by the partial paralysis of the offensive which occurred in the last war. and bent all its ingenuity and powers of organisation to finding the key to the trench deadlock. A new tank technique was developed as well as a new use for the bombing aeroplane in co-operation with land forces. Deep study was paid to entirely new departures, such as parachute infantry. The German method is wasteful, since it consists in the deliberate sacrifice of large numbers of tanks, warplanes, and trained men in a supreme effort to break the machine opposed to it. Such a technique can only be employed if large reserves are available to fill in the gaps that must occur. So far, the Germans have felt no embarrassment in that respect. They have poured material into every

breach of the Allied line, and have hurled it against forces ill-equipped to receive it. They can afford to do so. Not until war material is pouring from Allied factories in a far greater stream than we see today will Germany be forced to economise on the field of battle. The. question of supply ranks equally in importance with that of trained officers and men. It is common knowledge that both in the air and on land Germany has gained an advantage which must be reduced at all costs. The best defence against an aeroplane is another aeroplane; the best antitank weapon is another tank. We must have more of both before it is too late.