Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1940. HOME DEFENCE ORGANISATION.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 21 August 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 21, 1940. HOME DEFENCE ORGANISATION.

(COMPREHENSIVE plans of home defence organisation, as they were outlined broadly by the Prime Minister (Mr Fraser) in an address on Sunday evening, and have since been elaborated to some extent by the Minister of National Service (Mr Semple) should be assured of whole-hearted approval and support throughout the Dominion. It is obviously desirable that our total able-bodied population should be organised as completely as possible for defence and for the maintenance of essential industries and. services, in any emergency that may arise. A considerable amount of voluntary work now being carried out. notably that of numerous women’s organisations, will dovetail admirably into the national plans that are being shaped, but much detail remains to be filled in. The speed and efficiency with which it is filled in must depend primarily on the response that is made to the Government’s call to voluntary national service. “Here,” as the Prime Minister said, “is the opportunity for all to volunteer for national service.” The national emergency corps is to comprise the emergency precautions organisation, of which some sort of nucleus exists in a few local body areas, the Home Guard now to be established, the recently-formed 'Women’s War Service Auxiliary and any other approved body. Jt is certainly desirable that the emergency precautions organisation should be developed and built up throughout the Dominion for service at need in either war or peace. Many women’s organisations are already busily engaged in patriotic and other activities which no doubt will be extended readily as that is shown to be necessarv and desirable.

The organisation of the Home Guard obviously should proceed with all possible expedition. Of this body Air Fraser said I hat if would give men the opportunity to undergo physical training and drill in their own districts and that membership would be open to all males 16 years of age or over who were not actively attached to any of the Defence forces. Observing that, the duties of the Home Guard naturally would depend on circumstances, the Prime Minister added: —

One can realise how valuable it would be to have a body of men in addition to the Territorials who could, for example, provide guards, pickets, controls and sentries, or be called upon to take a part in coast-.watching. They could also aid in the transport of military forces, assist in the work of emergency precautions committees, and form a reserve from which the Territorial Force could be replenished. In an extreme emergency they would be embodied in the military forces, by proclamation, as a trained and fully armed body.

The factor governing the practicable rate of expansion and training of the Home Guard to the point thus indicated no doubt is the available supply of arms and other equipment. There is everything to be said, however, for giving what physical and other training is possible to the largest possible number of men in anticipation of the provision of weapons and other equipment. Available arms and equipment may be made to go a long way. It is not necessary, for instance, that every individual should be provided with a rifle in order that useful instruction in shooting may proceed. Particularly in its returned soldiers, the Dominion has available large numbers of men who are either qualified to act forthwith as instructors or could acquire the necessary qualifications in refresher courses.

Of necessity the plans outlined by the Prime Minister and his colleague are to some extent sketchy, but that the development of a strong home defence organisation is worthy of the best endeavours of men and women throughout the Dominion is not in question. More is to be heard on the subject in Masterion tomorrow when the Assistant Minister of National (Service, the Hon D. Wilson, is to meet representatives of Wairarapa local bodies, at the first of a series of meetings to be held in the North Island.

A LIMITED SACRIFICE.

jty[OST people, no doubt, are sorry that it has been deemed

advisable to abandon British Somaliland for the time being', and probably the event is regretted most of all by the troops, white and coloured and drawn from different parts of the Empire, who have given a gallant account of themselves during the last week or two in withstanding the invasion and inflicting heavy and disproportionate losses on the invaders. Tlie abandonment to an enemy of any territory is always and inevitably a matter of regret. At the same time there is every reason to believe that any loss of prestige Britain may suffer, whether in friendly or in enemy countries, on account of the withdrawal from Somaliland will be based upon a misconception of the facts.

Some of the British reports issued in the opening days of the Italian invasion no doubt conveyed an. impression that it was intended to defend and hold at least part of the territory. Whatever element of deception may have been embodied in these reports was fully explained and accounted for in the War Office communique published yesterday. It was decided, that statement showed, that the reinforcements needed to ensure the successful defence of Somaliland could be used more advantageously elsewhere and the policy adopted was “to remain with our small force, using it to inflict maximum losses on the enemy until withdrawal became inevitable.’’ Premature disclosure of that policy would have militated against its success and might have enabled the enemy to avoid the losses he has in fact suffered in effecting a barren conquest.

The fate of the war most certainly is not going to be decided in British Somaliland, nor, in spite of what Mussolini’s mouthpiece, Signor Gayda, has had to say on the subject, is there reason to believe that the Italians will derive any advantage whatever from the occupation of that territory. The “(Jiornale d’italia,” Signor Gayda’s paper, was quoted the other day as averring that besides giving Italy new economic resources and raising her prestige at the expense of Britain, the conquest of Somaliland would “give Italy a chance of freeing her vast front and bring nearer the Ita.lian threat, to the vital base at Aden.” This appears to be imaginative and unsupported specid at ion.

In occupying Somaliland, Italy has gained no new jumpingoff places of any importance for land, sea or a.ir operations. For what they are worth, she already had air bases in her own territory of Eritrea, not to mention French Somaliland, which is doubtless at her disposal, which are strategically well placed for an attack on Aden, and she is possessed also of African ports decidedly superior to Berbers. The position at present, however, is that Britain decisively holds the upper hand at sea and in the air in the Bed Sea and on its southern approaches, as she does in the Mediterranean. Italy’s naval craft have been driven into harbour—a number of her surface ships and submarines were attacked in Massawa the other day by British bombers—and she has been outfought iit. the air." Various developments are possible in Africa, but Italy has yel to show that she is capable of taking effective offensive action at any vital point. It is not even certain that she will venture to attempt an invasion of Egypt, from Libya, though it is then' if anywhere that she is faced by an objective worthy of her utmost endeavours. In British Somaliland, meantime, she has paid a price in l-ives and material and obtained remarkably little in exchange. In addition, the continued occupation of the territory of necessity will keep fairly strong forces in idleness. It remains true that the whole of her forces in her blast. African territories—estimated to number some 200,000 in all— are isolated from her army in Libya, the Sudan being interposed between them.