Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, JULY 29, 1940. AMERICA’S ECONOMIC WEAPON.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 July 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, JULY 29, 1940. AMERICA’S ECONOMIC WEAPON.

yyillLE Tokio is angrily and anxiously inquiring of the United States what its true intentions are regarding an embargo on the export of oil and scrap metals to Japan, President Roosevelt has stated blandly that “the licensing control order is designed to conserve United States resources tor national defence, especially high-quality aviation gasoline.” Further: “He insisted that it was not connected with the British acquiescence in the .Japanese demand lor the closing of the Burma Road.”

It is by no means clear that Japan will derive much comfort from these diplomatically-worded but unsubstantial assurances. A distinct suggestion to the contrary appears in a report that the President’s action is warmly welcomed in the United States, where it is seen to apply against Japan as well as Germany and Italy, and in the observation of the New York “Herald-Tribune” that Mr Roosevelt’s action shows that democracy can move with realism in the defence of its own interests. There is obvious force and point in the same paper’s reference to the “colossal anomaly of a nation preparing to conscript youth and spending millions for defence, while allowing its material resources to be exploited by the only Power against which defence is ever likely to be necessary.”

The possibility at least is clearly raised that the United States Government is intent on making purposeful use of the economic weapon against aggression both in Europe and in Asia. The development of the licensing or embargo system now taking shape has some bearing on the position in Europe, as may be seen*in the fact that two ships leaving the United States with oil for Spain have been stopped, but since these ships in any case would have had to reckon with the British blockade the new development *o£ American policy is more obviously and immediately important as it relates to the Far East.

Hitherto, while maintaining “its traditional policy in the Far East,” and therefore refusing to recognise Japan’s pretensions in China, the United States has at the same time been exporting tremendous quantities of war materials—oil, metals and other commodities —to Japan. It has been contended that without these supplies from the United States, Japan would not have been in a position to carry on her war against China and her developing attack on the trading and other rights of third Powers in that country. Made against this background, the recent protest of the American Secretary of State (Mr Cordell Hull) against the British agreement temporarily to close the Burma Road for the 'transit of war supplies to China wore an appearance of insincerity. If, however, the United States is prepared to make resolute use of the economic weapon against Japanese aggression, the outlook in the Far East may be transformed. That Japan is largely dependent on American supplies of essential war materials is a familiar fact and one that has long been the subject of criticism in the United States. It is stated, for instance, that Japan bought more than 2,000,000 tons of American scrap metal last year and had been heavily increasing her purchases in anticipation of an embargo. As to oil, disclosures that hundreds of thousands of barrels of that commodity left Californian ports during April and May last, to be stored in vast tank areas in Japan—and possibly to leak through Russia for the use of the Nazi war machine—have been arousing advocates of defence and opponents of aggression in the United States. During 1939, a recent report in the “Christian Science Monitor” stated, at least 16 million dollars’ worth of petroleum products from California flowed into Japan. Much of this impelled bombers on their missions of destruction over Chinese cities. Steel, copper, scrap iron, molybdenum and other war materials are also going to Japan and to the Russian port of Vladivostok. . . . The man in the street looks askance at American sale, under existing conditions, of the fuel that keeps Japan’s war chariot rolling. But . those who are interested in foreign commerce point out that Nippon and America are at peace, and that international trade, which labours under so many handicaps these days, should be maintained wherever possible./ • Reasons now appear for believing that the American Government and people are awakening to the shortcomings of the poliej 7 of facilitating and assisting aggression for the sake of trade. It is to be regretted only that the awakening has been somewhat belated. Account has still to be taken of the damaging use that Japan may be able to make of heavy stocks of war materials imported from the United States. In the economic weapon, however, the United States undoubtedly 7 has the means of imposing an ultimate cheek on Japanese aggression and also of assisting materially the British blockade of totalitarian aggressors in Europe. WAR IN THE AIR. PRINCIPALLY because there is no exact knowledge of the amount of air striking power Nazi Germany may be holding in reserve, the conflict of British and German air forces cannot yet be regarded as having entered a decisive stage. It is well established, however, that in the actual development of air warfare over an extended period the balance of advantage has turned heavily and decidedly against Germany. Whether the Nazis are capable in the immediate future of enlarging and intensifying their air attacks on Britain and on British shipping remains to be seen, but for many weeks past the Germans certainly have suffered far greater loss and damage in air warfare than they have been able to inflict. In upwards of a thousand bombing attacks on Germany and on German-occupied territory—attacks methodically planned and driven home with magnificent valour and skill—the British air forces have demonstrated how hollow was Marshal Goering’s boast that not a single British bomb would be. dropped on Germany. At, the same time the Nazis have been disappointed equally in their hopes of being able to make bombing attacks on Britain and to get away before any effective force could be concentrated against them. In attacks both on the United Kingdom and on shipping in the Channel and elsewhere, the loss of enemy machines has been heavy in proportion to the damage effected and altogether out of proportion to the loss of defending British machines. The facts obviously suggest that the enemy must expect to suffer proportionately increased losses in any intensified attacks he may attempt with increased forces.

Whatever the present relative strength in men and machines may be, Britain, backed by her Dominions and with the productive resources of the United States also to draw upon, no doubt is capable of a much greater rate of expansion than Germany can hope to attain, even when account is taken of additional resources the Nazis have gained in occupied territory. One important purpose achieved in the sustained and successful attacks of the. British air forces is that of-cutting down the enemy’s air striking power by the destructive bombing of such objectives as oil stores, aeroplane factories and aerodromes. Much of the air preparation of (he Empire, on the other hand, is being developed well beyond the range of enemy attack. One of the latest reminders of that fact is the news of the arrival in the United Kingdom of a Canadian air squadron trained ami equipped in every detail in the Northeim Dominion. Where attack on Britain and an attempt to blockade Britain by the use of air force are concerned, the outlook from I In* enemy’s standpoint is so far from promising as to suggest the probability that Hitler may seek some alternative method of extending his aggression, by action in the Mediterranean or elsewhere.