Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, JULY 27, 1940. COMPETITION IN THE BALKANS.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 27 July 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, JULY 27, 1940. COMPETITION IN THE BALKANS.

QFTEN as the reports of the German official news agency are to he mistrusted, there is probably at least a considerable element of truth in its statement that the visits of Balkan statesmen to Salzburg are “intended to regulate and stabilise conditions in South-Eastern Europe in a peaceful manner,” and that: “Economic questions will figure largely in the discussions.” There is much to support the view stated by neutral correspondents that Hitler’s principal desire at present, where the Balkans are concerned, is to secure an uninterrupted flow of foodstuffs and of war supplies, particularly Rumanian od.

It has to be recognised, too, that the Fuehrer is in some respects well placed to pursue these aims. Having Jost some territory to Russia, the rulers of Rumania have quite openly placed themselves in the hands of the Nazi dictatorship, no doubt hoping under that policy to be able to set some limits to the territorial concessions they are likely to be under Jhe necessity of making presently to Hungary and Bulgaria. The seizure of the assets of a large oil company owned by British and Dutch interests and the withdrawal from London ol an ambassador who has endeavoured consistently to build up friendship between his own country and the United Kingdom are in themselves pointed indications of the extent to which Rumania has fallen under the sway of the Nazis.

Although, however, the Nazi dictatorship is to an extent favoured by the circumstances of the. moment in the Balkans, it does not follow that it is able to count upon easy and assured continuing success in that region. A good deal has been said about the difficulties the- Nazis may experience in inducing Hungary and Bulgaria to modify or postpone their territorial claims on Rumania, but if only these small countries had to be reckoned with the German dictatorship no doubt would bring its problems in the Balkans to a speedy settlement. The much more important question raised and involved, however, is whether Germany can pursue her schemes of control and aggrandisement in' the Balkans without coming into collision with Russia.

There is no question of the Soviet Government thinking of any other interests than its own, in the Balkans or elsewhere, but, taking account only of those interests, it must be supposed thaUstalin and his colleagues have turned a jealous and perhaps an uneasy eye on the conferences between Nazi and Balkan representatives which.opened in. Salzburg yesterday. In spite of disclaimers, it is no doubt perceived quite as clearly in Moscow as in other parts of the world that if the Nazi dictatorship retains the power to engage in predatory aggression, an attack by it on Russia will be only a matter of time. That being so, every, development on the German side of the common frontier’on which the Reich and Russia now face one another nearly all the way across Europe inevitably is of great interest and concern to the chiefs of the Soviet State.

Naturally and not without reason, Stalin and his colleagues will examine the policy Germany is now developing in the Balkans from the point of view of the extent, to which it will help to prepare the way for an ultimate Nazi attack on Russia. Professing that her aims in South-Eastern Europe are entirely peaceful and that, she desires only to secure an uninterrupted flow of supplies, Germany is none the less obviously intent on bringing as many as possible of the Balkan States under hei controlling influence. She has achieved already a considerable measure, of success in the case ol Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and no doubt she hopes also, perhaps making some use of Italy as an instrument, to establish an effective domination over Yugoslavia.

It will be of considerable interest to note the manner in which Russia reacts to these developments, present and prospective. The recent policy of the Soviet, from the Baltic to the Balkans, is most easily understood as one of buffering the Russian frontier against ultimate German attack. This policy, has been developed successfully, at light cost, in the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, as well as in the absorption of the Baltic States. Having accomplished so much, will the Soviet be content to see German influence extended and consolidated over a great part of the Balkan Peninsula? It seems rather unlikely that Stalin and his colleagues will decide merely to hold what'they have and for the rest to play a purely passive and waiting part while Germany builds up her strength and influence in South-Eastern Europe. It is no doubt open to them, without of necessity precipitating an immediate military conflict, to use the. weapons of political influence and intrigue in such a way as to throw many obstacles in Germany’s path to overlordship in the Balkans. SAVAGERY FOR ITS OWN SAKE. TN spite of the lurid light that has been east so often on the bestial and destructive trend of Nazi mentality. it seems impossible to find any rational explanation of the- sinking of the French liner Meknes, while she was on her way from England to France, carrying nearly 1,300 Frenchmen who had decided to return home and lake no further part in the war. The ship was conspicuously marked and brilliantly lighted, so that there can have been no doubt as to her identity. There is no reason to suppose that this act of wholesale murder was. committed on their own responsibility by a party of homicidal maniacs constituting the crew of the German motor torpedoboat which first machine-gunned the liner, then fired on her with small cannon and finally sank her with a torpedo. As the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr Alexander) lias pointed out, the German High Command at first admitted responsibility for’the sinking, though in doing so it increased largely the tonnage of the unfortunate Meknes. It is only as a lame and belated second thought that the Germans have decided to say that “Alexander sank the Meknes in order to create antiGerman propaganda.’’

On the facts, the outrage seems to admit, of no other explanation than that in the eyes of the German High Command an opportunity to commit wholesale murder is valued above all other considerations. In this instance the desire to commit murder appears to have outweighed the desire for plunder which also characterises conspicuously the Nazi mentality. The Meknes was bound for France and on reaching that country the ship and all on board of her would have been at the mercy and disposal of the Nazis. Instead of awaiting her arrival, however, they chose Io destroy the ship in circumstances of atrocity which make an additional and dark stain even on their foul record. If their character and quality had never been revealed save in this single.deed, the Nazis would still be branded as something that must be destroyed if decent standards of hiimani'v are again to rule in the world.