UNWORTHY ATTACKS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 9 July 1940, Page 3

UNWORTHY ATTACKS

ON BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE REPLY TO CRITICISM IN FRANCE. SURVEY OF OPERATIONS IN FLANDERS. (British Official Wireless.) RUGBY. July 7. Recent statements made in high quarters in France, and doubtless inspired by Nazi influence, have displayed a regrettable tendency to indulge in recrimination regarding AngloFrench co-operation in the field and to belittle the work of the British Expeditionary Force in a way which most of their ccmrades-in-arms would certainly resent as strongly as anyone here. A senior officer of the B.E.F. referred to these unworthy attacks today in a Press interview, and strongly deprecated any similar recourse to re crimination on the British side. He pointed out that the information about a campaign the details of which are still very confused was not sufficiently complete for any measured judgment to be possible. This officer confined his remarks, therefore, to a clarification of the general character of the operations in which, between May. 19 and May 25. the French and British were seeking to arrest the German thrust to the sea. following the break through near Sedan, and an explanation of those aspects regarding which statements reflecting upon the honour of the B.E.F. have been put into circulation. When General Weygand took command on May 19 he was faced with the fact that the Meuse was crossed and the gap in the line which had been been made about May 12 was much enlarged and deepened to some 30 miles, and into it the Germans had poured some eight armoured divisions, and an unknown number of motorised infantry. By this time the B.E.F. had fallen back west of Brussels. It consisted of seven divisions in line and two in reserve. while improvised forces were holding bridgeheads, villages and towns. These improvised troops consisted of territorials who had been sent to do work on aerodromes but who were drawn into battle to protect the rear of the British right and also the rear of the right French army. EFFORT TO CLOSE GAP. This French army consisted of about eight divisions at that time, but these were in a state of considerable disorganisation, having fought their way back in the face of an attack which was probably heavier than that to which the B.E.F. had been subjected. On May 20. after consultation with General Ironside, who had come from London, it was decided that the B.E.F. should attack toward the south with two divisions, and this plan was agreed to by General Blanchard, who said that part of Hie first French army would be available to operate on the left flank of the British divisions. However, on tlie morning of May 21 the French Command said that their divisions could not be ready till next day. Time being of supreme importance, the British commander decided that the attack must proceed. An attacking force reached the first objective, which was to the south of Arras, and there met heavy opposition from the German infantry, and for the next two days fought where they stood. quite unsupported by the French. The Germans, however, had worked round tlie western flank, and it was decided to withdraw. The officer pointed out on May 23 all the British divisions were in the battle line and the Expeditionary Force had none in reserve, despite arrangements made witli the French and Belgians to take over a sufficient part of the line to release three British

divisions. which could, in three days, be built up as a reserve. These facts should be kept in mind in considering the subsequent operations—all the British divisions were engaged and therefore there were no reserves, and the only two which were available for further movement were those which had been fighting near Arras on May 22 and 23 without any French support and were withdrawn late on May 23 because they would otherwise have been surrounded. PLAN OF JOINT ATTACK. | On May 22, General Gillotte. who was in effective command of all the forces north of the gap. had a meeting with King Leopold and General Gort. when he outlined General Weygand’s plan, which has for a joint attack from the north of the gap by British and French forces contemporaneously with an attack from the south of the gap by French forces. General Gillotte was killed in a motor accident that night and General Blanchard took his place as chief co-ordinator of the Allied forces. On May 23 General Blanchard suggested that an attack southward by two British and three French divisions should be made on May 25. The only British divisions available being' those just withdrawn from near Arras, the British command said that the attach could not be macle before May 26. when these divisions would be reac’v again. However, by May 25 information of the Belgian reverses caused General Gort to send two divisions tc the Belgian front. When this order was given it was realised that the result would be that the French would not carry out an attack, as it was thought most unlikely that they would advance unless strongly supported by British troops. When Staff officers arrived at French headquarters to inform General Blanchard of the decision to send two divisions Io support the Belgians, the French general was found busy working out times for a withdrawal. The attack from the south, which was the other part of General Weygand’s plan, apparently never materialised. At the end of the time the B.E.F. was on an extended line of 75 miles, with the left flank in the air as a result of the Belgian capitulation. Even had General Weygand’s plan of attack from the north been put into operation and had an attack from the south matured, in the events which happened it is unlikely that the result, would have-been different. • General Weygand’s plan was admirable on paper but it came far too late.