RUSSIA’S LATEST TURN.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 11 June 1940, Page 4

RUSSIA’S LATEST TURN.

A QUESTION of some moment raised by Italy’s declaration of war concerns the possible reactions of Russia. The Soviet has taken occasion of late pointedly to warn Italy that any attempt on her part to engage in aggression in the Balkans would be met and resisted. An end has thus been made decisively of prospects supposed by some well-informed obsert e1 ’ 3 to have been raised of what the American journal Current History” has called “a three-power entente—aimed squarely at Britain —among Nazi,Germany Fascist Italy and Communist Russia.”

It is now clear that any hopes that were entertained of promoting an alliance on these lines have fallen to the ground, but the really interesting question raised concerns the view likely to be taken by Russia and some of the Balkan States of the Italian declaration of war. That the Duee will venture to defy the Soviet by making immediate war on, for example, Yugoslavia, seems most unlikely. He has declared expressly that he has no intention of extending the war into the Balkan Peninsula but much must depend upon whether Russia and the Balkan States are prepared to accept this assurance at its face value. Obviously any such acceptance would imply extreme credulity, for nothing can be more certain than that just as Nazi Germany is carrying .the policy of aggression to its practicable limits, with a complete disregard of specific guarantees and assurances given to many of the neutral States now invaded and subjugated, a Nazi-Fascist partnership would make every effort to do the same, as time and opportunity served. Tn other words, by standing aside while Italy assisted Germany to attack the Allies, Russia and the Balkan States would be assisting the Axis partners to prepare for later aggression in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Assuming that the matter appears in this light to Russia and the other States concerned —and it can hardly in reason appear in any other light—ltalian intervention in the war may have other results than those looked for by the Axis partners. The most momentous question here raised is whether the way is being opened in any degree to a new understanding between Russia and the Allies. Evidently the question is not one that can be answered out of hand and with complete assurance.

Serious obstacles to such an understanding have been raised by Russia’s participation in the partition of Poland and by her invasion of Finland and the peace terms imposed on that country. It should perhaps not be concluded finally that a measure of understanding between Russia and the Allies is impossible, but evidently it will not be attained easily.

A,t one time it was held strongly by considerable sections of British opinion that the Chamberlain Government had erred badly in not making an agreement with Russia which might have averted the subjugation of Czechoslovakia. An opinion that an opportunity had been thrown away of including Russia in a European peace front was greatly weakened, however, if it was not finally negatived, by the subsequent action of the Soviet against the Baltic States, Poland and Finland. A rather remarkable readjustment of ideas and of European factors would be needed now to enable the Allies and Russia to find a basis of co-operation. Presumably, however, it is with the object of seeking a basis at least of friendly understanding that Sir Stafford Cripps has gone to Moscow as British Ambassador and that a new French Ambassador has also gone to the Soviet capital.