CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 8 May 1940, Page 5

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE Mr Chamberlain on Events in Norway OPPOSITION LEADERS AND OTHERS CRITICAL ENLARGED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MR CHURCHILL Mr Chamberlain, in his statement in the House of Commons regarding the Norwegian campaign, began by pay ’ g tribute to the skill of the Havy and A. my in the wittoawa from Namsos and Andalsnes without loss, m spite of constant attack by 50 German bombers, Daventry reports. Th convoy was out of the range of our fighters and they had to depend on anti-aircraft fire from the escorting ships. » y did well net to lose more than one British and one Frenc destroyer. On land our forces had shown themselves, m for man, to be superior to the enemy. Mr Chamber-lain then referred to the shock caused by the news of our withdrawal from Southern Norway. He remm - ed the House that the expectations raised had never been justified by the statements of British ministers, but by reports emanating from Stockholm. The forces involved were not much more than a single division and its losses were not proportionately heavy. The Germans had far heavier losses in warships, planes, transports and men. The results were not to be assessed solely by losses on the spot. Our determination had been stiffened, Turkey remained unperturbed and the position in South-Eastern Europe was quieter since there was a more normal distribution of the Fleet in the Mediterranean. The reaction was more serious in Sweden than anywhere else. If Sweden decided for neutrality, he hoped that her neutrality would be impartial. Passing on to refer more particularly to the Norwegian campaign, Mr Chamberlain said he had not heard of any criticism of our decision to send forces to Narvik and he could only assume, that that move was approved. * Referring’ to criticism as to why the Government had sent an expedition to Trondheim when it knew from the beginning that Germany had local air superiority, Mr Chamberlain said they knew that an expedition in that area was one of risk. They could not pretend to foresee everything that had happened. The decision to attempt to take Trondheim was made after repeated appeals had been received from the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief to take Trondheim at all costs and it was decided unanimously to risk an expedition. Plans for a direct assault on Trondheim had been prepared and carefully considered. •" For a time it had seemed as if Trondheim might have been captured by the forces on land, but there were no demolitions in the lines of communications to delay the Germans except the destruction of two bridges which were blown up by a British party. Referring to the dispersal of the forces intended for Finland Mr Chamberlain pointed out that the Norwegians would not allow British forces to enter their ports to counter any German move. The adyance troops of the Finnish party had not been disbanded. He believed it was right to make the attempt they had in southern Norway and right to withdraw when it was clear that their plans would not succeed. Their plans failed.-because they could not secure aerodromes and because of the arrival of German reinforcements. He asked that there should be no hasty opinions about the results so far. The Germans had made certain gains and had paid a big price for them and it was too early to say where the balance lay. Other fronts might blaze up at several points and they had to be ready to meet any such attacks. Mr Chamberlain said he had endeavoured, in his speeches, to steer a middle course. It was a time, he said, to close our ranks. There was no division among Cabinet members. He had agreed to a new arrangement under which Mr Churchill was given special responsibility for military objectives from day to day. Mr Churchill would keep his post as First Lord of the Admiralty, but if it were found that holding both these posts was too much for him steps would be taken to relieve him. Mr Chamberlain added that he wanted the co-operation of all parties.