NAZI PROPAGANDA

Wairarapa Times-Age, 24 April 1940, Page 8

NAZI PROPAGANDA

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR ALLIED MORALE. STRAIN OF EXPECTATION. When a state of war was declared last September there were some people in this country who heaved a sigh of relief —not. heaven knows, because they desired war. but because doubt was resolved and the mind was composed for action, states the "Spectator." They realised that war as Herr Hitler understand:’, it had already been going on in Europe for at least a year, and now it had only come into the open with its more grim realities exposed. And yet. even today, after five months, it has not come fully into the open. The Allies have taken the initiative on their side in applying the full force of the naval blockade, but still await the military action which Hitler is expected to start, rind ho still keeps us guessing as to when or where his blow will be delivered; and more than that, he keeps all the neutrals guessing as to whether they are cast for the part of his next enemies, or whether they may continue to possess their souls as neutrals. None of us in the Allied countries doubts that the major battles will soon be joined, but the necessity of their coming does not alter the fact that for the first five months at least Herr Hitler has been waging a war similar to that which he was waging before —a so-called "war of nerves." It is not altogether surprising that he should cling tenaciously to this form of war since by means of it all his former victories were won. His method consisted, first in performing all the actions which indicated the will to war—the building up of armies, equipment and a national war economy and fostering among his people the belief that the use of force was a necessary and manly expression of national greatness. Next it consisted in frightening his victims, always with this advantage that his possible opponents disliked force whilst he was suitposed to have no such scruples. To us it seems ludicrous that, he and his propagandists should still think this sort of war efficacious after the Allies have accepted his challenge and. being al war, have no further throat to fear. Is it possible he still believes that he may achieve his ends by armed diplomacy, partly by wearing down his opponents’ will to victory by maintaining suspense, partly by spreading doubt and confusion in the minds of neutrals and inducing them to seek his peace? Or is the talk designed to promote a belief in greater strength than he actually possesses, to hearten his own people and dishearten ours? Hitler at least has never made the mistake of under-estimating Ihe psychological factors in war. Whether his psychology is good or bad is not the point, which is that he recognises

- its importance: Total war. as the word indicates, includes everything—- . men, equipment, organised industry . and finance, discipline, the economical application of brains, and morale. ; Morale, perhaps, first of all. since it . presupposes all the rest —for war pur- • poses it is the moral quality which is j manifested as courage, confidence, deI termination to win—and there can bo no determination to win without seeking the means, applying cleverness in planning, persistence in organisation, sacrifice in rejecting non-essentials. Morale rests on a stalo of mind. In, Germany this state of mind postulates a Fuehrer who is infallible and unconquerable and leads hi?, pcole, even if through tribulation, from one success to another. And since it must also rest on some general sense of the! rightness of theccausale —al least its rightness for Germany. Nazi propaganda has never ceased to appeal to the belief in the past wrongs of Ger- ! many, to the wickedness of her enomI ies. and to tier inevitable destiny to be the dominant Power in Europe. Since much of this belief is illusion, it has to be sustained by r: rigorous censorship and by intensive propaganda,. Totalitarian war in Germany gives pride of place to propa^atida — the propaganda which nt homo deludes | the people about realities and creates (.confidence in victory, and abroad aims pit magnifying the prestige of the | Reiph and weakening the morale of | actual or potential enemies. i On the Allied side the high morale jof the British and French people, 'manifest from the starl throughout | I their empires, ir. the factor which I | make:) us sure of victory. Here wo | have advantages denied to the enemy. We are not dependent on any Government to plead the rightness of our cause; it was the consciousness of its rightness originating in the minds of the people themselves which caused the Allies to accept the German challenge. To this belief was added confidence in our power to win. the second ingredient al' the Allied will to victory. Against this has been directed the Nazi offensive in the “war of nerves,” which, though per-! haps expected to have its greatest results among neutral:), has doubtless also been designed to weaken the will to victory by suspense—keying : us up to expectations of battle, now 1 in Holland and Belgium, now in Sweden and Not way, now in the Balkans. ' now with a “seer,'t. weapon," now with • all the imagined horrors al' mass war in the air, all the- more formidable be- ; cause not experienced but over about- i to-be. :

Offensives of litis kind tiro doubtless disturbing to some mind::, but obviously cannot deflect us a moment from our purpose in the war. We might suffer real harm from thorn if we played the enemy's game by exaggerating in the 'public mind the very idea which he wish.es to exaggerate—the terrific character of this or that impending blow which we are leaving to his initiative, say in an attack on the Low Countries, or in a mass attack from the air. Those who expatiate at length on ihe horrors of the impending war without fully explaining our own resisting and striking power are playing into Hitler’s

hands—they make themselves the instruments of iiis war on minds. Not that theer is any need of concealment —suppression of facts is almost as bad as panicky exaggeration. The morale on which the British will to victory depends lias no conn torpor I in Germany—it rests on confidence Hint the people know Ihe essential facts, have arrived at conclusions by free discussion, and arc behind the Government in the determination to pool all efforts in winning the war. The spirit of the team makes for victory, ft admits of no defections. The reply to the alarmists waging their war of nerves is not to dwell overmuch on the alarms, but m dissipate them by leadership and action, improve the organisation, and show how the defen-! sive is growing in strength, and how

the offensive, undertaken at our own time, will soon bo the preoccupation of die enemy, hi mini war our minds as wi ll ns our armies must take the offensive so that it is Hitler who is left, guessing how the resourceful French and Brilon:: intend to dispose of (he talkative mystery-mongers of Nazi Germany.