INVASION AND ECONOMY.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 22 April 1940, Page 4

INVASION AND ECONOMY.

FOSS of the food supplies she has hitherto obtained from Denmark—supplies for the. time being cut off completely by the German invasion of that country —is very far from being of negligible importance to Britain. Alternative supplies are or should bo available, from this country among others, but their transport will entail a greater call on shipping resources than.'while trade with Denmark met a part of Britain’s needs. ■Even here, however, there is a compensating factor. Between them, Denmark and Norway possess nearly six million tons 01. shipping. At any given time by far the greater proportion ol this tonnage is on the high seas. The bulk of the Danish and Norwegian merchant fleets will thus have escaped capture by the Nazis. No doubt most of, these ships, excluded meant inn l from their home ports, will find it convenient to take service with the Allies. Some of them are reported Io have done so already, and. the arrangement so obviously is mutually advantageous that it may be expected to extend on a considerable scale. Any gains that Germany derives from a policy of plunder and expropriation in Denmark seem likely, on the other hand, to be very short-lived. In normal circumstances, five-sixths of Denmark’s exports are of agricultural produce, bill these exports are only made possible by huge imports of fodder, fertilisers and other essential materials. As the position was summed up recently:— To produce 1,250 million kronen worth of agricultural produce, Denmark had to import 535 million kronen worth of raw materials to make her primary production possible. Without fodder brought across the North Sea, she cannot feed her 564,000 horses, her 3,180,000 cattle, or even her 28 million hens. Without fertilisers, she cannot continue her intensive factory methods of agriculture. As a leading Dane said last year: “If Germany marches into Denmark, our only surviving industry will be tanning —tanning the skins of our starved stock!" Germany herself cannot help in this regard, for she has been facing a domestic shortage of fodder for years, and her own flocks and herds have been dwindling. Il is another vital point that by invading Norway and Denmark, Germany lias cut herself off from all imports from Ihe United States and elsewhere which have reached her hitherto by Way of the Scandinavian countries. The amount of these imports is stated Io have been large, up to the time of the invasion, in spile of the Allied blockade. So far as economic factors are concerned, il is thus (dear that the balance of advantage, following on the invasion of Denmark and Norway, must turn heavily against Germany. Prior to its latest criminal enterprise, the Ileich was obtaining considerable quantities of imports from both Denmark and Norway, including some imports which came through these countries from furl her a field. The most important of all items in the latter category, though not by any means Hie only one, was of course Swedish iron. Germany will now obtain nothing from Norway and very little from Denmark, even if she is prepared to starve Hie people of that iinforl imale country. On Hie oilier hand il is likely that Britain will he able in great part to offset, the loss of food supplies from Denmark by hiring Danish and Norwegian ships.