Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 20, 1940. ON THE SCANDINAVIAN FRONT.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 20 April 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 20, 1940. ON THE SCANDINAVIAN FRONT.

TO nutnv people in this country and no doubt in other parts 1 of the world, the'land campaign, now taking shape in Norway is in most of its details extremely obscure. Apiut from tiie fact that reports on the operations as jet aie m ‘‘/y ' and in some instances of doubtful authenticity the natn Configuration of a great part of Norway does end i^ f to the development of a coherent campaign capable o be n understood easilv by non-expert onlookers from a distance. Most of ns must be content to learn from the disclosure ot events as they occur the precise significance of, for example, detelo}.inents like the latest landing of British troops at Namsos and ‘at other points. Some broad aspects of the position are apparent, J lowe '’ er ’ even to the uninstrncted layman. It already seems cleat that Nazi Germany is fighting at a heavy disadvantage on the iiet front that has been opened up by the invasion ol Norway, and that the Allies, on the other hand, are faced by opportunities which, if thev are turned as enterprisingly to account as thet have been thus far, may be expected to extend indefinitely. One aid to an understanding of the position is to bear in mind that the different areas in which fighting is m progress in Norway are to a great, extent isolated from one another. Except in Hie south, a large part of Norway consists ol uninhabited and unproductive mountains. As one writer put it recently:— The mountains in Norway come right down to the sea and most of the towns nestle on a narrow coastal strip with the houses, as at Bergen and Narvik perched on beetling hill sides Life in Norway, except in the southern aiea, fiom Sta vanger to the Swedish frontier, is concentrated on a narrow coastal belt. More than eighty per cent of the people ■- P along the coastline, and more than three-quarters of the total area of Norway is entirely unproductive. One most vital particular in which the invasion of Norwat has already cost Germany dear and will continue to do so while the British Navy holds command of the North Sea, is that ol supplies of iron, perhaps the most vital of all war materials. Germany is dependent principally upon the output ot Ihe ironfields in Northern Sweden. The only convenient and sufficient means of transporting ore from these mines to Germany throughout the year is by way ol the port of Narwk, in which enemy naval forces Were lately destroyed by the Britisli Navy. There is no available substitute of any importance for Hie Narvik route. No very large quantity of iron ore can be transported to Germany by the railways running Hie length of Sweden, and the Swedish port of Lulea, on the Gulf of Bothnia, which is connected by rail with the northern ironfields, is closed by ice except for a few months in the summer and autumn. It has been estimated that Germany can secure less,than two million tons of iron ore a year by the Lulea route and that she will have fourteen million tons of ore a year on her hands ■with no means of transporting it. Even as matters stand, there is thus a tremendous change—a change very much , lor the worse from the German standpoint—from the conditions recently existing in which Germany was able to secure cargoes of iron ore shipped from Narvik by way of Norwegian territorial waters. There is every likelihood that the German force now being attacked on the outskirts ol Narvik and between that point and Hie Swedish frontier, will speedily be eliminated. Already, in any case, Germany has lost the use of the neutral lane.' The Allied blockade extends to the coast of Norway. Germany’s principal forces in Norway are established in the southern territory, around Oslo, but her vital interests are in the north, and. she has no prospect whatever ol being able to take effective action in that quarter. The necessity of overcoming the whole of the German forces in Norway of course is clearly emphasised. Establishing a firm hold on any considerable part of the. country, Germany would acquire, amongst other things, air bast's Irom which she could attack Britain at comparatively short range. Stavanger, for example, is only about 300 miles distant Irom Scotland. It. Was no doubt part of the original German plan that the Norwegian fiords should be used as bases lor L-boats ami other commerce raiders and for naval action against the Allies. TTopes in that category appear to have been extinguished finally, however, by the destruction of a large part of the German Elect and by the extent to which the British Navy has mastered and now controls the entrances to the Baltic: A great deal of course depends on that control being perfected and made secure. Something must depend also on developments in Sweden —particularly the possibility or proliability of a German attack on that country and on the effectiveness of measures taken to repel the attack—and on the action or inaction of Russia. Taking account, however, ol the splendidly effective part that has been and is being played by the British Navy and Air Eorce and on the reasonable assumption that action at sea and in the air will be continued ' and will be followed up effectively in land operations, there is a great deal in the position and outlook’ to inspire confidence. The German forces in Norway to all appearance are isolated from effective reinforcement or supply, and the loss of essentia] iron supplies (though account of course Ims Io lie taken of reserves ami of some supplies still available) may be expected Io sei definite limits to the possible' extension of lhe period of the war. On these grounds and others, il is easy to agree with lhe London “Daily Telegraph” that on Hit' new front the outlook for the Germans is dark,