Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 13. 1940. RUSSIA AVOIDING RISKS?

Wairarapa Times-Age, 13 April 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 13. 1940. RUSSIA AVOIDING RISKS?

OBSERVING that Russia’s full connivance in the German invasion of Denmark and Nor Way had been announced by the Moscow Wireless Station, a London message yesterday added that a leading article published in the Izvestia was nro-German, but left Russia precisely where she was beioie, “and shows no disposition on her part io run risks in Germany s interests.’’ That Russia will refuse to take risks on behalf ot Germany or any other country may be believed very easily. That she will abstain, in the present disorder oi: world altans, from reaching out for her own supposed advantage is not so confidently to be taken for granted. It is possible that the .Soviet dictatorship may see prospects of advantage.to itself in a policy of further aggression in Northern Europe or m the opening up of a new field of conflict in the Balkans. Much as its attitude, in other respects may be cloaked in mystery, the administration headed by M. Stalin is' completely unscrupulous in foreign policy. The latest evidence on that point—in itself conclusive —. is the declaration of the controlled Soviet newspaper above quoted, the Izvestia,” that “the German occupation of Denmark and Norway was a necessary consequence of the Allies’ violation ol Norwegian neutrality.” The men who ordered the publication of that declaration are of course perfectly well aware that the invasion of Denmark and Norway had been planned and prepared by Nazi Germany long before the Allies took any step towards"closing the Norwegian corridor —the neutral territorial waters which Germany had been violating methodically and deliberately since the beginning of the war. In face of the demonstration afforded in this instance and in many others that Soviet foreign policy is insincere and unscrupulous, it is evidently necessary that a wary ei e should be kept on Russian tactics in Northern Europe and in other areas, notably the Balkans. As to the last, it was reported yesterday that large numbers of Soviet troops and reinforcements had arrived in the region of Odessa from the north —a threatening move which accounts very fully lor the. active defensive preparations that are being made in Rumania. Russia, it is true, has given explicit assurances that, she will not attack Rumania. The Soviet claims that it is entitled to recover from that country the province of Bessarabia, but in a speech delivered as recently as Ihe end of last month, the Soviet Foreign Minister, M. Molotov, said: “Russia does not intend to retake Bessarabia from Rumania, by war.” It has been recalled, however, that the Soviet attack on Finland was preceded by similar declarations. By people in Rumania and elsewhere .who desire nothing more than. to be left to live in peace, M. Molotov’s assurances on the subject ol Bessarabia are regarded with extreme scepticism. If there is a safeguarding element in the situation it is in the demonstration afforded in the Russo-Finnish war of the military and industrial inefficiency of the Soviet Union. In the opinion of many well-informed people, the poor showing that Russia made iii her attack on the tiny but resolute Finnish nation has made it clear that she is unfit to measure her strength against any Western Power. Apart, from the uninspired and blundering organisation and leadership ol the Russian forces, there is evidence that the Finnish campaign exposed serious weaknesses in Soviet industrial and transport organisation and gave rise, amongst other things, to serious problems of civilian food supply. A prudent desire to avoid a repetition of similar troubles on a creator scale may induce the Soviet Io abstain from intervening actively in the present war. On their record, however, bearing in mind the fate of the Baltic States, Poland and Finland, M. Stalin and his colleagues must be regarded as watching alertly for the chance of grasping at any advantage that is to be obtained cheaply. The greatest danger of all, where the Soviet dictatorship is concerned, will arise if the duration of the war is extended. The present rulers of Russia undoubtedly would he delighted to go to all practicable lengths in imposing their will on a weakened Western Europe. Touching on possibililies in this category, Mr W. 11. Chamberlin observed in a recent article in “Current Opinion” that the biggest prize of all, for Stalin, may prove lo be his quasi-ally, the Third Reich. Should the present war go against German (Mr Chamberlin observed) it is quite conceivable that the more extreme Nazis, rather than submit to another Versailles, would wipe out the remnants of the individualist system, and declare Germany a collectivist, or even a Communist, Republic. This is not a reasonable prospect in 1940. But it may well become a reality within two or three years. 11 must be hoped that this is an extreme estimate of possibilities, and lluil I here are forces in Germany capable of reconstructing Hie life of Hie nation to vastly belter effect Ilian Mr Chamberlin suggests. 'Phe Allies .'ire bound in any case, lo pursue unswervingly Iheir aim of making an end ol 11 ifl.ei'isin. 'l’he altitude and policy of Soviet Russia provides an additional incentive, if it were needed, however, for aiming not only al Hie immediate defeat of aggression, hut a! Hie creation of an international organisation capable of upholding and safeguarding peace.