THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1940. THE NEUTRALITY OF SWEDEN

Wairarapa Times-Age, 11 April 1940, Page 4

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1940. THE NEUTRALITY OF SWEDEN

ALTHOUGH she stands, geographically and in political relationships, almost at the storm-centre of the dramatic, events now shaking Northern Europe, Sweden thus iar has played an inconclusive part. A report that she had ordered a general mobilisation is denied, but to the denial is affixed an admission that “certain steps in regard to the country’s defence have been taken.” According to a radio announcement from Stockholm, Sweden is determined “to remain strictly neutral, with the right to take steps to fight to defend her neutrality.” This determination obviously is one that will not he carried out easily. There is no longer a safe middle course along which Sweden can hope to steer. Her choice manifestly is between becoming part, of Germany’s war organisation oi casting in her lot with those who are fighting to re-establish liberty and security in the world. Sweden cannot hope to repeat in Norway’s . ease the policy she pursued towards Finland —that of remaining neutral, but giving unofficial hell) to her invaded neighbour. Any attempt of that kind by Sweden 'pin doubt would make her an immediate target of German attack. Sweden admittedly is on the horns of a cruel dilemma. All her sympathies are completely with Norway and Denmark, as, indeed, they were with Finland, but she no doubt tears that in taking a bold stand in defence of her own independence and on behalf of her fellow-members of the Oslo group she might be making a useless sacrifice. On the other hand it- may be supposed that her leaders and people perceive clearly that a German victory would make an end of the independence of Sweden as well as of that of Norway and Denmark. The vileness of the Nazi aggression is nowhere emphasised more luridly than in the attack now made on Scandinavian countries which have broken with a warlike past io become, as the Leader of the Opposition in the British House of Commons (Mr C. R. Attlee) has called them, the most highly-civilised nations in Europe. Sweden has her full share, with the other Scandinavian States, both of warlike traditions of the past and of modern political and social achievements’which have made these States the admiration of the civilised world. With a fine record of peaceful achievement, to their credit, the four Oslo Powers, including emancipated Finland, have endeavoured as a group to stand aloof from the quarrels of their mighty neighbours. For Finland, Norway and Denmark, the outcome has been a lawless invasion of their territory—Denmark only escaping, by unconditional submission the horrors of war at impossible odds. Tn Sweden, as well as in other countries, it surely must, come to be recognised (hat the policy of passive neutrality has its definite limitations. On this subject some pertinent observations were made, during the course of the Russo-Finnish war. by the French Socialist leader, M. Loon Blum, who is assuredly no warmonger. Visualising a situation in which Sweden, having refused, passage to French and British troops to aid Finland, might bo attacked by Germany and ask' for Allied help, M. Blum added : — We touch here on the , real significance of this new kind of neutrality, which is in effect a sort of one-way security. The “complete neutral” owes no help to anybody, not even to his nearest neighbour, but if he himself is in danger belligerent Powers will be expected to come to his aid, either because his “neutrality” has been guaranteed or because the preservation of his independence is a vital interest to one of the belligerent groups. It is a disastrous conception which has more to do with the origin of this war than is widely suspected, and which, one hopes, will not survive this war. Redoubled weight is given to these contentions now that Norway is fighting for her own life and very justly may be regarded as fighting for Sweden’s life as Well. Swedish policy in the immediate future no doubt is likely to be influenced potently by the vigour and effect of Allied assistance given to Norway. At time of writing, the course of events on land and sea is incompletely defined, but there is every indication that the Allies are taking and will take most; purposeful action in helping Norway to defeat and repel the German invading forces. Success, or even successful progress in these efforts would give Sweden additional and excellent reasons for departing from her present policy and faking the only course in which she would have any hope of safeguarding her own future. TOTALITARIAN RIVALRIES ONE great question raised by the developments now taking shape in the Baltic concerns the probable effect of these developments on Russo-German relationships. It is something less than certain that German aggression in Ihe Baltic will permit, much less facilitate, a continuation of friendly co-opera-tion between the Soviet and Nazi dictatorships. Until now, all recent developments in the Baltic have been in Russia’s favour and to Germany’s detriment. This applied emphatically to tin 1 establishment of Soviet military control over the Baltic. States and the removal of Gorman minorities from those territories. In the partition of Poland, too, Germany to an extent played the part of Russia’s eatspaw. The invasion of Finland gave Russia some further advantages, though these were gained at a disconcerting cost in lives and material and at the cost, too, of an exposure of serious weaknesses in both the military and industrial organisation of the Soviet. On the whole the attack on Finland and its outcome have strengthened suspicions that the Russian dictatorship is intent, not only on extending its command of the Hallie as against Germany, but also on a further westward drive through Sweden ami Norway. The actual and projected constrnction ol new railways into and across Finland are highly suggestive from that standpoint. Whatever course it may now adopt, the Soviet thus lar has shown every inclination to gather in maximum profits al minimum cost —avoiding heavy war commitments. Late experience, including that of the Finnish campaign, lias gone to show that Russia is ill prepared for war and is not. in a position to give, in the immediate future, any very important economic assistance to Germany, if. indeed, she desires to do so. Al the same time, in spite of the present partnership between the two dictatorships, Soviet ambitions in I lie Bailie are more obviously ami more dangerously threatened by Germany than by any ether Power. Even should the Soviet now elect, to make common cause will: the Nazis, it does not by any means lollou’ that their alliance will rest bn a firm basis or will be maintained easily in stress of war.