Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 6, 1940. THE COURSE OF THE WAR

Wairarapa Times-Age, 6 April 1940, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, APRIL 6, 1940. THE COURSE OF THE WAR

J?ACTS which tire in themselves of cardinal importance, but which need to be considered in relation to others hardly if at all less important were touched upon by the British Prime Minister (Dlr Chamberlain) in the speech at the animal meeting of the United Kingdom Conservative Party which was reported yesterday—a speech in which Mi- Chamberlain declared that after seven months of war he felt ten times as confident of. victory as at the beginning. The British Prime Minister plainly was on firm ground when lie said: — Whatever reason Herr Hitler has for making no immediate endeavour to overwhelm us, one thing is certain —ho has missed the bus. Those seven months have enabled us to remove weaknesses and so enormously to add to our fighting strength that the future can be faced with calm confidence. It is not in doubt that any hopes Hitler and his associates formerly entertained of overwhelming the Allies by sudden military attack have faded progressively during the seven months of war. Relatively to the enemy, the Allies are farbetter prepared and far stronger than they were at the beginning of that period. Apart, for example, from all that lias been done in Hie organisation and arming of land, sen and air forces, there have been vital developments like the extension of. the Alaginot Line to the Channel coast of PTanee, around the frontiers of Luxembourg and Belgium. The most: formidable works of the Maginot. Line are to be found along the strip of frontier between the Rhine and the Moselle where France and Germany are in direct contact. Since the war began, however, the defences from the Moselle 1o the sea have been strengthened enormously. This does not. necessarily mean that the Allies would content themselves with a merely passive defence it the German attempted todrive through the Low Countries, but il does mean that a formidable additional obstacle has been raised Io the invasion of France. It may he claimed broadly that the- Allies are in every way much’ better placed than they were in the opening days of the war to repel any attack Germany may launch. It is a truth to be recognised, however, that the advantage derived from the strengthening of defences and the assembling of great forces meantime held inactive is largely negative. It is upon positive action rather than upon ability to withstand any attack made upon them that the Allies must rely if they are to overthrow the Hitler regime. This most, certainly does not mean that the Allies should be prepared to adopt the policy of lashing out at the enemy regardless of the cost in lives and in. other ways. Account has to be taken, however, of the possibility that the Nazi dictatorship, having admittedly, as Mr Chamberlain says, missed the bus where lightning war is concerned, may stake its remaining hopes upon the prolongation of a policy of limited action. The possibility has been suggested, and is worth considering, that Hitler may attempt to repeat in this war the tactics of the waiting game upon which he relied for some years in his ascent to political, mastery of the Reich. By his inaction during the years 1930 to 1933, Hitler antagonised some of his principal followers and sacrificed for the time a good deal of popular support, In the end, however, he achieved his aim with the- help of vested interests in industry and agriculture and by means of an intrigue with Von Papen and the late President Hindenburg. Some acute and well-informed observers are of opinion that it will be impossible for the Nazi dictatorship to continue delaying tactics in the- present war. A belief that Germany must strike with all her power or collapse is based upon the increasing effect of the Allied blockade and the consequent difficulty of maintaining the physical and moral strength of the German nation. If this estimate of the position and outlook should prove to be well-founded, Nazi Germany in the near future Will engage in desperate and forlorn-hope efforts for victory, and in doing so inevitably will enable the Allies to use their fighting power with maximum advantage. Should events take that course, heavy calls will be macle upon the fortitude and courage of the people of the Allied nations, civilians as well as combatants, but the problem to be solved will be simplified. Much more difficult problems Will arise if the Nazis are able to extend for any great length of time their present tactics of waiting and delay. To anticipate the enemy in launching frontal attacks on strong fortified lines would be suicidal folly and even attack by air on purely military objectives has its definite limitations. As to the contention that if there is a deadlock on the Western Front other fronts should be created, there is point in the following observations made recently by the military correspondent of the “Sydney MorningHerald”:— It is easy to win a war on paper, but the plain fact is that we cannot ci-eate fronts just where we want them, because we started the war to prevent that kind of thing. No other front can be created without a preliminary invasion of a neutral country by Germany or without prior action by the neutrals themselves, and we have the story of the last few weeks to convince us that no neutral desires to make his country a battlefield. It is, of course, incumbent on the Allies io pursue the war with nil possible energy and enterprise, but it is just as necessary that action should be taken only against objectives which may be attacked with reasonable hope of advantage. At a minimum, Ilie immediate future no doubt .will witness, with an intensification of the blockade, a rapidly rising tempo of air warfare, but, failing desperate action by the enemy, the Allies in a measure may have to play their own waiting game.

ATTACK BY IMITATION RATTIER amusing' developinenl of I he electoral campaigning' in the Uniled States in which Ihe Republican Party professedly is onf to overthrow both the New Peal and ils supporters is Hie publication of the Prank report —a document of one hundred printed pages prepared by a Republican policy committee of 200 members under the chairmanship of Dr (Henn Frank, former president of the University of Wisconsin, “to let the country know what the party stands for and what against.” A preliminary report was prepared by the committee on the eve of the. 1938 Congressional election, but w'as not made public. Republican candidates objected Io its publication on the ground that it might commit them to a line of action not in agreement with votes they had already east in lhe House or Senate. It was assumed that in any case lhe report would bo of much greater interest to the country al large on lhe eve of this year’s Presidential eleclion. Thai assumption appears Io have been well justified, though perhaps not solely on the grounds suggested. The surprising feature of the report is its failure to attack the New Deal or Io offer alternatives. Taken as a whole (a Washington correspondent observed not long ago) the report, a frankly partisan proposition, is an extraordinary document. For, instead of exploding a series of bombs under the Roosevelt regime, it in effect endorses every fundamental New Deal project. It would repeal a total of exactly one New Deal measure. That one is an Act of Congress extending the power of the President to monetary control. Even there a substitute is proposed under whhich a banking commission would be created with authority to “stabilise” the monetary system. There are some drastic proposals in Hie report, amongst them one that national expenditure should be cut by twenty per cent —lhe reduction to lake effect in 1912—but this is declared to be impracticable, Hie more so since lhe Prank commiHee makes defence and oilier proposals which would entail al least maintaining the present level of expenditure. On the whole, the report suggests that Hie Republicans propose Io open Hie political battle by stealing the armament of their enemies.