Wirarapa Times-Age MONDAY, APRIL 1, 1940. SOVIET WORDS AND DEEDS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 1 April 1940, Page 4

Wirarapa Times-Age MONDAY, APRIL 1, 1940. SOVIET WORDS AND DEEDS

r TF it could be accepted as having been made with sincerity, 1 the statement of the Soviet Premier and Foreign Minister (M. Molotov) that Russia is neutral in the war between the Allies and Germany and will not intervene in. a would go far to imply the maintenance of peace in tbe and also in Northern Europe. In itself, and m light of leeei developments of Soviet policy, however, M. Molotov s statement obviously is at best of doubtful meaning and value. _ Several 0 its passages, indeed, can hardly be read otherwise than as embodying definite threats of aggression. For example, the Soviet Minister warned Sweden and Norway that Russia “would not tolerate Hie proposed. Scandinavian defensive alliance, which was directed against Russia A genuinely defensive alliance, and there is no reason.to doubt that the proposed pact between Sweden, Norway and inland is in that category, is directed against nobody. As was observed in a recent message from Stockholm: “Russia s objection to the pact remains a mystery unless the Soviet Government regards a pact, against aggression as being directed against, itself.” Unfortunately there is no mystery in the mailer. The Russian attack on Finland was naked aggression and the objection now raised to the Scandinavian alliance can be taken to mean nothing else than that the Soviet is intent on further aggression against her smaller neighbours. This m itsel threatens an extension of the war, not only because Finland and the Scandinavian States may be expected to defend themselves against further attack, but because an attempt by Russia to extend her domination over these northern count)ns would constitute .a. threat to the Allies against which the} would be bound to take action. Already the Allies are faced “ by difficult problems on account of the weakness with which the Scandinavian countries are allowing Germany to violate their neutrality. It cannot be doubted that these problems would be intensified seriously if Russia succeeded in extending her domination over the Scandinavian States. M. Molotov was extremely ambiguous in his references io the position in South-Eastern Europe. lie said, for exam pie:— Soviet relations with Turkey and Iran are determined by treaties of non-aggression and we are resolved to fulfil our obligations. We have no pact of non-aggression with Rumania. This is to be explained by the unsettled controversy over Bessarabia. There is, however, no worsening of our relations with Rumania. Tn light of what has happened to Poland and to Finland, it may not be at all extravagant Io interpret these observations as implying that the Soviet intends to throw Rumania to the Nazi wolves, with the understanding that Russia shall take, in Bessarabia, her share of the body of the victim.

Something- entirely different, from M. Molotov’s speech, with its sinister suggestions and veiled threats, would be expected from the spokesman of a Power sincerely intent, on doing what is possible to prevent an extension of the war. It seems unlikely that Germany would venture to attack Rumania unless she were assured at least of Russian approval, but that, she will do so if assured of both the approval and support of Russia seems highly probable. Even il plans to that end are not already cut and dried, M. Molotov’s references to the subject no doubt will be regarded in Berlin as highly encouraging. The possibility is at least indicated, that the Soviet Government intends to play a mischief-making part in the war, alike' in Northern and in Sou th-Eastern Europe. It may ho supposed that the Russian dictators are intent primarily on extending their oWn power and influence and that they have no very deep or fervid feelings of friendship for Germany. This will not in itself prevent, them, however, from making use of their partnership with the Nazi dictatorship as a means of embarrassing the Allies and accentuating the military and other problems by which Britain and France are confronted. Against, the background of the treatment moled out by the Soviet to Poland and Finland and in light, of a speech like that delivered by M. Molotov to the Supreme Soviet Council, it is easy to assess the merits, or demerits, of the “ flands off Russia” policy proclaimed at the Easter conference of the Now South Wales Labour Party, but repudiated, it may bo hoped by the weight of Labour opinion, as well as by other sections of opinion, in Australia. No section, of opinion in Empire countries desires war with Russia if it can be avoided in honour and with safety. Russia, however, already stands convicted of ruthless aggression against small nations and there are good reasons at least for suspecting- that she contemplates further aggression. No true lover of liberty and democracy will in these circumstances raise his voice in favour of the “Hands off Russia” policy,