Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1940. FINNISH=SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 12 March 1940, Page 6

Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 1940. FINNISH=SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS.

QOME of the uncertainties surrounding the Kusso-Finmsh b situation were cleared up by yesterday’s announcement in Helsinki that a delegation headed bj the Prime S ister of Finland (M. Ryti) went to Moscow on Wednesday last, “to ascertain whether Polities a cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace It> uM be supposed that Finland would not have opened negotiations MU not Celt that. iprospo s ts of ~,£ resistance to the Russian invasion were doubtlul ot. veie tending to disappear. In view of, the magnificent , her forces against tremendous odds, the outlook foi Finland no doubt would have been entirely s p ’"£ sured of adequate help from outside For the deni, ot the measure of help needed, Norway and Sweden, in then dele mination to refuse a passage to Allied forces, must be■ he el responsible. There does not seem to be any question that, the Allies would gladly give Finland the help shemeeds it they had an effective means of reaching her territory.

In their present policy and particularly in their refusal of a passage for Allied troops into Finland, it may appear that Norway and Sweden are 'playing directly into the hands of the totalitarian aggressors. Indeed, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that, through fear, they are in a measure doin<>’ this. It must also be supposed, however, that. they vUI still'endeavour to safeguard their own vital interests to the greatest extent possible and that on that account they will not be content, completely to abandon Binland.

Putting the matter on no higher ground, the Scandinavian States would be very foolish to betray Finland because they could not do that without expecting to share her disaster At the same time, apart from the sympathy with which Finland is regarded—a sympathy intensified by her heroic resistance to invasion—it is essential to the interests of the Allies that the independence of Finland and that of the Scandinavian States should be maintained. If the overthrow of Finland ami its absorption by the Soviet, were followed by an invasion ol Sweden and Norway, and perhaps the partitioning of these countries by Russia and Germany, new fronts of attack would be opened on North Atlantic and other sea communications on which both Britain and France are vitally dependent—Britain much more than France.

These dangers to Norway and Sweden and to the Allies hinge directly on the fate of Finland. Assuming therefore, that Ihe''Scandinavian States have finally determined not to grant a passage to the Allied troops which might enable Finland to repel the Russian invasion, far-reaching importance evidently attaches Io the question whether Finland has any hope of securing terms of peace which would ensure her continued existence and independence. In the absence of dependable international guarantees it seems hardly possible that Finland can he safeguarded Io that extent.

A direct, agreement, with Russia, whatever its ostensible terms, obviously in itself will give Finland little security. II the present negotiations are allowed to run their course tin 1 Soviet certainly will not be content, with less than a considerable tract of Karelian territory and bases giving it land and naval command ol' Ihe Gulf of Finland. Thus st ripped of her covering defences, Finland, in the absence of effective international guarantees, would be at Russia’s mercy, even if for Hie lime being she nominally retained her independence.

The Soviet '.would then be well placed to repeal against Finland al leisure the tactics Nazi Germany employed against Austria and Czechoslovakia. If has Io be remembered that the Soviet at present is supporting a bogus ami puppet government in lhe Finnish border town of Teri.joki ami professes to regard it as the legitimate government of Finland.

Il thus appears that the next question to be determined concerns less the precise terms lhe Soviet is prepared Io oiler to Finland Ilian wlielher practicable means are available of maintaining lhe continued imlepcmlent existence ol h’iulami. A promising step in that direct ion might he taken il Sweden and Norway guaranteed Finnish independence ami accepted Hie backing of Hie Allies in support of their guarantee. Whether a compound guaranlee on lhese lines is practicable, in view ol lhe present altitude ol' lhe two Scandinavian Stales is, how ever, at best a somewhat open question. The position ami out look are made still more critical by the latest rep.mis in hand al time of writing—reports that the uegoliat ions in .Moscow are likely to lai)