FUEL HANDICAP

Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 March 1940, Page 3

FUEL HANDICAP

GERMANY’S BIG PROBLEM LIMIT TO SYNTHETIC PRODUCTION. SUPPLIES FROM RUMANIA. An English authority. Mr IT. J. A. Wilson, in the January issue of the new aviation journal "Aeronautics.” discusses from new angles the question of Germany’s fuel supplies. He concludes that even if Germany secures the rights—by forces—to. the full output of Rumanian wells, negotiates for all sin-phis Russian oil. and develops synthetic production to its practicable limit, she would still be below wartime requirements, mainly because of extreme difficulties of I transport of Rumanian and Russian petrol and oils. j German consumption is based on I three sources: (1) Imports; (2) synthetic production from coal; and (3) I crude oil production. As there arc only very few figures available for 1939 those for 1938 are given; the 1939 statistics available arc given in parentheses. German oil consumption in 1938 amounted to 6,627,000 tons, of which 4,971.000 tons 12.623,000 tons during the first six months of 1939) had to be imported. Principal suppliers were Venezuela. Mexico. U.S.A., Rumania, smaller quantities were imported from the Netherlands East Indies. Iran. Peru, and Russia (4000 tons during the first six months of 1939). With the exception of Rumania all those imports have been stopped by the swift action of the British Fleet. NO SOLUTION. Synthetic production of oil from coal amounted to 2,100.000 tons in 1939; the product, a light fuel, is of 75 octanes and mainly reserved for the use of the German Air Force. How much the synthetic production could be increased can hardly be calculated; in any case il cannot become great enough to cover Germany's wartime consumption.

If we assume that Germany's war consumption will amount to between 12,500,000 and 15,000.000 tons a year—consumption during the Polish campnign is given as over 1.000,000 tons — and further consider that for the extraction of one ton of fuel 4.5 tons of coal are required, the amount of coal to be brought to bank only for fuel production is approximately G 0.000.000 tons a year. The amount of additional labour in coal mines only for this purpose would amount to approximately 110.000 men. while Iho number of additional workers in the extraction plants would bo between 65.000 and 70,000. Furthermore, large numbers of workers will bo required for the erection of these plants. It is doubtful whether Germany commands this additional labour force or the raw materials foi' this purpose. Fuel production from crude oil amounted to 552.000 tons in 1938 from which mainly lubricants are derived. In spite of great effort no new wells I have been discovered from which 1 larger outputs could be expected.

RESERVES NOT LARGE. Expert opinion is divided in regard to the quantity of reserves. Stocks from official imports can only be small if German consumption, production. and import statistics during the last years are correct. But there is hardly any reason to assume that these statistics are not correct: as to overstating the consumption figures it

must not be overlooked that alone the number of private vehicles in Germany amounted to almost 3,500,000. not to speak- of the numerous light and heavy military vehicles. That (ho actual figures for home production and imports have been greater than those published by the German authorities is hardly believable. As to the home production, published figures might have been greater than the actual ones duo to Germans’ love for record figures and to prove the economic achievements of iho regime; regarding the official imports of oil into Germany figures can be proved by comparing them with the exports from oil-pro-ducing countries. The difference between these figures is not large enough for greater stocks. Unquestionably, considerable quantities of oil. imported on Government orders, have never been published. There is a least one order which became known not long ago by which the German Government acquired approximately 2,000.000 tons of oil in exchange for a number of tankers, built in German shipyards. Bui it is doubtful whether these stocks, which are estimated at 3.000.000 tons, are large enough to guarantee a continuous supply for the fighting forces and ■especially for industry for a long period. RUSSIAN OIL. As suppliers from overseas can no longer reach Germany, she has io look for Continental suppliers. There are two: Russia and Rumania, from both of whom Germany hopes lo obtain sufficient quantities. Russia's oil production amounted—according to the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,” Berlin, May 4. 1939 —to approximately 30.000,000 tons in 1938, of which onlv 2.500.000 tons were available for export. Russia’s mobilisation of her Western army, resulting in a considerably larger consumption of oil. would not allow exportation' of greater quantities, even if her production could be increased, or her transport problem could be solved. But even the Russians do not think that production could be increased much in the near future as they have taken up the synthetic production of fuel.

But even if Russia were to' export oil to Germany, the question will arise how Germany is going to pay for these quantities. Her foreign exchange and gold fund is too small to allow the purchase of greater quantities. On the other hand barter agreements with Russia are out of the question as the goods required by Russia in exchange for raw materials are either arms or machines, both of which, and especially the raw material for their construction. Germany needs badly in her present struggle. RUMANIAN OIL OUTPUT. German military writers have often stressed the importance of the Rumanian oil fields in case of Germany being compelled to fight. Rumanian crude oil production in 1938 amounted to 6,603.000 tons, showing a decline of 2.200,000 tons since 1936. Production during the first six months of 1939 amounted to 3.099.789 lons. It is wrong to assume that this decline in output was caused by the exhaustion of the Rumanian oil wells. The real reason can be found in the fact that the industry, because of the lack of proper mining regulations, did not invest large amounts for boring hew wells. If Germany were able to command the complete present Rumanian production she would not obtain quantities large enough to keep her military and industrial war machine working at full capacity. But the quantities al her disposal would be sufficient to overcome many of her today’s deficiencies. Again the trans-

portation problem has to be solved beforehand. In peacetime 37 per cent of Rumanian exports to Germany were transported by ship from Constantza to Hamburg... This route is closed. Seven and a half per cent were transported by rail; lack of rolling stock makes a considerable increase irnposJ sible. The remaining 55 per cent were shipped on the Danube, from Giurgiu to Regensburg, a distance of 1170 miles. The Danubian States (including Germany) command a fleet of about 300 tankers and oil barges totalling 220.000 tons. Il is estimated that present transport capacity on the Danube amounts to only 1,000.000 tons a year (first eight months of 1939, 478,899 tons); the river is not navigable during three months. It is doubtful whether Germany will succeed ‘in increasing today's (anker fleet to such an exlent that the toial Rumanian yield could be brought into (ho Reich during the remaining nine months. Fuels of a higher octane number than 90 wore not produced in Germany before the outbreak of hostilities in quantities worth mentioning. Dr Gustav Egloff, the eminent American oil expert, has come to the following conclusion: "Not the guns of France and Great Britain, but the ’knocking of her airplane motors will toll the doom of Germany in this war. Germany has pi'incipall.v ihe gasoline she obtailns from coal, a product which not only dimishes the speed and carrying power of ’planes, but cuts down their life span."