ITALY’S OPPORTUNISM

Wairarapa Times-Age, 2 January 1940, Page 4

ITALY’S OPPORTUNISM

TN the extent to which it has thus far developed, Italian ' policy with reference to the war is summed up as one which will permit of a move in either ol two directions' suppoit ol Germany or support of the Allies. It is not in doubt that, as one who has sought to glorify war and has affirmed the necessity for political expansion, Signor Mussolini would welcome the opportunity of throwing in his 10l with either side if he deemed it to’be assured of victory. The altitude thus far of the Italian dictatorship was summed up reeenlly bv an American writer (Mr Livingston Hartley) as one of watchful and calculating caution. Italy, he observed, must move very carefully towards war. because she is so vulnerable An early entrance on either side, before the outcome was clearly apparent, might lead to serious disaster, such as a collapse of the home front under the attrition of Allied sea power, or another Caporetto before an assault from the Alps. The Italians know from their experience that an ally who must be supported in war is liable to have little voice in the terms of peace. . . . Already there is evidence of manoeuvring towards a position which will permit a move in either direction. Rome supported Hitler’s peace drive because its success would bring her some concessions without any danger. But simultaneously she swunP carefully away from the role of German ally to a place in the middle of the road—possibly even further away than that Care is imposed not only by fear of Berlin, but also by fear of the effect on Mussolini’s prestige of too rapid a swing from his disastrous Axis policy. Even will) these, considerations ruling, the weakening ol the Axis alliance has been emphasised positively in the attacks on Russia made by the controlled Italian Press attacks which evidently cannot be palatable to the Nazi dictatorship. It may be hoped that. Italian sentiment will turn more and more definitely against both Germany and Russia even if it should prove that the Allies are by no means prepared io pay a price that would be agreeable to Mussolini for Italian support at a later stage of the war,