MECHANISED WARFARE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 12 December 1939, Page 4

MECHANISED WARFARE

GERMANY’S LACK OF PETROL. The spectacular success of the German armed forces in Poland was rightly regarded as a triumph for the new motorised methods of war. The whole campaign was finished in a month. Recent reports suggest that the advance was not as triumphant as the Germans claimed. The air losses were substantial; the tanks suffered more casualties than had been expected; and there were more breakdowns and technical set-backs than the High Command cared to admit. Nevertheless, the success of their motorised forces was impressive. Germany, however, must be at a greater disadvantage in motorised warfare than in the old-fashioned kind where the weight of manpower was decisive. The chief disadvantage comes from the need of petrol. In 1936, the “Deutsche Wehr.” the organ of the Nazi wing of the German General Staff, estimated that the petrol and oil requirements of the army alone would be 5,500,000 tons a year in wartime. This is slightly less than the total peace-time consumption of Greater Germany. If to this is added the amounts required for the Air Force, the. U-boats, raiders, and ordinary civil transport, it is evident that in wartime Germany requires between twice and thrice as much as she consumes in peacetime. After the most energetic possible development of oil-from-coal processes, Germany has to import twothirds even of her peacetime needs. Rubber is another serious weakness. The German High Command must expect tremendous destruction of motor vehicles, rs lines of communication are under continuous fire. But apart from synthetic production, which satisfies only about one-fifth of the' peacetime demand, the .German Army will have to rely entirely upon reclaimed rubber. Already Field-Marshal Goering has comrqandeered the tyres of all motor vehicles which are not directly required for national service, and this suggests that the Nazis have been forced to start consuming their reserves. In the personnel for motorised warfare, moreover, Germany is at a serious disadvantage. Ultimately, even if materials are equally available for both sides, the relative strength depends upon the number of drivers and mechanics, and the scale of the motor industries. At the end of last year there were 2,542,000 motor vehicles in use in Britain and 2.461,000 in France, compared with 1,773,000 in Greater Germany. In other words, in Britain and France there is one motor-vehicle for every 44. In production, the Allies outnumber Germany by two to one.