UNLIKELY ON WESTERN FRONT

Wairarapa Times-Age, 16 October 1939, Page 5

UNLIKELY ON WESTERN FRONT

American Correspondent’s Survey FACTORS HEAVILY ADVERSE TO NAZIS INITIAL ATTACK ON POLAND SEEN AS BLUNDER (By Telegraph—Press Association— Copyright.) NEW YORK, October 14. The situation on the Rhine anti the Moselle is such that the question is not will the Germans engage in a general batt e, but can they do so with reasonable hope of success? says, the “New York Times’’ correspondent, Mr Archambault,, in a message from Paris. A competent French reply is in the negative. The reasons can be summarised as follows: 1. Strategic. Because of the uncertainty of British and French action, the Germans made an initial blunder by attacking Poland, which was a weaker opponent, giving the stronger opponents time to mobilise. A concentrated lightning attack against France, instead of Poland,' might have altered the situation entirely. Now, instead of entering the west overwhelmingly.superior, the day can be sighted when the Germans may be inferior. 2. Manpower. Hitherto the British and French losses have been'negligible. It is believed that the German casualties in Poland represent a rifle strength of twelve divisions. Germany s maximum force available for the Western Front is estimated at 100 divisions, apart from armoured cars, and an actual striking force of 50 to 00 divisions, whereas the Kaiser had 120 divisions initially. 3. Possible zones of action. The possibilities’ are an offensive use of man-power in a limited attack on the Rhine-Moselle front, an attack on the line between Lauterburg and the Swiss frontier, or an attack through neutral countries, ’who are mobilised and are .all stronger than in 1914. Mr Archambault adds that a frontal attack on the Maginot Line would be most costly and probaby inconclusive. A Blitzkrieg (lightning war) was predicted on preponderance of material, but the Polish campaign has reduced the preponderance and also the proportion of German raw materials, which, coupled with transportation difficulties, leads technicians to estimate that each German combatant will require from ten to twelve employed in the rear, compared with the Allies’ requirement of from five to seven. 4. Aviation. The French are most gratified <lt the excellence of their planes, the Curtiss-Morane being fully equal to the Messerschmidt. The war life of a plane is very brief, and six replacements are needed annually. It is doubted if Germany is in a position to maintain her air strength. Her war needs are six thousand planes, estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 tons annually. It is doubted if the German stocks can stand tire strain. 5. -Transportation. Germany railway reports show a lamentable picture, with unrepaired lines and a dearth of rolling stock.