Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1939. RUSSIA’S NEW NEUTRALITY.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 19 September 1939, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1939. RUSSIA’S NEW NEUTRALITY.

♦ WIDE possibilities, some of them carrying a suggestion of extreme menace, are opened up by the events leportec yesterday—the invasion of a large part of Eastern Poland y Russian troops. The Polish official view of the matter is that the Soviet is making an unprovoked attack on Poland m flagrant violation of the non-aggression pacts into which the two countries have entered. Arriving at the same conclusion, the Allied democracies presumably would be bound to class Russia with Nazi Germany as an aggressor who ought m justice to be resisted at all costs. The only question then to be determined would be whether an attempt to defend 1 Oland against both German and Russian aggression could be regal dec from the standpoint of the Allies as practicable.

At present Poland is to all appearance on the point of military collapse, though the Allies are fighting on her beha ’ and are pledged to continue the war until the wrong Germany has done her is righted. Are they now to pledge themselves to make war on both Germany and Russia until Poland is re-established in independent integrity? Taking account ot the fact that Russia is credited with being by far the sti onges military power in Europe, and that Poland is a State lying along her frontiers, the question of fighting both Russia and Germany with a view to the ultimate restoration of Polish independence evidently calls for very serious consideration. The point has hardly been reached, however, at which this question is imminently raised. While official representatives of Poland maintain that Russia has committed a flagrant act of aggression, the Soviet Premier and Foreign Minister (M. Molotov) has contended, in the broadcast address reported yesterday, that action has been taken by Russia on sufficient grounds and in a Note addressed to all the countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations, the Soviet has declared that it will pursue a policy of neutrality towards these countlies. M. Molotov’s leading'argument is that the Polish State for practical purposes no’ longer exists and that in these circumstances Russia’s treaties with Poland have ceased to have any significance. These contentions are denounced by the Polish Embassy in London as a pretext unworthy of discussion. They are in fact, however, much more than a pretext just how much more is likely to appear clearly in the immediate future. Whether there is or is not any justification for the action taken by the Soviet, it appears to be the simple fact that the Polish State either has collapsed for the time being or is on the point of doing so. It also seems likely that the possibility of reestablishing the Polish State in its recent scope and character may come to be regarded as definitely open to question. A good many people may disbelieve or look with profound scepticism on M. Molotov’s declaration that the Soviet Governjnent is willing to help the Polish people to escape from the catastrophe into which-they have been plunged through the adventurous and unseruplous policy of their Government” as well as to “extend a fraternal hand of assistance” to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations. There is much to support the view, expressed by Mr Boris Shub in an article in “Current History” that Russia’s recent diplomatic moves are dictated primarily by national self-interest. Mr Shub observes that, unlike Lenin, to whom nationality was nothing and the dream of an international dictatorship of the proletariat was everything, Stalin, during bis twelve years of dictatorship, has done everything within his power to regenerate the springs of Russian national patriotism. “This,” says Mr Shub, “is the atmosphere within which Stalin’s foreign policy is unfolding, and this is the background which makes that policy comprehensible.” Anticipating events that have since taken shape, Mr Shub wrote: — To the international Communist movement, Russian understanding with Germany would constitute a death-blow, because the propaganda machinery of the Comintern has been geared for years as an anti-Fascist force. From the standpoint of Russian national security, however, the manoeuvre is not with justification.

According to her official spokesman, Russia has preferred an understanding' with Germany to one with Britain under which Russia might have been left to withstand Germany while Britain held aloof. This, justified or not, is the Soviet interpretation of the British refusal to guarantee the Baltic States against their will. The complexity of the position now reached is as obvious as are the dangers it holds. Diplomatically, Russia has turned away from the democracies and towards Germany. At the same lime, her invasion of Poland no doubt, is inspired in part, by a determination to establish safeguards against Germany’s eastward drive. Serious account, of course, has to be taken of Russia’s policy, not only in Europe, but in the Far East. It is clear that the Soviet dictatorship is intent on pursuing a policy of national self-interest, but as to the lines on which that policy is likely to develop, in Poland and elsewhere, a great deal is still left to the imagination. The one thing fairly obvious meantime is that the situation created by the Russian invasion of Eastern Poland cannot well be dealt with by precipitate action on the part of the Allied democracies. Even should the outcome be a cold-blooded agreement between the Soviet and Germany once again to partition Poland, the Allies would have in reason to assure themselves that practicable methods of redress existed before they committed themselves to an effort to right the wrong'.